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Foreword 
 
 
New media and their related communication systems are no longer “new.” 
They survived the introduction period in the later half of the 1990s and the 
shakeout at the turn of the twenty-first century; they are now developing, 
maturing, and playing increasingly competitive roles in the media landscape. 
Financiers, audiences, advertisers and sponsors, and media firms are gaining an 
understanding of the uses and opportunities presented by these “new economy” 
technologies. 
This book focuses on developments in new media firms, effects on 
traditional media firms, and emerging issues involving these media. It contains 
chapters based on selected papers from the workshop, “The ‘New Economy’ 
Comes of Age: Growth and Dynamics of Maturing New Media Companies” 
sponsored by the Media Management and Transformation Centre of Jönköping 
International Business School on 12-13 November 2004. The purpose of the 
workshop was to seek assessments and evaluations of firms in the new economy 
in order to comprehend their scope and activities, enable discussions of their 
status and future, explore implications for policy making, and spark new 
research on issues involved. 
The new economy has implications not only for the macro-economy but 
also for the management, marketing and financing of the companies. 
Presentations at the workshop focused on questions central to the new economy 
debate, such as organizational change in maturing new media companies, 
challenges of growth in adolescent firms, changing leadership and managerial 
needs in growing and maturing firms, internationalization of small and medium 
new media firms, investments in new media firms. They explored changes in 
the new media environment, markets, products, and business practices and how 
firms have adapted to those changes as they have matured and gained consumer 
acceptance. The chapters in this volume reveal a great deal about new media 
firms and technologies and how they are now creating niches within media and 
communication activities that are providing them competitive spaces in which 
to further develop and succeed. 
The volume was edited by Cinzia dal Zotto, research manager of and a post-
doctoral fellow at the Media Management and Transformation Centre. 
 
 
Prof. Robert G. Picard, Director 
Media Management and Transformation Centre 
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Introduction  
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 3 
What is the New Economy?  
Cinzia dal Zotto 
 
The widespread usage of the term “new economy” evokes the impression of a 
general consensus among the economists using it. However, this term means 
different things to different people and therefore there is no common definition 
(Bosworth & Tripplet, 2000). Usually the search for a definition brings to 
broad descriptions of the character and main qualities of the new economy. In 
many cases, these descriptions are not more than a general characterization of 
the macroeconomic performance of the U.S. in the 1990s. According to the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis the new economy is described as the expansion of 
the U.S. economy in the 1990s, characterized by its unprecedented length, 
strong growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita GDP, 
higher rates of investment as well as low inflation and unemployment 
(Fraumeni & Landefeld, 2000). Driving forces of this phenomenon have been 
identified as the impact of globalization, the intensified international 
competition and the impact of technological innovation over the last decades 
which led to a general improvement in long-run productivity growth (Davies, 
et al., 2000).  
Some authors have tried to give a narrow definition to the new economy in 
order to be able to conduct empirical studies. According to Gordon (2000) the 
new economy is understood as equivalent to an acceleration in the rate of 
technical advance in IT in the second half of the 1990 decade, without taking 
into account its contributions prior to 1995. The new economy is therefore 
seen as a transformation eradicating the budget deficit, inflation and the 
business cycle. For Bosworth and Triplett (2000) the new economy embraces 
IT, namely computers, peripherals, computer software, communications and 
related equipment. Being the spread of these new technologies evident both on 
the demand and on the supply side during the 1990s, the IT is seen as an 
accelerator of the economy’s trend rate of output and productivity growth.  
From both the broad and the narrow definitions it appears that the new 
economy resembles a transformation to a “knowledge and idea-based economy” 
in which innovative ideas and technology are the keys to economic growth. 
Risk, uncertainty and constant change are described to be the norm in this kind 
of economy. If the broad definition of new economy limits the time period, it is 
not clear though why a whole economy should be identified with only one 
sector or industry. According to these definitions either all the years before 
1990 (Davies, et al.,2000) or all sectors outside the new economy are excluded 
and referred to as “old economy” (Nordhaus, 2000). 
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The new economy is often referred to as the “E-conomy” (Cohen, et al., 
2000). This term points at the fact that the recent economic transformation is 
driven by the development and diffusion of modern electronics-based 
information technology. The E-conomy is intended as a structural shift, 
bringing transformation and disruption, and not primarily as a macroeconomic 
or cyclical phenomenon. However, it is not about soft macroeconomic 
landings, smooth growth, permanently rising stock prices, government budget 
surpluses, or permanently low rates of unemployment, interest and inflation. 
What, then, is the new economy about? There are eras when advancing 
technology and changing organizations transform not just one production 
sector but the whole economy and the society on which it rests. Such moments 
are rare. But today we may well be living in the middle of one. Information 
technology builds tools to manipulate, organize, transmit, and store 
information in digital form. It amplifies brainpower in a way analogous to that 
in which the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution’s technology of steam 
engines, metallurgy and giant power tools multiplied muscle power. Currently, 
not a single sector of the world economy is sheltered from the developments of 
IT. Greenspan (2000) stated that there is, with few exceptions, little of a truly 
old economy left. Virtually every part of our economic structure is affected by 
the newer innovations. However, since technological developments to date have 
been based on some former inventions, it is really difficult to draw a line that 
separates “old” from “new”. Indeed, the telegraph was the predecessor of the 
telephone and the microprocessor is a further development of the transistor 
invented by Shockley in 1947. Only the interconnection of computers via the 
Internet on an international scale represents a development which can be 
characterized as “new” because it can only be found in the 1990s. This event 
has surely marked a line and, by sparking a revolution in information 
availability, given birth to a new kind of economy (Greenspan, 2000).  
According to Jentsch (2001) the new economy is any economy characterized 
by the following features:  
 
• the economy’s information sector contributes more than 25% to the 
GDP growth rate 
• in the economy’s business sector, the Internet is adopted as an 
infrastructure for economic transactions by at least 25% of the 
businesses 
• at least 25% of all households have a computer and access to the 
Internet 
 
The benchmark of 25% represents a statistical indicator claimed to be large 
enough to have a significant impact on the economy as a whole (Department of 
Commerce, 2000). The information sector includes here the industries 
software, hardware, communication equipment and services (Jentsch, 2001). 
This technology-centered definition is based on the assumed novelty of large-
What is the New Economy? 
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scale IT adoption and interconnection. Further, it encompasses quantitative 
indicators which help to detect and analyze the emergence of the new economy 
regardless of time and place as well as to compare it to other economies.  
The extraordinary build-out of the communications networks that link 
computers together is almost as remarkable as the explosion in computing 
power. The result has been that the new economy has emerged faster, diffused 
more rapidly and more widely throughout the economy than previous 
technological revolutions (Castells, 1996; Shapiro & Varian,1999). The new 
economy can though emerge in other countries than the U.S. or Europe within 
periods other than the 1990-2000 timeframe. At present we are in fact 
witnessing the impact of the new economy on countries such as China and 
South Korea.  
The New Economy and Economic Growth 
The definition described above does not explicitly include the consequences of 
the technology adoption. The positive development of the U.S. economy in the 
recent years could be attributed to different factors such as globalization, 
deregulation, flexible labor markets and an anti-inflationary monetary policy. 
There is no doubt though that an increasing interconnection and the 
subsequently increased information availability have altered the growth process 
of industries. The traditional Exogenous Growth Theory explains economic 
growth as a result of the accumulation of human capital and technical progress 
in a world of constant returns to scale and scarce resources. According to the 
more recent Endogenous Growth Theory (Romer,1986), there are three 
important elements influencing long term economic growth: externalities, 
diminishing returns in the production of new knowledge and increasing returns 
in output production. Companies investing in new knowledge cannot perfectly 
internalize advances in knowledge such as new research results. Externalities 
arise when other businesses capture such knowledge spill-overs and use them as 
a costless factor of production. This means that doubling inputs in research will 
not necessarily double the amount of new knowledge produced and assimilated 
and as a consequence knowledge production shows diminishing returns. 
Further, Romer (1986) assumes increasing returns in the production of 
consumption goods. Thus it seems that long-term growth is mainly driven by 
the accumulation of knowledge, which in turn is enhanced by 
interconnectivity. 
As interconnectivity has led to an increased availability of information, 
knowledge can be easily accumulated. According to Weitzman (1998) the 
ultimate limit to economic growth is represented by the ability to process the 
abundance of potentially new ideas into a productive form and not by the 
ability to generate new ideas. Therefore, economic growth implies the existence 
of a complete learning process, where knowledge is not only produced but also 
Jönköping International Business School 
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assimilated and successfully applied. The key to the successful—and therefore 
productive—application of knowledge is human inventiveness (Shiller, 2000). 
However, if knowledge becomes an increasingly important production 
factor, then intellectual property rights may influence the market structure 
more than expected. The right to exclude others from using knowledge may in 
fact lead to temporary monopolies or to market failure, despite free competition 
or low market entry barriers (Jentsch, 2001). Furthermore, externalities such as 
spill-over effects can be seen as imperfect incentives to invest in knowledge 
production and therefore lead to market failures. Finally, because of increasing 
returns, some firms—such as those involved in the production of information 
goods—might devolve into natural monopolies. Production cost structures 
based on high fixed costs but almost zero marginal costs (Romer, 1990) for each 
following unit can lead to economies of scale and to potential monopolies.  
The above described limits can be at the base of economic downturns. 
However, since World War II, the U.S. business cycles have changed their 
appearing: contractions have become shorter, expansions longer, fluctuations in 
general have become less volatile (Jentsch, 2001). Proponents of the new 
economy even claim that the U.S. economy is on a steady growth path behind 
which the main driving factor is represented by IT investments. Apparently the 
features of these investments enhance the stability of business operations and 
therefore reduce the volatility of the business cycle. Greenspan (2000) explains 
that IT investments not only have a capacity-enhancing and cost-cutting effect. 
On the contrary, being the foundation of the revolution in information 
availability, they have enhanced learning processes and consequently reduced 
uncertainty. Market participants are therefore able to react more quickly to 
changing conditions. As a consequence the whole economy can more easily 
adapt to external shocks, volatile fluctuations are reduced and contractions as 
well as recessions are shorter.  
The New Economy and the Media  
Without media though, IT investments would not have led to such a revolution 
in information availability and to smoother business cycles. Moreover, although 
news media present themselves as detached observers of market events, they are 
themselves an integral part of these events. Significant market events generally 
occur only if there is similar thinking among large groups of people, and the 
news media are essential vehicles for the spread of ideas (Shiller, 2000). Not 
only limits to IT investments but also barriers to media coverage prevent 
interconnections to be established and potentially break or hinder the 
emergence of a network based economy such as the new economy. Networks 
have indeed to reach a critical mass in order to become a source of increasing 
returns and growth (Cohen, et al., 2000; Economides, 2000): the more users 
participate in the network the more will follow and the higher the value of the 
network. Metcalfe’s law states that the value of a network is proportional to the 
What is the New Economy? 
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square of the number of nodes on the network. Therefore, a tenfold increase in 
the size of the network leads to a hundredfold increase in its value (Shapiro & 
Varian 1999). Further, the value of products in a networked economy depends 
not so much on scarcity or production costs, but on plentitude. Pricing of such 
goods is claimed to be reverse: the more, the cheaper despite increasing quality 
(Kelly, 1997). 
Very basic factors such as urbanization are keys to generate population 
density and make the introduction of IT and media economically feasible. 
Among the underdeveloped countries the lack of literacy, electricity and 
telephony hinders interconnectivity and consequently the creation of networks: 
this is a further critical factor for the emergence of the new economy and 
therefore for economic development and growth. The blessing of the 
information revolution will though not automatically accrue to everyone even 
in the developed countries. Socially weaker citizens in particular are in danger 
of becoming the pariahs of the modern information society. Their lack of 
financial resources, knowledge and skills is said to prevent them from exploiting 
the advantages of ICT developments, so reinforcing their disadvantage and 
existing forms of inequalities. This can produce a divide between information-
poor and information-rich. In a society in which always greater importance is 
given to information and communication and thus to ICT, the social 
participation of these groups of people comes under pressure, thereby 
endangering not only the economy but also democracy (Frissen, 2005). 
Policy Implications 
A direct policy implication here is that public tasks lie not only in the area of 
equal access, but also in the field of provision of information itself. Varied, 
multimedia information provision—which is not guaranteed by the market—
and a wide range of communication platforms should be secured in order to 
allow citizen participation to the economy. If the new networked media such as 
online newspapers or digital television are a prerogative of the developed 
countries, in underdeveloped areas traditional print and broadcast media play a 
determinant role in enhancing the information society and spreading 
knowledge. The technological infrastructure needed to bridge the digital divide 
and therefore to drive the old economy towards the new interconnected 
economy can only be built through knowledge and financial investments. In 
this perspective the mass media can be considered as truly drivers of growth and 
should therefore be subsidized by the governments in less developed countries. 
Further, in today's context, government policy toward resources needs to 
focus on basic research and on human resources. Today's high technology is not 
the work of self-taught tinkers. Clever engineers working in family garages 
stand on the shoulders of fundamental, formal, largely academic scientists who 
created the enormous body of research and development on which the E-
conomy rests (Cohen, et al., 2000). Basic research creates the next technological 
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frontiers. Being close to basic research—having a constant flow of personnel 
back and forth—is a powerful aid to firms seeking to live on the technological 
frontier. 
The growth of the E-conomy requires human expertise and talent to 
develop, apply, and use new frontier technologies. Everyone needs to know 
enough about how our modern information and communications technology 
systems work in order to make effective use of them both at work and at home. 
Rising differences in wages between those with more formal education and 
those with less, and between those with more technology-using experience and 
those with less, are indicators of the magnitude of change and of the potential 
long-run severity of the problem. This means that government policy should 
seriously address investments in education in order to eliminate or at least 
reduce the digital divide. 
It is here again the case, as it has always been with technological revolutions, 
of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1975): the destruction of particular jobs, 
professions, specialties, and the emergence of new ones. The people who fill the 
new jobs are not the people who filled the old ones. Hence the shift to the new 
economy will not command broad political consent unless government policy is 
and is seen to be based on the inclusion of everyone in the economic 
transformation, and the wide diffusion of the benefits. For if the benefits are 
not broadly understood, broadly seen as accessible, and broadly shared, the 
durable political coalition to support policies to speed the coming of the new 
economy will not exist. And the transformation will be stunted and delayed. 
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Background, Questions, and Speculations  
for Tomorrow's Economy 
J. Bradford DeLong1 
 A. Michael Froomkin 
 
Two and a quarter centuries ago the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith 
(1776) used a particular metaphor to describe the competitive market system, a 
metaphor which still resonates today. He saw the competitive market as a 
system in which:  
 
every individual...endeavours as much as he can...to direct... industry so that its 
produce may be of the greatest value....neither intend[ing] to promote the public 
interest, nor know[ing] how much he is promoting it....He intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end that was no part of his intention....By pursuing his own interest 
he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it" (Smith, 1776). 
 
Adam Smith's claim back in 1776 that the market system promoted the 
general good was new. Today it is one of the most frequently-heard 
commonplaces. For Adam Smith's praise of the market as a social mechanism 
for regulating the economy was the opening shot of a grand campaign to reform 
how politicians and governments looked at the economy. 
The campaign waged by Adam Smith and his successors was completely 
successful. The past two centuries have seen his doctrines woven into the fabric 
of how our society works. It is hard to even begin to think about our society 
without basing one's thought to some degree on Adam Smith. And the 
governments that have followed the path Adam Smith laid down today preside 
over economies that are more materially prosperous and technologically 
powerful than ever before seen (Maddison, 1994). 
Belief in free trade, an aversion to price controls, freedom of occupation, 
freedom of domicile, freedom of enterprise, and the other corollaries of belief in 
Smith's invisible hand have today become the background assumptions for 
thought about the relationship between the government and the economy. A 
                                                     
1 DeLong would like to thank the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, 
and the Institute for Business and Economic Research of the University of California for financial 
support. We both would like to thank Caroline Bradley, Joseph Froomkin, Hal Varian, Ronald 
P. Loui, Paul Romer, Andrei Shleifer, and Lawrence H. Summers for helpful discussions. 
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free-market system, economists claim, and most participants in capitalism 
believe, generates a level of total economic product that is as high as possible 
and is certainly higher than under any alternative system that any branch of 
humanity has conceived and attempted to implement (Debreu, 1957). It is 
even possible to prove the "efficiency" of a competitive market, albeit under 
restrictive technical assumptions. 
The lesson usually drawn from this economic success story is laissez-faire, 
laissez-passer: in the overwhelming majority of cases the best thing the 
government can do for the economy is simply to leave it alone. Define property 
rights, set up honest courts, perhaps rearrange the distribution of income, 
impose minor taxes and subsidies to compensate for well-defined and narrowly-
specified "market failures", but otherwise the economic role of the government 
is to disappear. 
The main argument for a free competitive market system is the dual role 
played by prices. On the one hand, prices serve to ration demand: anyone 
unwilling to pay the market price because he or she would rather do other 
things with his or her (not unlimited) money does not get the good (or service). 
On the other hand, price serves to elicit production: any organization that can 
make a good (or provide a service) for less than its market price has a powerful 
financial incentive to do so. Thus what is produced goes to those who value it 
the most. What is produced is made by the organizations that can make it the 
cheapest. And what is produced is whatever the ultimate user’s value the most. 
You can criticize the market system because it undermines the values of 
community and solidarity. You can criticize the market system because it is 
unfair, for it gives good things to those who have control over whatever 
resources turn out to be most scarce as society solves its production allocation 
problem, not to those who have any moral right to good things. But – at least 
under the conditions economists have for two and a quarter centuries first 
implicitly and more recently explicitly assumed – you cannot criticize the 
market system for being unproductive. 
Adam Smith's case for the invisible hand so briefly summarized above will 
be familiar to almost all readers: it is one of the foundation-stones of our 
civilization's social thought. Our purpose in this chapter is to shake these 
foundations, or at least to make readers aware that the changes in technology 
now going on as a result of the revolutions in data processing and data 
communications may shake these foundations. Unexpressed but implicit in 
Adam Smith's argument for the efficiency of the market system are assumptions 
about the nature of goods and services and the process of exchange, 
assumptions that fit reality less well today than they did back in Adam Smith's 
day. 
Moreover, these implicit underlying assumptions are likely to fit the "new 
economy" of the future even less well than they fit the economy of today. 
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The Structure of this Chapter 
Thus the next section of this chapter deconstructs Adam Smith's case for the 
market system. It points out three assumptions about production and 
distribution technologies necessary if the invisible hand is to work as Adam 
Smith claimed it did. We point out that these assumptions are being 
undermined more and more by the revolutions in data processing and data 
communications currently ongoing. 
In the subsequent section we take a look at things happening on the 
frontiers of electronic commerce and in the developing markets for 
information. Our hope is that what is now going on at the frontiers of 
electronic commerce may contain some clues to processes that will be more 
general in the future. 
Our final section does not answer all the questions we raise. We are not 
prophets, after all. Thus our final section raises still more questions, for the 
most we can begin to do today is to organize our concerns. By looking at the 
behavior of people in high-tech commerce—people for whom the abstract 
doctrines and theories that we present have the concrete reality of determining 
if they get paid—we can make some guesses about what the next economics and 
the next set of sensible policies might look like, if indeed there is going to be a 
genuinely new economy and thus a genuinely next economics. 
Moreover, we can warn against some pitfalls in the hope that such warnings 
might make things better rather than worse. 
“Technological” Prerequisites of the Market Economy 
The ongoing revolution in data processing and data communications 
technology may well be starting to undermine those basic features of property 
and exchange that make the invisible hand a powerful social mechanism for 
organizing production and distribution. The case for the market system has 
always rested on three implicit pillars, three features of the way that property 
rights and exchange worked. 
 Call the first feature excludability: the ability of sellers to force consumers to 
become buyers, and thus to pay for whatever goods and services they use. Call 
the second feature rivalry: a structure of costs in which two cannot partake as 
cheaply as one, in which producing enough for two million people to use will 
cost at least twice as many of society's resources as producing enough for one 
million people to use. Call the third transparency: the ability of individuals to 
see clearly what they need and what is for sale, so that they truly know just what 
it is that they wish to buy.  
All three of these pillars fit the economy of Adam Smith's day relatively well. 
The prevalence of craft as opposed to mass production guaranteed that two 
could only be made at twice the cost of one. The fact that most goods and 
services were valued principally for their (scarce) physical form meant that two 
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could not use one good. Thus rivalry was built into the structure of material life 
that underpinned the economy of production and exchange. 
Excludability was less a matter of nature and more a matter of culture, but 
certainly by Smith's day large-scale theft and pillage was more the exception 
than the rule: the courts and the law were there to give property owners the 
power to restrict the set of those who could utilize their property to those who 
had paid for the privilege. 
Last, the slow pace and low level of technology meant that the purpose and 
quality of most goods and services were transparent: what you saw was pretty 
much what you got. 
All three of these pillars fit much of today's economy pretty well too, 
although the fit for the telecommunications and information-processing 
industries is less satisfactory. But they will fit tomorrow's economy less well 
than today's. And there is every indication that they will fit the twenty-first 
century economy relatively poorly (MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1995). 
As we look at developments along the leading technological edge of the 
economy, we can see that considerations that used to be second-order 
"externalities" that served as corrections growing in strength to possibly become 
first-order phenomena. And we can see the invisible hand of the competitive 
market beginning to work less and less well in an increasing number of areas. 
 
Excludability 
In the information-based sectors of the next economy, the owners of goods and 
services—call them "commodities" for short—will find that they are no longer 
able to easily and cheaply exclude others from using or enjoying the 
commodity. The carrot-and-stick which had enabled owners of property to 
extract value from those who wanted to use it was always that if you paid you 
got to make use of it, and if you did not pay you did not get to make use of it. 
But digital data is cheap and easy to copy. Methods do exist to make 
copying difficult, time-consuming, and dangerous to the freedom and wealth of 
the copier, but these methods add expense and complexity. "Key disk" methods 
of copy protection for programs vanished in the late 1980s as it became clear 
that the burdens they imposed on legitimate owners and purchasers were 
annoying enough to cause buyers to vote-with-their-feet for alternative 
products. Identification-and-password restrictions on access to online 
information are only as powerful as users' concern for information providers' 
intellectual property rights, which is surely not as powerful as the information 
providers' concern. 
In a world of clever hackers, these methods are also unreliable. The methods 
used to protect Digital Video Discs against casual copying are no longer secure. 
Without excludability, the relationship between producer and consumer 
becomes much more akin to a gift-exchange than a purchase-and-sale 
relationship (Akerlof, 1985). The appropriate paradigm then shifts in the 
direction of a fund-raising drive for a National Public Radio station. When 
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commodities are not excludable then people simply help themselves. If the user 
feels like it he or she may make a "pledge" to support the producer. The user 
sends money to the producer not because it is the only way to gain the power to 
utilize the product, but out of gratitude and for the sake of reciprocity. 
This reciprocity-driven revenue stream may well be large enough that 
producers cover their costs and earn a healthy profit. Reciprocity is a basic 
mode of human behavior. People in the large do feel a moral obligation to tip 
cabdrivers and waiters. People do contribute to National Public Radio. But 
without excludability the belief that the market economy produces the optimal 
quantity of any commodity is hard to justify. Other forms of provision—public 
support funded by taxes that are not voluntary, for example—that had fatal 
disadvantages vis-a-vis the competitive market when excludability reigned may 
well deserve reexamination. 
We can get a glimpse of how the absence of excludability can warp a market 
and an industry by taking a brief look at the history of network television. 
During its three-channel heyday in the 1960s and 1970s, North American 
network television was available to anyone with an antenna and a receiver: 
broadcasters lacked the means of preventing the public from getting the signals 
for free. Free access was, however, accompanied by scarce bandwidth, and by 
government allocation of the scarce bandwidth to producers. 
The absence of excludability for broadcast television did not destroy the 
television broadcasting industry. Broadcasters couldn't charge for what they 
were truly producing, but broadcasters worked out that they could charge for 
something else: the attention of the program-watching consumers during 
commercials. Rather than paying money directly, the customers of the 
broadcast industry merely had to endure the commercials (or get up and leave 
the room; or channel-surf) if they wanted to see the show. 
This "attention economy" solution prevented the market for broadcast 
programs from collapsing: it allowed broadcasters to charge someone for 
something, to charge advertisers for eyeballs rather than viewers for programs. 
But it left its imprint on the industry. Charging-for-advertising does not lead to 
the same invisible hand guarantee of productive optimum as does charging for 
product. In the case of network television, audience attention to advertisements 
was more-or-less unconnected with audience involvement in the program. 
This created a bias toward lowest-common-denominator programming. 
Consider two programs, one of which will fascinate 500,000 people, and the 
other of which 30 million people will watch as slightly preferable to watching 
their ceiling. The first might well be better for social welfare: the 500,000 with 
a high willingness-to-pay might well, if there was a way to charge them, 
collectively outbid the 30 million apathetic couch potatoes for the use of scarce 
bandwidth to broadcast their preferred program. Thus a network able to collect 
revenues from interested viewers would broadcast the first program, seeking the 
applause (and the money) of the dedicated and forgoing the eye-glazed semi-
attention of the larger audience. 
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But this competitive process breaks down when the network obtains revenue 
by selling commercials to advertisers. The network can offer advertisers either 
1,000,000 or 60 million eyeballs. How influenced the viewers will be by the 
commercials depends relatively little on how much they like the program. As a 
result, charging-for-advertising gives every incentive to broadcast what a mass 
audience would tolerate. It gives no incentive to broadcast what a niche 
audience would love. 
As bandwidth becomes cheaper, these problems become less important: one 
particular niche program may well be worth broadcasting when the mass 
audience has become sufficiently fragmented by the viewability of multiple 
clones of bland programming. Until then, however, expensive bandwidth 
combined with the absence of excludability meant that broadcasting revenues 
depended on the viewer numbers rather than the intensity of demand. Non-
excludability helped ensure that broadcast programming would be "a vast 
wasteland" (Minow & LaMay, 1985). 
In the absence of excludability industries today and tomorrow are likely to 
fall prey to analogous distortions. Producers' revenue streams—wherever they 
come from—will be only tangentially related to the intensity of user demand. 
Thus the flow of money through the market will not serve its primary purpose 
of registering the utility to users of the commodity being produced. There is no 
reason to think ex ante that the commodities that generate the most attractive 
revenue streams paid by advertisers or others ancillary will be the commodities 
that ultimate consumers would wish to see produced. 
 
Rivalry 
In the information-based sectors of the next economy the use or enjoyment of 
the information-based commodity will no longer necessarily involve rivalry. 
With most tangible goods, if Alice is using a particular good, Bob cannot be. 
Charging the ultimate consumer the good's cost of production or the free 
market price provides the producer with an ample reward for his or her effort. 
It also leads to the appropriate level of production: social surplus (measured in 
money) is not maximized by providing the good to anyone whose final demand 
for a commodity is too weak to wish to pay the cost for it that a competitive 
market would require. 
But if goods are non-rival—if two can consume as cheaply as one—then 
charging a per-unit price to users artificially restricts distribution: to truly 
maximize social welfare you need a system that supplies everyone whose 
willingness to pay for the good is greater than the marginal cost of producing 
another copy. And if the marginal cost of reproduction of a digital good is near-
zero, that means almost everyone should have it for almost free. However, 
charging price equal to marginal cost almost surely leaves the producer 
bankrupt, with little incentive to maintain the product except the hope of 
maintenance fees, and no incentive whatsoever to make another one except that 
warm fuzzy feeling one gets from impoverishing oneself for the general good. 
Tomorrow’s Economy 
17 
Thus a dilemma: if the price of a digital good is above the marginal cost of 
making an extra copy, some people who truly ought—in the best of all possible 
worlds—to be using it do not get to have it, and the system of exchange that we 
have developed is getting in the way of a certain degree of economic prosperity. 
But if price is not above the marginal cost of making an extra copy of a non-
rival good, the producer will not get paid enough to cover costs. Without non-
financial incentives, all but the most masochistic producer will get out the 
business of production. 
More important, perhaps, is that the existence of large numbers of 
important and valuable goods that are non-rival casts the value of competition 
itself into doubt. Competition has been the standard way of keeping individual 
producers from exercising power over consumers: if you don't like the terms the 
producer is offering, then you can just go down the street. But this use of 
private economic power to check private power may come at an expensive cost 
if competitors spend their time duplicating one another's efforts and attempting 
to slow down technological development in the interest of obtaining a 
compatibility advantage, or creating a compatibility or usability disadvantage 
for the other guy. 
One traditional answer to this problem—now in total disfavor—was to set 
up a government regulatory commission to control the "natural monopoly". 
The commission would set prices, and do the best it could to simulate a socially 
optimum level of production. On the eve of World War I when American 
Telephone and Telegraph—under the leadership of its visionary CEO 
Theodore N. Vail—began its drive for universal coverage, a rapid political 
consensus formed both in Washington and within AT&T that the right 
structural form for the telephone industry was a privately-owned publicly-
regulated national monopoly. 
While it may have seemed like the perfect answer in the Progressive era, in 
this more cynical age commentators have come to believe that regulatory 
commissions of this sort almost inevitably become "captured" by the industries 
they are supposed to regulate. Often this is because the natural career path for 
analysts and commissioners involves someday going to work for the regulated 
industry in order to leverage expertise in the regulatory process; sometimes it is 
because no one outside the regulated industry has anywhere near the same 
financial interest in manipulating the rules, or lobbying to have them adjusted. 
The only effective way a regulatory agency has to gauge what is possible is to 
examine how other firms in other regions are doing. But such "yardstick" 
competition proposals—judge how this natural monopoly is doing by 
comparing it to other analogous organizations—are notoriously hard to 
implement (Shleifer, 1986). 
A good economic market is characterized by competition to limit the 
exercise of private economic power, by price equal to marginal cost, by returns 
to investors and workers corresponding to the social value added of the 
industry, and by appropriate incentives for innovation and new product 
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development. These seem impossible to achieve all at once in markets for non-
rival goods and digital goods are certainly non-rival. 
 
Transparency 
In many information-based sectors of the next economy the purchase of a good 
will no longer be transparent. The invisible hand assumed that purchasers know 
what it is that they want and what they are buying so that they can effectively 
take advantage of competition and comparison-shop. If purchasers need first to 
figure out what they want and what they are buying, there is no good reason to 
presume that their willingness to pay corresponds to its true value to them. 
Why is transparency at risk? Because much of the value-added in the data-
processing and data-communications industries today comes from complicated 
and evolving systems of information provision. Adam Smith's pinmakers sold a 
good that was small, fungible, low-maintenance and easily understood. Alice 
could buy her pins from Gerald today, and from Henry tomorrow. But today's 
purchaser of, say, a cable modem connection to the internet from AT&T, is 
purchasing a bundle of present goods and future services, and is making a down 
payment on the establishment of a long-term relationship with AT&T. Once 
the relationship is established, both buyer and seller find themselves in different 
positions. Adam Smith's images are less persuasive in the context of services—
especially bespoke services which require deep knowledge of the customer's 
wants and situation (and of the maker's capabilities)—which are not, by their 
nature fungible or easily comparable. 
When Alice shops for a software suite, she not only wants to know about its 
current functionality—something notoriously difficult to figure out until one 
has had days or weeks of hands-on experience—but she also needs to have some 
idea of the likely support that the manufacturer will provide. Is the line busy at 
all hours? Is it a toll call? Do the operators have a clue? Will next year's 
corporate downsizing lead to longer holds on support calls? 
Worse, what Alice really needs to know cannot be measured at all before she 
is committed: learning how to use a software package is an investment she 
would prefer not to repeat. Since operating systems change version numbers 
frequently, and interoperability needs changes even more often, Alice needs to 
have a prediction about the likely upgrade path for her suite. This, however, 
turns on unknowable and barely guessable factors: the health of the 
corporation, the creativity of the software team, the corporate relationships 
between the suite seller and other companies. 
Some of the things Alice wants to know, such as whether the suite works 
and works quickly enough on her computer, are potentially measurable at least 
—although one rarely finds a consumer capable of measuring them before 
purchase, or a marketing system designed to accommodate such a need. You 
buy the shrink wrapped box at a store, take it home, unwrap the box and find 
that the program is incompatible with your hardware, your operating system, or 
Tomorrow’s Economy 
19 
one of the six programs you bought to cure defects in the hardware or the 
operating system. 
Worse still, the producer of a software product has every incentive to 
attempt to "lock in" as many customers as possible. Operating system revisions 
that break old software versions require upgrades. And a producer has an 
attractive and inelastic revenue source to the extent that "lock in" makes 
switching to an alternative painful. While consumers prefer the ability to 
comparison-shop and to switch easily to another product, producers fear this 
ability and have incentives to perform subtle tweaks to their programs to make 
it difficult to do so. 
 
The Economics of Market Failure 
That the absence of excludability, rivalry, or transparency is bad for the 
functioning invisible hand is not news (Tirole, 1988). The analysis of failure of 
transparency has made up an entire subfield of economics for decades: 
"imperfect information." Non-rivalry has been the basis of the theory of 
government programs and public goods, as well as of natural monopolies: the 
solution has been to try to find a regulatory regime will mimic the decisions 
that the competitive market ought to make, or to accept that the "second-best" 
public provision of the good by the government is the best that can be done. 
Analysis of the impact of the lack of excludability is the core of the 
economic analysis of research and development. It has led to the conclusion 
that the best course is to try to work around non-excludability by mimicking 
what a well-functioning market system would have done. Use the law to expand 
"property," or use tax-and-subsidy schemes to promote actions with broad 
benefits. 
But the focus of analysis has traditionally been on overcoming "frictions": 
how can we make this situation where the requirements of laissez faire fail to 
hold into a situation in which the invisible hand works tolerably well? As long 
as it works well throughout most of the economy, this is a very sensible 
analytical and policy strategy. A limited number of government programs and 
legal doctrines will be needed to closely mimic what the invisible hand would 
do if it could function properly in a few distinct areas of the economy (like the 
regional natural monopolies implicit in the turn-of-the-twentieth-century 
railroad, or in government subsidies basic research).  
Out on the Cybernetic Frontier 
But what happens when the friction becomes the machine? What will happen 
in the future should problems of non-excludability, of non-rivalry, of non-
transparency come to apply to a large range of the economy? What happens 
should they come to occupy as central a place in business decision-making as 
inventory control or production operations management do today? In the 
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natural sciences, perturbation-theory approaches break down when the 
deviations of initial conditions from those necessary for the simple solution 
become large. Does something similar happen in political economy? Is 
examining how the market system handles a few small episodes of "market 
failure" a good guide toward how it will handle many large ones? 
We do not know. But we do want to take a first step toward discerning what 
new theories of the new markets might look like should new visions turn out to 
be necessary (or should old visions need to be adjusted). The natural place to 
look is to examine how enterprises and entrepreneurs are reacting today to the 
coming of non-excludability, non-rivalry, and non-transparency on the 
electronic frontier. The hope is that experience along the frontiers of electronic 
commerce will serve as a good guide to what pieces of the theory are likely to be 
most important, and will suggest areas in which further development might 
have a high rate of return. 
 
The Market for Software (Shareware, Public Betas and More) 
We noted above that the market for modern, complex products is anything but 
transparent. While one can think of services, such as medicine, which are 
particularly opaque to the buyer, today it is difficult to imagine a more opaque 
product than software. Indeed, when one considers the increasing opacity of 
products in the context of the growing importance of services to the economy, 
it suggests that transparency will become a particularly important issue in the 
next economy. 
Consumers' failure to acquire full information about the software they buy 
certainly demonstrates that acquiring the information must be expensive. In 
response to this cost, social institutions have begun to spring up to get around 
the shrink-wrap dilemma. The first was so-called shareware: you download the 
program, if you like the program you send its author some money, and maybe 
in return you get a manual, access to support, or an upgraded version. 
The benefit to try-before-you-buy is precisely that it makes the process more 
transparent. The cost is that try-before-you-buy often turns out to be try-use-
and-don't-pay. 
The next stage beyond shareware has been the evolution of the institution of 
the "public beta." This public beta is a time-limited (or bug-ridden, or 
otherwise restricted) version of the product: users can investigate the properties 
of the public beta version to figure out if the product is worthwhile. But to get 
the permanent (or the less-bug-ridden) version, they have to pay. 
The developing free-public-beta industry is a way of dealing with the 
problem of lack of transparency. It is a relatively benign development, in the 
sense that it involves competition through distribution of lesser versions of the 
ultimate product. An alternative would be (say) the strategy of constructing 
barriers to compatibility: the famous examples in the computer industry come 
from the 1970s when the Digital Equipment Corporation made non-standard 
cable connectors; from the mid-1980s when IBM attempted to appropriate the 
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entire PC industry through the PS/2 line; and from the late 1980s when Apple 
Computers used a partly ROM-based operating system to exclude clones. 
Fortunately for consumers, these alternative strategies proved (in the latter 
two cases at least) to be catastrophic failures for the companies pursuing them. 
Perhaps the main reason that the free-public-beta strategy is now dominant is 
this catastrophic failure of strategies of non-compatibility, even though they did 
come close to success. 
A fourth, increasingly important, solution to the transparency problem is 
Open Source software. Open Source solves the software opacity problem with 
total transparency: the source code itself is available to all for examination and 
re-use. Open Source programs can be sold, but whenever a right to use a 
program is conferred, it brings with it the additional rights to inspect and alter 
the software, and to convey the altered program to others. 
In the "Copyleft license," for example, anyone may modify and re-use the 
code, provided that they comply with the conditions in the original license and 
impose similar conditions of openness and re-usability on all subsequent users 
of the code. License terms do vary. This variation itself is a source of potential 
opacity. However, it is easy to envision a world in which Open Source software 
plays an increasingly-large role. 
Open Sources' vulnerability (and perhaps also its strength) is that it is, by 
design, only minimally excludible. Without excludability, it is harder to get 
paid for your work. Traditional economic thinking suggests that all other things 
being equal, people will tend to concentrate their efforts on things that get 
them paid. And when, as in software markets, the chance to produce a product 
that dominates a single category holds out the prospect of enormous payment 
(think "Windows"), one might expect that effort to be greater still. 
Essentially volunteer software development would seem particularly 
vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons. Open Source has, however, evolved 
a number of strategies that at least ameliorate and may even overcome this 
problem. Open Source authors gain status by writing code. Not only do they 
gain kudos, but the work can be used as a way to gain marketable reputation. 
Writing Open Source code that becomes widely used and accepted is serves as a 
virtual business card and helps overcome the lack of transparency in the market 
for high-level software engineers. 
The absence of the prospect of an enormous payout may retard the 
development of new features in large, collaborative, open-source projects. It 
may also reduce the richness of the feature set. However, since most people 
apparently use a fairly small subset of the features provided by major packages, 
this may not be a major problem. Furthermore, open source may make 
proprietary designer add-ons both technically feasible and economically 
rational. 
In open source the revenues cannot come from traditional intellectual 
property rights alone. One must provide some sort of other value, be it help 
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desk, easy installation, or extra features, in order to be paid. Moreover, there 
remains the danger that one may not be paid at all. 
Nevertheless, open source already has proven itself to be viable in important 
markets: the World Wide Web as we know it exists because Tim Berners-Lee 
Open-Sourced html and http. 
 
Of Shop-bots, Online Auctions, and Meta-Sites 
Predictions abound as to how software will use case- and rule-based thinking to 
do your shopping for you, advise you on how to spend your leisure time, and in 
general organize your life for you. But that day is still far in the future2. So far, 
we have only the early generations of the knowledge-scavenging virtual robot 
and the automated comparison shopper. Already, however, we can discern some 
trends, and identify places where legal rules are likely to shape micro-economic 
outcomes. The interaction between the law and the market has, as one would 
expect, distributional consequences. More surprisingly, perhaps, it also has 
potential implications for economic efficiency. 
Shop-Bots 
BargainFinder was one of the first Internet-based shopping agents3. In its first 
incarnation, back in 1997, it did just one thing. Even then it did it too well for 
some. Now that Bargain Finder and other intelligent shopping agents have 
spread into a wide range of markets, a virtual war over access to and control of 
price information is raging in the online marketplace. Thus one has to ask: does 
the price come at a price? 
In the initial version of BargainFinder, and to this day, the user enters the 
details of a music compact disk she might like to purchase. BargainFinder 
interrogated several online music stores that might offer to sell them. It then 
reports back the prices in a tidy table that makes comparison shopping easy. 
Initially, the system was not completely transparent: it was not always possible 
to discern the vendor's shipping charges without visiting the vendor's web site. 
But as BargainFinder's inventors said, it was "only an experiment." 
Today, it's no longer an experiment. Shipping and handling is included as a 
separate and visible charge. The output is a handsome table which can be sorted 
by price, by speed of delivery, or by merchant. It can be further customized to 
take account of shipping costs by zip code, and results can be sorted by price or 
speed of delivery. While the user sees the names of the firms whose prices are 
listed, it's a short list, and there is no way to know what other firms might have 
been queried. 
Other, newer, shopping agents take a more aggressive approach. R-U-Sure, 
available at http://rusure.com, installs an application on the desktop that 
                                                     
2 A useful corrective to some of the hype is Kathyrn Heilmann et al., Intelligent agents: A 
technology and business application analysis, http://haas.berkeley.edu/~heilmann/agents/#I 
3 http://bf.cstar.ac.com/bf/.http:bf/ 
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monitors the user's web browsing. Whenever the user interacts with an e-
commerce site that R-U-Sure recognizes, it swings into action, and a little box 
pops up with a wooshing noise. It displays the queries it is sending to 
competing merchants' web stores to see if they have a better price, and reports 
on the winner. 
Competitor clickthebutton, http://www.clickthebutton.com, installs an icon 
in the taskbar, but only pops up when clicked. The company provides a full and 
impressively lengthy list of the sites it is capable of querying on the shopper's 
behalf. 
  
Bidding Services 
Price competition is also fostered by bidding services and auctions. Bidding 
services such as http://www.priceline.com (hotels, air tickets) and http:// 
www.nextag.com (consumer goods and electronics) invite customers to send a 
price they would be willing to pay for a commodity service or good. The price 
competition is, however, constrained. There is no obvious way for consumers to 
learn what deals others have been able to secure, and the bidding services appear 
designed to discourage experimentation designed to find out the market-
clearing price. 
Priceline requires the consumer to commit to pay if his offer is accepted; 
Nextag does not, but tracks the user's behavior with a "reputation" number that 
goes up when a merchant's acceptance of a bid results in a purchase and goes 
down when an accepted bid does not lead to a purchase. Unlike Priceline, 
however, Nextag contemplates multi-round negotiations: "sellers" it warns, 
"will be more likely to respond to your requests if you have a high rating." 
At first glance, a highly variegated good like a college education would seem 
to resist any effort at a bidding process. Nevertheless ecollegebid.org, 
http://www.ecollegebid.org/, has a web site inviting prospective college students 
to state what they are willing to pay and then offers to match it with a "college's 
willingness to offer tuition discounts." Although the list of participating colleges 
is not published, or even shared with competing colleges, Executive Director 
Tedd Kelly states that 6 colleges are set to participate and negotiations are 
under way with more than 15 others. In its first five weeks 508 students placed 
ecollegebids. Once a college meets a price, the student is asked, but not 
required, to reply within 30 days and to submit an application that the college 
retains the option of rejecting. 
  
Auction Sites 
Auction sites provide a different type of price competition, and a different 
interface with shopping bots. Users can either place each of their bids manually, 
or they can set up a bidding pot to place their bids for them. Ebay, for example, 
encourages bidders to not only place an initial bid but also to set up "proxy 
bidding" in which any competing bid immediately will be met with a response 
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up to the user's maximum price. Since Ebay gets a commission based in part on 
the final sale price, it gains whenever proxy bidding pushes up the price. 
Perhaps the fastest growing segment of the online auction market is aimed at 
business-to-business transactions. An example is Freemarkets, a provider of 
global supply management solutions, which has been growing very fast and in 
2004 has been acquired by Ariba, an enterprise spend management solution 
provider.  
 
Meta Auction Sites 
There is a significant number of competing consumer auction sites in 
operation. The profusion of auctions has created a demand for meta-sites that 
provide information about the goods on offer on multiple online auctions. 
Examples of meta-sites include http://www.auctionwatch.com/ and 
http://www.auctionwatchers.com/. 
Auctionwatch, like BargainFinder before it, has become too successful for 
some. E-bay initially requested meta-sites no to list their auctions. When 
Auctionwatch failed to comply, E-bay} threatened auctionwatch.com with legal 
action, claiming that Auctionwatch's "Universal Search" function, which directs 
users to auctions on E-bay and competing services (Yahoo, Amazon.com, MSN, 
Bidstream, and Ruby Lane) is an "unauthorized intrusion" that places an 
unnecessary load on E-bay's servers, violates E-bay's intellectual property rights, 
and misleads users by not returning the full results of some searches. 
The claim that E-bay's auction prices or the details of the sellers' offers to 
sell are protected by copyright, trade secret or other intellectual property law is 
bogus. However, there are proposals in Congress to change the law in a way 
that might make the claim more plausible in the future. Other hitherto 
untested legal theories might, however, prove more plausible. A claim that 
meta-sites were imposing somehow damaging E-bay by overloading its servers, 
or a claim based on some kind of trespass might find more support. 
Whether meta-auction sites do burden searchees' servers is itself a difficult 
factual issue. To the extent that multiple people not interested in bidding see 
the data on the meta-site, the load on E-bay is reduced. The current law is 
probably in the meta-sites favor. But there is uncertainty. And this uncertainty 
is compounded by the possibility of legislation. 
  
Efficiency? 
It is particularly appropriate to ask what the economically-efficient solution 
might be at a time when the law is in some flux. Most economists, be they 
Adam Smithian classicists, neo-classical Austrians, or more modern economics 
of information mavens, would at first thought instinctively agree with the 
proposition that a vendor in a competitive market selling a standardized 
product—for one Tiger Lily CD is as good as another—would want customers 
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to know as much as possible about what the vendor offers for sale, and the 
prices at which the goods are available. 
The reason for this near-consensus is that in a competitive market every sale 
at the offer price should be welcome: all are made at a markup over marginal 
cost. Thus all on-line CD retailers ought to have wanted to be listed by 
BargainFinder, if only because every sale that went elsewhere when they had the 
lowest price was lost profit. 
But not so. 
A significant fraction of the merchants regularly visited by BargainFinder 
were less than ecstatic. They retaliated by blocking the agent's access to their 
otherwise publicly-available data. As of March 1997, one third of the merchants 
targeted by the BargainFinder locked out its queries4. One, CDNow, did so for 
frankly competitive reasons. The other two said that the costs of large numbers 
of "hobbyist" queries were too great for them. Morover E-bay, the best-known 
online auction site, had begun to walk down the trail blazed by BargainFinder 
by blocking Auctionwatch's access to Ebay's data. 
One possible explanation for the divergence between the economic theorist's 
prediction that every seller should want to be listed by BargainFinder or 
Auctionwatch and the apparent outcome is the price-gouging story. In this 
story, stores blocking comparison sites tend to charge higher than normal prices 
because they are able to take advantage of consumer ignorance of cheaper 
alternatives. The stores are gouging buyers by taking advantage of relatively 
high costs of search. 
Our utterly unscientific web-browsing supports the hypothesis that 
consumers have yet to figure out how to bring their search costs down – R-U-
Sure may need a lot more publicity. Prices are in flux, and do not appear to be 
behaving the way Adam Smith would predict. Random browsing among 
various delivery channels reveals wide price fluctuations, peaking at 40% on one 
occasion for consumer electronics items under $200. In this case BargainFinder 
and its successors would indeed be valuable developments. They will make 
markets more efficient and lower prices (Cane, 1997). 
Another possibility is the "kindly service" story. Perhaps stores blocking 
BargainFinder, R-U-Sure, or meta-sites tend to charge higher than normal 
prices because they provide additional service or convenience. If commerce 
                                                     
4 In January 1997, BargainFinder shopped at nine stores: CD Universe, CDnow!, NetMarket, 
and GEMM, IMM, Music Connection, Tower Records, CD Land, CDworld, and Emusic. A 
sample search for the Beatles White Album in January 1997 produced this output: 
I couldn't find it at Emusic. You may want to try browsing there yourself. CD Universe is not 
responding. You may want to try browsing there yourself. $24.98 (new) GEMM (Broker service 
for independent sellers; many used CDs, imports, etc.) I couldn't find it at CDworld. You may 
want to try browsing there yourself. $24.76 Music Connection (Shipping from $ 3.25, free for 9 
or more. 20 day returns.) CDnow is blocking out our agents. You may want to try browsing there 
yourself. NetMarket is blocking out our agents. You may want to try browsing there yourself. 
CDLand was blocking out our agents, but decided not to. You'll see their prices here soon.IMM 
did not respond. You may want to try browsing there yourself. 
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becomes increasingly electronic and impersonal (or if "personal" comes to mean 
"filtered through fiendishly clever software agents"), this sort of humanized 
attention will become increasingly expensive. To the extent that this additional 
service or convenience can be provided automatically, things are less clear. 
In a sometimes forgotten classic, The Joyless Economy, Tibor Scitovsky 
noted that the advent of mass production of furniture seemed to cause the price 
of hand-carved chairs to increase, even as the demand for them shrank 
(Scitovsky, 1976). As consumers switched to less costly (and less carefully made, 
one size-fits-all) mass-produced furniture, carvers became scarce and business 
for remaining carvers became scarcer. Soon only the rich could engage their 
services. 
If the kindly service story is right, the rise of the commodity market creates a 
risk of a possible decline in service-intensive or higher-quality goods. Mass 
tastes will be satisfied more cheaply; yet specialty tastes will become more of an 
expensive luxury5. On the other hand, the rise of ShopBots such as 
BargainFinder or R-U-Sure offers an opportunity for consumers to aggregate 
their preferences on worldwide scale. Indeed, Mercata, http://www.mercata. 
com/, provides a service by which consumers can group together to put in a 
group buy for a product. The larger the number of units, the lower the price, 
although it is not clear that the even the resulting price is always lower than 
might be found by determined web-browsing. Thus the transactions costs 
associated with both aggregation of identical but disparate preferences, and the 
communication and satisfaction of individualized preferences should be going 
down. As it becomes increasingly easy for consumers to communicate their 
individualized preferences to manufacturers and suppliers, and increasingly easy 
to tailor goods to individual tastes – be it a CD that only has the tracks you 
like, customized blue jeans, or a car manufactured just-in-time to your 
specifications – personalized goods may become the norm, putting the "joy" 
back into the economy and replacing the era of mass production with an era of 
mass customization. 
Some signs of this were visible even before the information revolution: lower 
costs of customization have already undermined one of Scitovsky's examples, as 
fresh-baked bread makes its comeback at many supermarkets and specialty 
stores. And Alfred P. Sloan created General Motors and the automobile 
industry of the post-World War II era by piling different body styles, colors, 
and option packages on top of the same Chevy drive train. 
In either the "price gouging" or "kindly service" stories, the advent of 
services such as BargainFinder and R-U-Sure presents retailers of many goods 
with a dilemma: If they join in, they contribute towards turning the market for 
CDs, books, consumer electronics and other similar goods into a commodity 
market with competition only on price. If they act "selflessly" and stay out, in 
                                                     
5 On the other hand, retailing, stock control, billing, auditing and shipping are different from, 
e.g. manufacturing, so in principle there might still be a role for a middleperson. Amazon.com, a 
leading Internet bookseller has almost no books in stock. 
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order to try to degrade the utility of shop-bots and meta-sites (and preserve 
their higher average markup), they must hope that their competitors will 
understand their long-run self-interest in the same way (Axelrod, 1984). 
But overt communication in which all sellers agreed to block BargainFinder 
would, of course, violate the Sherman Act. And without a means of retaliation 
to "punish" players who do not pursue the collusive long-run strategy of 
blocking BargainFinder, the collapse of the market into a commodity market 
with only price competition, and with little provided in the way of ancillary 
shopping services, appears likely. 
When we wrote the first draft of this essay, we noted that if CD retailers 
were trying to undermine BargainFinder by staying away, their strategy 
appeared to be failing. Some CD retailers who initially blocked BargainFinder 
then unblocked it, while others were clamoring to join. Since then, the rise of a 
new generation of meta-sites and alternate means of creating price competition 
makes the question somewhat moot. The technological arms race pitting meta-
sites and shop-bots against merchants will continue, but the advantage seems to 
be with the attackers, if only due to their numbers. 
Whether or not this is an occasion for joy depends on which explanation 
above is closer to the truth. The growth of the bookstore chain put the local 
bookshop out of business, just as the growth of supermarkets killed the corner 
grocer. Not everyone considers this trend to be a victory, despite the lower 
prices. A human element has been lost, and a "personal service" element that 
may have led to a better fit between purchaser and purchase has been lost as 
well. 
So far, the discussion has operated on the basis of the assumption that 
merchants would have an incentive to block comparison shopping services if 
they charge higher than normal prices. Strangely, some merchants may have 
had an incentive to block it if they charged lower than normal prices. As we all 
know, merchants sometimes advertise a "loss leader," and offer to sell a 
particular good at an unprofitable price. Merchants do this in order to lure 
consumers into the store where they either may be attracted to more profitable 
versions of the same good (leading, in the extreme case, to "bait and switch"), 
or in the hope that the consumer will spy other, more profitable, goods to 
round out the market basket. 
You can explain this merchant behavior in different ways, either by talking 
about the economics of information, locational utility, myopic consumers 
generalizing incorrectly on the basis of a small number of real bargains, or about 
temporary monopolies caused by the consumer's presence in this store as 
opposed to another store far away. 
It may be that merchants blocking BargainFinder did not want consumers 
to be able to exploit their loss-leaders without having to be exposed to the other 
goods offered simultaneously. Without this exposure the loss-leaders would not 
lure buyers to other, higher-profit, items, but would simply be losses. The 
merchant's ability to monopolize the consumer's attention for a period may be 
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the essence of modern retailing; the reaction to BargainFinder, at least, suggests 
that this is what merchants believe. 
The growing popularity of frequent buyer and other loyalty programs also 
suggests that getting and keeping customer attention is important to sellers6. 
Interestingly, this explanation works about equally well for the "kindly service" 
and "loss leader" explanations, the two stories that are consistent with the 
assumption that the CD market was relatively efficient before BargainFinder 
came along. 
 
Browsing Is Our Business 
More important and perhaps more likely is the possibility that BargainFinder 
and other shop-bots threaten merchants who are in the "browsing assistance" 
business. Some online merchants are enthusiastically attempting to fill the role 
of personal shopping assistant. Indeed, some of the most successful online stores 
have adapted to the new marketplace by inverting the information equation. 
Retail stores in meatspace ("meatspace" being the part of life that is not 
cyberspace) provide information about available products – browsing and 
information acquisition services – that consumers find valuable and are willing 
to pay for, either in time and attention or in cash. Certainly meatspace 
shopping is conducive to unplanned, impulse, purchases, as any refrigerator 
groaning under kitchen magnets will attest. Retail stores in cyberspace may 
exacerbate this: what, after all, is a store in cyberspace but a collection of 
information? 
CDNow, for example, tailors its virtual storefront to what it knows of a 
customer's tastes based upon her past purchases. In addition to dynamically 
altering the storefront on each successive visit, CDNow also offers to send 
shoppers occasional email information about new releases that fit their past 
buying patterns. 
One can imagine stores tailoring what they present to what they presume to be 
the customer's desires, based on demographic information available about the 
customer even before the first purchase. Tailoring might extend beyond 
showcasing different wares: taken to the logical extreme it would include some 
form of price discrimination based on facts known about the customer's 
preferences, or on demographic information thought to be correlated with 
preferences. 7 
                                                     
6 Otherwise, it would slightly odd to find firms giving discounts to the customers who 
presumably most want the merchant's wares. Perfect price discrimination would suggest that the 
customers who most want the goods should be charged the most. Of course, in a true commodity 
industry, loyalty programs can also be understood as nothing more than price competition, i.e. 
discounting. 
7 The U.S. and other legal systems impose constraints on the extent to which stores may 
generalize from demographic information: for example, stores that attempt race-based, sex-based, 
or other types of invidious price variation usually violate U.S. law. 
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A critical microeconomic question in all this is how consumers and 
manufacturer/sellers exchange information in this market. Both consumers and 
sellers have an interest in encouraging the exchange of information: in order to 
provide what the consumer wants, the sellers need to know what is desired and 
how badly it is wanted. Consumers need to know what is on offer where, and at 
what price. A shop-bot may solve the consumer's problem of price, but it will 
not tell him about an existing product of which he is unaware. Similarly, 
CDNow may reconfigure its store to fit customer profiles, but without some 
external source of information about customers this takes time, and requires 
repeat visitors. 
Indeed, it requires that customers come in through the front door: all the 
reconfiguration in the world will not help CDNow or E-bay if customers are 
either unaware that they would enjoy its products, or if the customers' only 
relationship with CDNow is via a shop-bot or a meta-site. 
The retail outlet in the average mall can plausibly be described as a mechanism 
for informing consumers about product attributes. The merchant gives away 
product information in the hopes that consumers will make purchases. Physical 
stores, however, have fixed displays and thus must provide more or less identical 
information to every customer. Anyone who looks in the window, anyone who 
studies the product labels, or even the product catalogs, receives the same sales 
pitch. 
Indeed, some of the more interesting recent writing on the micro-economics 
of virtual retailing suggests that what is really at stake is a war for the customer's 
attention, a war for eyeballs. Certainly, the rush to create "portals" that, 
providers hope, will become the surfer-shopper's default homepage on the 
Internet suggests that some large investors believe eyeballs ware well worth 
having. So too does the tendency of successful early entrants in one product 
market to seek to leverage their brand into other markets. 
It may be that the "dynamic storefront" story is the Internet's substitute for 
the kindly service story. If so, then the rise of agent-based shopping may well be 
surprisingly destructive. It raises the possibility of a world in which retail shops 
providing valuable services are destroyed by an economic process that funnels a 
large percentage of consumer sales into what become commodity markets 
without middlemen: people use the high-priced premium cyberstore to browse, 
but then use BargainFinder to purchase. 
To appreciate the problem, consider Bob, an on-line merchant who has 
invested a substantial amount in a large and easy to use "browsing" database 
that combines your past purchases, current news, new releases, and other 
information to present you with a series of choices and possible purchases that 
greatly increase your chances of coming across something interesting. After all, a 
customer enters seeking not a particular title, and not a random title, but a 
product that he or she would like. What is being sold is the process of search 
and information acquisition that leads to the judgment that this is something to 
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buy. A good on-line merchant would make the service of "browsing" easy and 
would in large part be selling that browsing assistance. 
In this browsing is our business story there is a potential problem: browsing 
assistance is not an excludable commodity. Unless Bob charges for his services 
(which is likely to discourage most customers and especially the impulse 
purchaser), there is nothing to stop Alice from browsing merchant Bob's 
website to determining the product she wants, and then using BargainFinder to 
find the cheapest source of supply. BargainFinder will surely find a competitor 
with lower prices because Bob's competitor will not have to pay for the database 
and the software underlying the browsing assistance. 
If so, then projects like BargainFinder will have a potentially destructive 
application, for many online stores will be easy to turn into commodity markets 
once the process of information acquisition and browsing is complete. It would 
be straightforward to run a market in kitchen gadgets along the lines of the 
BargainFinder, even if much of the market for gadgets involves finding 
solutions to problems one was not consciously aware one had. First free-ride off 
of one of the sites that provides browsing assistance to discover what you want, 
then open another window and access BargainFinder to buy it. 
Students and other people with more time than money have been using this 
strategy to purchase stereo components for decades: draw on the sales expertise 
of the premium store, then buy from the warehouse. But the scope and ease of 
this strategy is about to become much greater. 
To merchants providing helpful shopping advice, the end result will be as if 
they spent all their time in their competitors' discount warehouse, pointing out 
goods that the competitors' customers ought to buy. The only people who will 
pay premium prices for the physical good—and thus pay for browsing and 
information services—will be those who feel under a gift-exchange moral 
obligation to do so: the "sponsors" of NPR. Thus cyberstores that offer 
browsing assistance may find that they have many interests in common with the 
physical stores in the mall, which fear that consumers will browse in their 
stores, and then go home and buy sales tax-free on the Internet. 
 
Collaborative Filtering 
Collaborative filtering provides part of the answer to the information exchange 
problem. It also provides another example of how information technology 
changes the way that consumer markets will operate. In their simplest form, 
collaborative filters such as FireFly bring together consumers to exchange 
information about their preferences. The assumption is that if Alice finds that 
several other readers—each of whom also likes Frisch, Kafka, Kundera and 
Klima but gets impatient with James and Joyce—tends to like William Gass, 
the odds are good that Alice might enjoy Gass's On Being Blue as well.  
In the process of entering sufficient information about her tastes to prime 
the pump, Alice adds to the database of linked preference information. In 
helping herself, Alice helps others. In this simplest form, the collaborative filter 
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helps Alice find out about new books she might like. The technology is 
applicable to finding potentially congenial CDs, news, web sites, software, 
travel, financial services and restaurants as well as to helping Alice find people 
who share her interests. 
At the next level of complexity, the collaborative filter can be linked to a 
shop-bot. Once Alice has decided that she will try On Being Blue she can find 
out who will sell it to her at the best price. 
The truly interesting development, however, comes when Alice's personal 
preference data is available to every merchant Alice visits. Leave aside for a 
moment who owns this data, and the terms on which it becomes available. A 
shop like CDNow becomes able to tailor its virtual storefront to a fairly good 
model of Alice's likely desires upon her first visit. CDNow may use this 
information to showcase its most enticing wares, or it may use it to fine tune its 
prices to charge Alice all that her purse will bear – or both. 
Whichever is the case, shopping will not be the same. Microsoft recognized 
the importance of tracking consumers’ preferences rather quickly and bought 
FireFly in 1998, only three years after the company was founded. 
Once shops acquire the ability to engage in price discrimination, consumers 
will of course seek ways of fighting back. One way will be to shop 
anonymously, and see what price is quoted when no consumer data is proffered. 
Consumers can either attempt to prevent merchants and others from acquiring 
the transactional data that could form the basis of a consumer profile, or they 
can avail themselves of anonymizing intermediaries who will protect the 
consumer against the merchant's attempt to practice perfect price 
discrimination by aggregating data about the seller's prices and practices. In this 
model, a significant fraction of cyber commerce will be conducted by software 
agents who will carry accreditation demonstrating their credit-worthiness, but 
will not be traceable back to their progenitors. 
Thus potential legal constraints on online anonymity may have more far-
reaching consequences than their obvious effect on unconstrained political 
speech (Froomkin, 1996). In some cases, consumers may be able to use 
collaborative filtering techniques to form buying clubs and achieve quantity 
discounts like Mercata. Or consumers will construct shopping personas with 
false demographics and purchase patterns in the hope of getting access to 
discounts (Negroponte, 1996). Business flyers across America routinely 
purchased back-to-back round trip tickets that bracket a Saturday night in an 
attempt to diminish airlines' abilities to charge business travelers premium 
prices. Airlines, meanwhile, have invested in computer techniques to catch and 
invalidate the second ticket. 
Consumers will face difficult maximization problems. In the absence of 
price discrimination, and assuming privacy itself is only an intermediate good 
(i.e., that consumers do not value privacy in and of itself), the marginal value to 
the consumer of a given datum concerning her behavior is likely to be less than 
the average value to the merchant of each datum in an aggregated consumer 
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profile. If markets are efficient, or if consumers suffer from a plausible myopia 
in which they value data at the short-run marginal value rather than long-term 
average cost, merchants will purchase this information leading to a world with 
little transactional privacy (Posner, 1978; Scheppele, 1988; Boyle, 1992). 
Furthermore, the lost privacy is not without gain: every time Alice visits a 
virtual storefront that has been customized to her preferences, her search time is 
reduced, and she is more likely to find what she wants—even if she didn't know 
she wanted it—and this is ever more true the more information the merchant 
has about her. 
The picture becomes even more complicated once one begins to treat 
privacy itself as a legitimate consumer preference rather than as merely an 
intermediate good. Once one accepts that consumers may have a taste for 
privacy it no longer becomes obvious that the transparent consumer is an 
efficient solution to the management of customer data. Relaxing an economic 
assumption does not, however, change anything about actual behavior, and the 
same tendencies which push the market towards a world in which consumer 
data is a valuable and much-traded commodity persist. 
Indeed, basic ideas of privacy are under assault. Data miners and consumer 
profilers are able to produce detailed pictures of the tastes and habits of 
increasing number of consumers. The spread of intelligent traffic management 
systems, video security and recognition systems and the gradual integration of 
information systems built into every appliance will eventually make it possible 
to track movement as well as purchases. Once one person has this information 
there is, of course, almost no cost to making it available to all. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure the demand for privacy. 
Furthermore, the structure of the legal system does not tend to allow consumers 
to express this preference. Today, most consumer transactions are governed by 
standard-form contracts. The default rules may be constrained by state 
consumer law, or by portions of the Uniform Commercial Code, but they 
generally derive most of their content from boilerplate language written by a 
merchant's lawyer. If you are buying a dishwasher you do not get to haggle over 
the terms of the contract, which (in the rare case they are even read) can be 
found in small print somewhere on the invoice. 
Although it is possible to imagine a world in which the Internet allows for 
negotiation of contractual terms even in consumer sales, we have yet to hear of 
a single example of this phenomenon, and see little reason to expect it. On the 
contrary, to the extent a trend can be discerned, it is in the other direction, 
towards the "web wrap" or "clip wrap" contract (the neologism derives from 
"shrinkwrap" contracts, in which the buyer of software is informed that she has 
agreed to the terms by opening the wrapper) in which the consumer is asked to 
agree to the contract before being allowed to view the web site's content. 
Indeed, the enforcement of these agreements is enshrined in law in the 
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proposed, and very controversial, Uniform Computer Information Transactions 
Act8. 
The Next Economics? 
We have argued that assumptions which underlie the microeconomics of the 
invisible hand fray when transported into tomorrow's information economy. 
Commodities that take the form of single physical objects are rivalrous and are 
excludible: there is only one of it, and if it is locked up in the seller's shop no 
one else can use it. The structure of the distribution network delivered 
marketplace transparency as a cheap byproduct of getting the goods to their 
purchasers. All of these assumptions did fail at the margin, but the match of the 
real to the ideal was reasonably good. 
Modest as they may be in comparison to the issues we have left for another 
day, our observations about microfoundations do have some implications for 
economic theory and for policy. At some point soon it will become practical to 
charge for everything on the World Wide Web. Whether it will become 
economically feasible or common, it remains to be seen. The outcome of this 
battle will have profound economic and social consequences. 
Consider just two polar possibilities. On the one hand, one can envision a 
hybrid gift-exchange model, in which most people pay as much for access to 
web content as they pay for NPR, and in which the few who value an in-depth 
information edge or speed of information acquisition pay more. At the other 
extreme, one can as easily foresee a world in which great efforts have been made 
to reproduce familiar aspects of the traditional model of profit maximization. 
Which vision will dominate absent government intervention depends in part 
on the human motivation of programmers, authors, and other content 
providers. The invisible hand assumed a "rational economic man," a greedy 
human. The cybernetic human could be very greedy, for greed can be 
automated. But much progress in basic science and technology has always been 
based on other motivations besides money. The thrill of the chase, the 
excitement of discovery, and the respect of one's peers have played a very large 
role as well, perhaps helped along by the occasional Nobel Prize, Knighthood 
for services to science, or a distinguished chair; in the future "Net.Fame" may 
join the list. 
Government will surely be called upon to intervene. Adam Smith said that 
eighteenth-century "statesmen" could in most cases do the most good by sitting 
on their hands. The twenty-first century "stateswomen" will have to decide 
whether this advice still applies once the fit between the institutions of market 
exchange and production and distribution technologies has decayed. 
We suspect that policies which ensure diversity of providers will continue to 
have their place. One of the biggest benefits of a market economy is that it 
                                                     
8 http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/cita10st.htm 
Jönköping International Business School 
 34
provides for sunset. When faced with competition, relatively inefficient 
organizations fail to take in revenue to cover their costs, and then they die. 
Competition is thus still a virtue, whether the governing framework is one of 
gift-exchange or buy-and-sell, unless competition destroys the ability to capture 
significant economies of scale. 
The challenge for policy makers is likely to be particularly acute in the face 
of technological attempts to recreate familiar market relationships. Just because 
markets characterized by the properties of rivalry, excludability, and 
transparency were efficient does not mean that any effort to reintroduce these 
properties to a market lacking them necessarily increases social welfare. 
Furthermore, in some cases the new, improved, versions may provide more 
excludability or transparency than did the old model; this raises new problems. 
Holders of intellectual property rights in digital information, be they producers 
or sellers, do have a strong incentive to re-introduce rivalry and excludability to 
the market for digital information. 
 
Increasing Excludability 
It appears increasingly likely that technological advances such as "digital 
watermarks" will allow each copy of a digital data set, be it a program or a 
poem, to be uniquely identified9 (Cox, 1996). Coupled with appropriate legal 
sanctions for unlicensed copying, a large measure of excludability can be 
restored to the market. Policy makers will need to be particularly alert to three 
dangers. 
First, technologies which permit excludability risk introducing socially 
unjustified costs if the methods of policing excludability are themselves costly.  
Second, as the example of broadcast television demonstrates, imperfect 
substitutes for excludability themselves can have bad consequences that 
sometimes are difficult to anticipate.  
Third, over-perfect forms of excludability10 raise the specter that traditional 
limits on excludability of information such as "fair use" might be changed by 
technical means without the political and social debate that should precede such 
a shift.  
We counsel caution: In the absence of any clear indication of what the 
optimum would be, the burden of proof should be on those who argue that any 
level of excludability should be mandated. This applies particularly to 
information that is not the content being sold but that is instead about the 
current state of the market itself. There is a long tradition that information 
about the state of the marketplace should be as widely broadcast as possible. We 
cannot see any economic arguments against this tradition. 
                                                     
9 For a sketch of excludability might be constructed and maintained for digital documents. 
10 See, e.g., the forms advocated in Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Intellectual 
property and the national information infrastructure (1995). 
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In particular, reforming the law to give sellers a property right in 
information about the prices that they charge appears extremely dangerous. 
There has never in the past been a legal right to exclude competitors from access 
to bulk pricing data. It is hard to see what improvement in economic efficiency 
could follow from the creation of such a right in the future. 
 
Increasing Rivalry 
It is somewhat harder to imagine how rivalry might be recreated for digitized 
data without using an access system that relied on a hardware token of some 
sort. Rivalry can be reintroduced if access to a program, a document or other 
digital data can be conditioned on access to a particular smartcard or other 
physical object. Perhaps a cryptographically based software analog might be 
developed that relied on some secret that the purchaser would have a strong 
incentive to keep to herself. In either case, a form of rivalry results, since 
multiple users can be prevented from using the data simultaneously. 
But imposing rivalry where it is not naturally found means imposing a 
socially unnecessary cost on someone. The result may look and feel like a 
traditional market, but it cannot, by definition, carry the "optimality" 
properties markets have possessed in the past. The artificial creation of rivalry 
ensures that many users whose willingness to pay for the good is greater than 
the (near-zero) marginal cost of producing another copy will not get one. 
Policy makers should therefore be very suspicious of any market-based 
arguments for artificial rivalry. 
 
Increasing Transparency 
It might seem that anything which encourages transparency must be good. 
Indeed, all other things being equal, from the point of view of consumers, 
merchants selling products that can survive scrutiny, and the economy as a 
whole, increases in the transparency of product markets are always a good thing. 
The issue, however, is to what extent this logic justifies a transparent consumer. 
The answer is fundamentally political. It depends on the extent to which 
one is willing to recognize privacy as an end in itself. If information about 
consumers is just a means to economic end, then there is no reason for concern. 
If, on the other hand, citizens perceive maintaining control over facts about 
their economic actions as a good in itself, some sort of governmental 
intervention into the market may be needed to make it easier for this preference 
to express itself. 
 
The Next Economics? 
We have focused on the ways in which digital media undermine the 
assumptions of rivalry, excludability, and transparency, and have tried to 
suggest that the issue of transparency is at least as important, complicated, and 
interesting as the other two. In so doing we have been forced to slight 
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important microeconomic features of the next economy. We have not, for 
example, discussed the extent to which the replacement of human salespeople, 
travel agents, and shop assistants will affect the labor market. 
The consequences may be earth-shaking. For about two centuries starting in 
1800 technological progress was the friend of the unskilled worker: it provided 
a greater relative boost to the demand for workers who were relatively unskilled 
(who could tighten bolts on the assembly line, or move things about so that the 
automated production process could use them, or watch largely self-running 
machines and call for help when they stopped) than for those who were skilled. 
The spread of industrial civilization was associated with a great leveling in the 
distribution of income. But there is nothing inscribed in the nature of reality 
that technological progress must always boost the relative wages of the 
unskilled. 
Nor have we addressed potentially compensating factors such as the looming 
disaggregation of the university, a scenario in which distance learning bridges 
the gap between elite lecturers and mass audiences, turning many educational 
institutions into little more than degree-granting standards bodies, with 
financial aid and counseling functions next to a gym, (just maybe) a library. 
While this may benefit the mass audience, it has harmful effects on one elite: it 
risks creating an academic proletariat made up of those who would have been 
well-paid professors before the triumph of "distance learning" in the lecture 
hall. 
Along a number of dimensions, there is good reason to fear that the 
enormous economies of scale found in the production of non-rivalrous 
commodities are pushing us in the direction of a winner-take-all economy (23). 
The long-run impact of the information revolution on the distribution of 
income and wealth is something that we have not even begun to analyze. 
Similarly, we have completely ignored a number of interesting 
macroeconomic issues. Traditional ideas of the "open" and "closed" economy 
will have to be rethought on sectoral grounds. Once a nation becomes part of 
the global information infrastructure, its ability to raise either tariff or non-tariff 
walls against certain foreign trade activities becomes vanishingly small. Nations 
will not, for example, be able to protect an "infant" software industry. It will be 
hard to enforce labor laws when the jobs telecommute away. 
National accounts are already becoming increasingly inaccurate as it 
becomes harder and harder to track imports and exports. Governments are 
unable to distinguish a personal letter with a picture attached from the 
electronic delivery of a $100,000 software program. Monetary and financial 
economics will also have to adapt. 
Traditionally the field of economics has always had some difficulty 
explaining money: there has been something "sociological" about how tokens 
worthless in themselves get and keep their value that is hard to fit with 
economists' underlying explanatory strategies of rational agents playing games-
of-exchange with one another. These problems will intensify as the nature and 
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varieties of money changes. The introduction of digital currencies suggests a 
possible return of private currencies. It threatens the end of seigneurage, and 
raises questions about who can control the national money supply. 
The market system may well prove to be tougher than its traditional 
defenders have thought, and to have more subtle and powerful advantages than 
those that defenders of the invisible hand have usually listed. At the very least, 
however, defenders will need new arguments. Economic theorists have 
enormous powers of resilience: economists regularly try to spawn new theories 
such as evolutionary economics, the economics of organizations and 
bureaucracies, public choice theory, and the economics of networks. We will see 
how they do. 
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The Anticipated Effect of the SuperNet 
on Alberta’s Media Industry 
Aaron Braaten 
 
The SuperNet is Alberta’s initiative, together with Bell Canada and Axia 
Internet, to bring broadband internet over 4,700 schools, hospitals, libraries, 
provincial and municipal government offices in 422 communities across rural 
and urban Alberta (SuperNet website, 2004). The Government of Alberta 
hopes that this new infrastructure project will have positive long-term economic 
consequences for the Province’s future. The construction of the Alberta 
SuperNet creates an ideal laboratory for researching the impact of structural 
technological change on a resource-rich economy. Prior to this project, only 
110 communities in Alberta had Internet Service Providers (ISPs) capable of 
offering high-speed internet, whereas after the project, 422 communities will 
become “SuperNet” communities (SuperNet website, 2004).  
The aim of the SuperNet is to decrease the “Digital Divide” separating rural 
and urban residents with respect to Internet usage (SuperNet website, 2004). 
Internet connection costs are of a highly convex nature—internet connection 
costs increase dramatically as population densities decrease, which is a reality 
that does not bode well for rural residents. While urban residents are able to 
take full advantage of the potential impacts of broadband (e-commerce, e-
education e-governance etc.) rural residents must dial into their nearest ISP, 
sometimes miles away and pay long-distance charges to do so (SuperNet 
website, 2004). Telecommunications companies often find it cost-prohibitive 
to bring broadband to small communities due to low population densities, and 
the Province’s initiative will enable ISPs to offer universal broadband pricing 
throughout the province.  
Research Questions  
With the potential for increased information sharing comes several research 
questions worth investigating. Most important for this study is the impact of 
broadband on other forms of information media—television and radio 
broadcasters, daily and weekly newspapers, magazines, book publishers—and 
other information-sharing media such as telephony and direct mail. Therefore, 
our central research question asks: “What will be the form, duration and 
intensity of the SuperNet’s impact on the various forms of media throughout 
Alberta?” Will small-town newspapers be forced to close as print advertising 
revenues dry up, or will the SuperNet benefit them in other ways? Will 
Jönköping International Business School 
 42
journalistic style and content change? Are various forms of print media in 
Alberta doomed for extinction? Will businesses change how they advertise in 
small towns? These are just some of the potential risks of technological change. 
The next section will outline data that have been identified and will assess the 
feasibility of obtaining and using the data to model respective media industries. 
Technological Shocks 
Technological advancements in network industries are characterized by steady 
growth with periodical shocks when a new technology is introduced. Past 
economic development has been characterized by periodical technological 
shocks:  
 
Table 1. Technological Shocks to Communications Industries 
 
1840’s Telegraph 
1870’s Telephone 
1890’s Radio Telegraphy 
1920’s Radio Broadcasting 
1950’s Television Broadcasting 
1960’s Geostationary Satellite Communications 
1970’s Computer Communications 
1980’s Optical Communications 
1990’s Internet and Mobile Communications 
Source: Shaw, Robert. The Impact of New Technologies Such as Broadband and VOIP on Telecommunication 
Markets. Presentation given at the Seminar on Economic and Market Analysis for Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC) and Baltic States, Czech Republic, Prague, September 9-11, 2003. Internet 
Telecommunications Union website, http://www.itu.int 
 
Each progressive advance in communications technology has led to an increase 
in human connectivity, or the ability of humans to share information across 
geographic locale, cultural constraint and time. The Internet can create new 
“niche communities” and enable persons in more isolated areas to connect with 
people of similar interests through web forums, chat and online dating services. 
The change in how economic agents obtain, share and disseminate information 
coincides with a change in economic behavior. If we think of each technology 
‘piggy-backing’ on the previous, we can see how the technologies confront each 
other as compliments or as competitors. For example, the existence of railways 
made it easier to install telegraph lines, and in this sense they are 
complimentary. The telegraph allowed for quicker communication between 
railway stations than the trains themselves, thus aiding in the operation of 
railways. Where telegraphy made it unnecessary to travel via train or send 
messages through the postal service in order to communicate, telegraphy was in 
direct competition with railways and the postal service.  Carrying this through 
other forms of technology, the telephone piggy-backed on telegraph lines with 
respect to its installation, but competed directly in terms of communication and 
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operation. Radio represented a new frontier of innovation that contested the 
long-standing position of fixed-type print, only to be later contested itself by 
television. Television was supposed to be able to offer everything radio did, but 
with pictures; fortunately for radio, though, television was not portable, did not 
work in the car and made little sense in the workplace (Canadian Association of 
Broadcasters, 1998).11  
Shaw (2003) argues that in each case of technological shock, analysts have 
consistently under-estimated the impact of new technology on everyday human 
interconnectivity while overestimating the overall usefulness and economic 
possibilities of the “new economy”.12 The 1990’s dotcom craze sent already 
overvalued dotcom stocks soaring due to feedback mechanisms, Ponzi schemes 
and “irrational exuberance” (Shiller, 2001).13 It could very well be that many of 
the anticipated benefits of delivering high-speed internet to rural areas suffer 
from the same irrational exuberance. This implies that the stream of benefits 
related to education, governance and public health would have a separate 
discount rate from the benefits of more innocuous uses such as online chat, 
media downloading and general interpersonal connectivity. Therefore, a 
theoretical framework that focuses on the human interconnectivity aspects of 
technology first will indicate the direction of future internet use.  
“Piggybacking” Technologies 
The Alberta SuperNet, like its predecessors, has “piggybacked” on other 
networks in a complimentary fashion—roadways for its construction and dial-
                                                     
11 Submission of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters to the CRTC New Media Hearing: 
Making New Media Work for Canada Broadcasting PN 1998-82 Telecom PN 98-20-1. 
APPENDIX 4: Competition for Radio in the New Media Age: A Research Paper from the 
Canadian Association of Broadcasters, November 2, 1998. Permanent link: http://www.cab-
acr.ca/english/research/98/appendix4_nov298.shtm 
12 Cited in Shaw (2003): “For the first 30 years of the telephone, promoters struggled to identify 
the killer application that would promote its wide adoption by home owners and businesses. At 
first the telephone was promoted as a replacement for the telegraph, allowing businesses to send 
messages more easily and without an operator. Telephone promoters in the early years touted the 
telephone as new service to broadcast news, concerts, church services, weather reports, etc. 
Industry journals publicized inventive uses of the telephone such as sales by telephone, consulting 
with doctors, ordering groceries over the telephone, listening to school lectures and even long 
distance Christian Science healing! The concept that someone would buy the telephone to chat 
was simply inconceivable at that time.” C. Fischer, America calling A social history of the telephone 
to 1940. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. “The popularity of email was not 
foreseen by the ARPANET's planners. Roberts had not included electronic mail in the original 
blueprint for the network. In fact, in 1967 he had called the ability to send messages between 
users “not an important motivation for a network of scientific computers” . . . . Why then was 
the popularity of email such a surprise? One answer is that it represented a radical shift in the 
ARPANET's identity and purpose. The rationale for building the network had focused on 
providing access to computers rather than to people.” – J. Abbate, Inventing the Internet. 
Cambridge; MIT University Press, 1999 
13 Shiller, Robert. Irrational exuberance. New York: Broadway books, 2001.  
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up connections for paving the way of the internet, etc. The focus of this paper 
will be the instances where this new network technology confronts other 
information sharing networks (media) in a competitive or complimentary 
fashion. Furthermore, it will identify further research questions concerning how 
these impacts ought to or can be tested empirically, and which data exists to do 
so. Past predictions of the internet’s impact on everyday life seemed overblown, 
as it was supposed to replace the telephone, newsprint, television and even radio 
in one fell swoop. Just as the television impacted radio in the area of sitcoms 
and dramas, but failed to compete with radio’s portability, the internet is not 
likely to have a parsimonious impact on all media. It will impact some media 
more than others due to a mixture of human preferences, technological lock-in 
and the degree of complementarity and competition amongst these forms of 
media. The purpose of this paper, then, is to adopt such a framework to 
identify those areas where technology will likely remain locked in, and areas 
where the broadband will alter the ‘rules of the game’.  
Weekly Newspapers: Most Likely to be Affected? 
Of all media, small weekly newspapers stand to lose or to gain the most from 
the SuperNet. Since the internet changes the nature of community from 
geographical space to cyberspace, users are able to expand their choices 
regarding which communities they belong to. However, since the small-town 
newspaper is a key hub of local civic participation, it can potentially provide an 
incubator for generating interest in broadband at the local level. In this sense, 
broadband internet can confront small-center newspapers as a “complement” 
through partnering with ISP providers, hiring technical staff with web design 
skills and by generating “network externalities” that add to the value received by 
the community from the Internet. The Alberta SuperNet is likely to exhibit 
“network externalities” which are said to exist when “when the amount that one 
party is willing to pay for access to a network depends on who or how many 
other parties are connected to it” (Varian, 2001).14 Therefore, the Alberta 
SuperNet could “piggy-back” on the small-town newspaper with the goal of 
reaching a critical mass of subscribers, and this can be done if small papers 
partner with ISP providers in their local market. 
Whether or not the existence of broadband internet will negatively affect 
community newspapers depends on several factors which include: the demands 
of readers brought about because of increased connectivity, how and from 
whom they obtain news online, the changing borders of community, how 
effectively newspapers can serve as a community hub and whether or not these 
newspapers respond to the anticipated increase in demand for a website version 
of the paper. Of 106 AWNA newspapers, only 18 did not have a viable web 
presence, and few had very much advertising space. 
                                                     
14 http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/infoecon/Networks.html#extern  
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 Small weekly newspapers are unique in that they may have minimum 
efficient scale issues, and their individual circulation may not justify a 
significant online presence. Hendriks (1999) provides a study of MES in the 
Netherlands (Hendriks, 1999).15 Since these newspapers obtain their revenue 
through advertising, they may not be able to operate as profitably online as in 
print. Minimum efficient scale can be interpreted as the minimum output 
needed for a firm to operate at the lowest point of its long run average cost 
curve. When the ratio of fixed to variable costs is very high, there is a potential 
to exploit economies of scale and minimize costs by expanding output. In other 
words, if the ratio of overhead costs relative to running costs is quite high, a 
firm is more likely to be able to exploit economies of scale in production. 
Varian and Shapiro (1999) argue that information markets follow this cost 
pattern, as the information is costly to produce, but cheap to reproduce.16 
Therefore, there is a minimum number of advertising hits a small newspaper 
will need in order to justify a strong online presence, just as there exists a 
minimum circulation that justifies production.  
Goel and Hseigh (2002) argue that the internet in general has positive 
competition effects for online businesses, as the internet lowers sunk costs for 
small businesses and therefore has the ability to decrease barriers to market 
entry (2002).17 Applying this argument to online journalism, the internet ought 
to decrease barriers to entry. However, more attention needs to be paid to 
smaller, weekly papers, whose staffing abilities are considerably less than those 
of larger daily newspapers. Therefore, it may be cost and time prohibitive for 
small newspapers to adopt an online presence. Because of this, weekly 
newspapers may have “minimum efficient scale” issues concerning web 
implementation.  
The internet has decreased barriers to entry into the market of information 
supply and the new media is placing new demands on the old media. This is 
evident in the wake of the recent rise of “bloggers”—persons who publish 
online web-logs—to the status of amateur journalists. Free online programs 
such as Blogger, Movable Type and Photobucket allow anyone with the desire 
to do so to publish text and photos online. Bloggers could be modeled as a 
“competitive fringe”, or “fifth estate” keeping watch over the mainstream media 
(MSM) and holding it accountable. If the MSM has a story wrong, blogs, 
acting as a competitive fringe, can expand their output of coverage readily in 
response. This brings an element of accountability to the MSM and will 
strengthen the need to have accurate, concise and detailed original content. 
                                                     
15 Hendriks, P.. Newspapers: A lost cause? Strategic management of newspaper firms in the United 
States and the Netherlands. Kluwer (1999)  
16 Varian, V. & Shapiro, C. (1999) Information rules, Harvard Business School Press. 
17 Goel, R.K. & Hsieh, E.W.T. Internet growth and economic theory, Netnomics 4: 221–225, 
2002. 
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Online content differentiation will become increasingly important to small-
community newspapers. By producing online content that is original and out-
ward focused, small newspapers can end up having their websites hyper-linked 
by web-based forums, blogs and communities. This can generate traffic and 
interest in local perspectives on current events and expand the paper’s internet 
footprint beyond its print circulation.18 Having real-time capabilities would 
allow small-center newspapers to cover events as they happen, thereby giving 
them “jump time” ahead of larger media outlets who must mobilize to the 
location of interest.  
Structure of the Market in Alberta 
Data from AWNA, CARD and CCNA all indicate that there are 106 weekly 
community newspapers in Alberta.19 In all, ownership of these papers is broken 
down into six groups20:  
 
Table 2. Newspaper Ownership and Market Shares in Alberta 
 
Major Corporate Owner (10+ papers) BC # papers in Alberta Share %   
Black Press   4 3.773585   
Bowes Publishers Limited - 31 29.24528   
Great West Newspaper Group Ltd. - 10 9.433962   
Independent Group (2-9 papers)   19 17.92453   
Independent Single (1 paper)   40 37.73585   
Unknowns / No Information   2 1.886792   
Total   106 100   
0 < HHI21 < 10,000       2707.369 
 
 
The HHI value of 2707.369 indicates that the market for community 
newspapers is closer to a competitive environment than a monopolistic 
environment, but this is misleading. Community newspapers do not necessarily 
circulate throughout the province, but instead have a monopoly/duopoly in 
their smaller community market. Therefore, it would be useful to examine the 
HHI in terms of total circulation, as well as by breaking newspaper markets 
                                                     
18 The author has noticed that small media outlets such as The Tyee in British Columbia have 
adopted an online-only version of their community newspaper that balances local, regional and 
national coverage. http://www.thetyee.ca 
19 AWNA FactSheet, 2003, www.awna.com  
20 From the CCNA ownership chart.  
21 HHI is the Herfindahl-Herschman index, which the sum of the squared individual market 
shares. A value close to 10,000 represents a monopoly, whereas a value close to one represents a 
competitive environment. 
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down by municipality/county. Examining which communities are served by a 
given number of AWNA member newspapers might give a better indicator. 
Most promising is the data from the Audit Bureau of Circulators in the form of 
the Canadian Newspaper Circulation Factbook, which contains “audited 
circulation data is listed by market, county, census division, and regional 
district or territory for the past 5 years” as well as their Newspaper County 
Penetration Reports, which are based on daily newspaper Audit Report figures 
(Audit Bureau Website). These reports contain a list of all counties by state or 
province, the number of households within each county and the newspapers 
with circulation totaling more than 100 in a county. The best way to analyze 
community newspapers, then, is to determine the “relevant market”, and this 
could probably be done with the Audit Bureau of Circulators data22. If 
community newspapers circulate out-of-county or even out of the community, 
then the relevant market can tell us which community newspapers compete 
with each other for readership, and which ones are a monopoly in their 
community or county. 
The AWNA 1995 Survey 
A 1995 readership survey by the Alberta Weekly Newspaper Association found 
some notable differences between readership of weekly and daily newspapers.23 
The survey reports that 69% of households polled reported reading every issue 
of a weekly paper, and 99% of households overall had at least one person read 
the paper, with half reporting two persons. Daily newspapers were read 
sporadically, and no questions were asked about related advertisement reading. 
59% of respondents indicated that they “always” look at the classified ads, and 
66% reported spending at least 15 minutes per week reading the weeklies, with 
the bulk concentrated around 15-45 minutes per week. When asked where they 
get local news, 50% of respondents replied “local” weekly newspapers, 9% 
responded “daily” and 20% responded “radio” while others claimed “other” or 
“not applicable”. Respondents also said that they used local newspapers for 
61% of their real estate queries and in 41% of the instances when they sought 
information about trucks and autos. In all categories selected, community 
newspapers were the preferred medium. The 1995 readership survey, however, 
is outdated and no new research is being done. 
                                                     
22 Relevant markets in this case would refer to geographical market spaces based on competing 
print circulation of various newspapers within a region. 
23 AWNA 1995 Provincial Readership Survey http://www.awna.com/readershipSurveyProv.htm 
(as of 2004) 
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Weekly Newspapers: Potential Partnering with ISP’s? 
Lowery (2003) surveyed over 100 Mississippi area weekly newspapers using an 
email that invited the papers to participate in an online survey, with a 95.4 
response rate. Lowery concluded that it was “unlikely that many small-
community sites will be able to—or wish to grow … the resources necessary to 
increase interactive options [of websites] in the future” (p.89). His study also 
recommended that chain-owned papers adopt centralized formats in order to 
increase the interactivity of websites. In their review, Mings and White posit 
that small-center newspapers have had positive experiences by combining web 
development operations and news reporting (2000). Mings and White 
highlight instances where internet newspapers offered “bundled” services—
internet access bundled with a newspaper subscription—by partnering with 
local Internet Service Providers, a “popular” but “roundabout” way for 
newspapers to gain revenue (p.84). Citing Meyer (1995), they say that “this 
model is most promising in markets where reasonably priced internet (and/or 
proprietary services) access is not readily available, most probably in small or 
remote areas” (Ming & White, p.84).  
The idea that a newspaper could partner with an ISP to provide, promote 
and foster internet usage by community businesses could also be the niche 
needed to make the SuperNet catch on in small centers. The SuperNet is a “to-
curb” installation, and whether or not an ISP will find it profitable to enter the 
market depends on several factors. Two newspapers in the Mings & White 
study have had positive experiences with this strategy, but cite one limiting 
factor: competition. If competition is fierce for local ISP’s, then it makes little 
sense for community newspapers to incur the up-front sunk-costs of becoming 
an ISP. A better option would be to partner with existing ISP’s in the area. 
Mings & White highlight the experience of one paper, which heard that an 
“aggressive, professional provider” was moving into the community, and it 
decided to “cut a deal for revenue sharing”, reciprocating by advertising the 
provider in the paper, and having readers log-on to the main page of the 
newspaper (Roiter, 1996). Becoming an actual ISP was not feasible for these 
newspapers; however, by partnering with more specialized ISP’s they were able 
to generate extra revenues. Mings & White suggest that online newspapers 
could venture into the web design business by designing web-pages for local 
businesses and then generating site revenue by advertising these sites on their 
main page.  
Lowery also found that the best strategy for web implementation by small 
newspapers was to partner with an outside vendor for web services in order to 
get around the substantial investment in web expertise (p. 88). In Alberta, chain 
newspapers stand best equipped to take advantage of ISP partnerships. Bowes 
Publishers, a subsidiary of Quebecor (Sun Media) appears to have internalized 
web design and offers its newspapers a design template. Some AWNA member 
papers depend on the AWNA for such a web template, whereas Greatwest 
papers tend to be more decentralized. Due to the importance of local 
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newspapers to the local community, and due to the potential for ISP partnering 
between weekly media and service providers, such a strategy could be a 
requirement for broadband usage to reach critical mass in small towns. By 
cross-promoting broadband, it is likely that certain towns could generate the 
“network externalities” needed to add value to the existence of the SuperNet in 
small centers.  
The Impact of Broadband Internet on Radio in Alberta 
A key study done by the Broadcast Bureau pf Measurement studied the 
relationship between the internet and radio (2001). The study found that: “Of 
People Who Have Internet Access at Work: 1) 73% of the people who have 
Internet access at work also have Internet access at home; 2) 87% of people who 
have Internet access at work said they are accessing the Internet the same 
amount or more than they were compared to the same time last year. Finally, 3) 
58% access the Internet at work at least once per day” (p. 9). Of those that were 
surveyed, roughly 80% were aware that it was possible to listen to the radio on 
the internet, and of all internet surfers, 33% had been to a radio station’s 
website, with much of this distribution concentrated amongst younger listeners 
(p.14, 16). Furthermore, 75% of those surveyed responded that they 
remembered the radio station discussing its website on-air (BBM, p.21). 
Respondents were mostly concerned with the ease of use of the website, with 
just under half concerned with being able to listen on-line (BBM, p.22). In 
addition to this, long-time internet users were more likely to attempt to listen 
to the radio on-line and these people were more likely to have made a purchase 
on-line within the past 6 months (BBM, p. 25).  
Of Alberta’s Canadian Association of Broadcasters member radio stations, 
approximately 33% of all stations had a “listen live” feature, and just over 33% 
posted weather on their site.24 Radio station websites in Alberta are not 
technically advanced, nor are they using RealPlayer or Windows Media 
technology. Chain-owned radio stations (Such as Corus Entertainment) in 
larger centers possessed a common design template that had both of these 
features, suggesting that chain stations were centralizing web design. Other 
radio stations used a specialized out-of-house web design company, Maple 
Solutions, to design their web space.25 Internet radio appears not to be catching 
on in Alberta as well as the BBM study had suggested.  
Radio stations in larger centers tend to be equipped with radio internet 
capability. Internet radio is not likely to confront broadcast radio as a displacing 
                                                     
24 Using the radio member list from http://www.cab-acr.ca , websites were each visited, and the 
two key features, weather (a proxy for web design dexterity) and “listen live” (a proxy for radio 
internet) were identified and catalogued as dummy variable, where the dummy was equal to 1 if 
either feature was present, zero otherwise. The average of the dummy variables yields a percentage 
figure, with 34% for “listen live” and 36% for “weather”.  
25 http://www.maplesolutions.ca/ 
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technology, but depending on the costs of relay towers, it might be cost-
effective to promote internet radio. Internet Radio will not likely displace 
broadcast radio due to the automobile, satellite radio aside. Furthermore, there 
is no revenue difference if a person is listening to their favorite radio station at 
work on the radio or over the internet. The only difference, possibly, could be 
in the quality of the broadcast and the person’s distance from a relay tower. In 
this sense, internet radio has potential to expand radio footprints globally, and 
broadband is not likely to have tremendous displacement effects. 
The Impact of Broadband Internet on Television in Alberta 
Most television stations in Alberta have embraced the internet as an 
information medium, especially since almost all stations are subsidiaries of the 
CBC, Craig Media, CTV or CanWest/Global media firms. Of the Alberta 
television stations listed in the CARD Database, 66% of them had the weather 
posted on their website, and 40% posted online classifieds, or had a link to such 
a service. None had any form of internet television broadcast available, 
indicating that internet television has not been the force predicted in the past. 
Alberta’s TV stations tend to use their websites to post breaking news (usually 
tied with the local paper, as with Canwest). The Canwest websites covered the 
local news of major centers in Alberta (with the smallest center being 
Lethbridge), but no links to weekly papers were identifiable. Global/Canwest 
has recently moved to a subscriber content revenue model that limits web access 
to archives and premium content to subscribers only. In this sense, non-rival 
information carried by other media firms is free whereas exclusive content such 
as opinion articles and in-depth features are user-pay. The canada.com website 
offers free email, news updates and financial portfolios similar to yahoo.ca, 
suggesting that CanWest generates an audience or potential market by 
providing the services free of charge.  
Television stations in Alberta are using websites as a part of their total media 
package—links to local news in major centers, financial portfolios etc., and 
seem to be adapting to the general internet use patterns of Canadians. Craig 
Media sites (A-Channel, recently acquired by CHUM) also post television 
schedules in advance to allow viewers to plan their viewing. However, due to 
the lack of robust data sources, it will be difficult to witness any displacement 
effects of broadband internet on television. So far, TV station websites seem to 
be complimentary technologies that serve to build brand loyalty amongst 
viewers. 
The Impact of Broadband on Book Publishing in Alberta 
Broadband internet could affect book publishers if internet users feel more 
confident making purchases online using a secure “always on” broadband 
connection than if they were using a dial-up connection that can possibly hang 
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up when a person calls. Media Metrix has stated that people with broadband 
connections are more likely to make a purchase online due to this psychological 
effect.26 In 2000, the report entitled Competitive Challenges Facing Book 
Publishers in Canada reported that: 
 
Among the major changes taking place in the Canadian book publishing 
industry are the following: the consolidation of retail outlets into mega-stores 
controlled by a very small number of companies4, the introduction of electronic 
markets through the Internet, and a reduction in institutional purchasing of 
books. Internet distribution and consolidation of retail distribution are putting 
more pressure on publishers to offer greater discounts to the distributors. At the 
same time, costs for distributing their books in the US market are increasing, 
thus creating financial barriers to entering into and expanding in the important 
US market (p. 12). 
 
Furthermore, their study found that “[t]he growth of megastore chains, in 
particular Chapters, and the growth of the Internet and companies such as 
Amazon.com, Chapters.ca and others as major distribution channels are putting 
added downward pressure on the net prices received by Canadian book 
publishers (p.77)”. If publishers are selling to a monopsony buyer (single buyer) 
then that buyer can potentially gain market power in the price it pays for books, 
with the result that the monopsony buyer may want to vertically integrate with 
wholesalers in order to streamline its process. “The creation by Chapters of its 
own wholesale distribution company will further reinforce the bargaining 
advantage of the buyers and intensify demands for additional price discounts by 
the book publishers. To sell books in Canada, the roads will increasingly pass 
through Chapters” (CCFBP Report, 2000, p. 77).27 
The most likely impact of the SuperNet on book publishing is to affect 
book sales in small communities. Local book shops are already threatened by 
Chapters in even the bigger centers such as Edmonton28, and in smaller centers, 
some have been driven out by supermarkets and department stores like Zellers 
and Wal-Mart. Future study should examine the psychological aspects of 
purchasing online, how internet connection affects this and how consumers are 
able to expand their domain of choices by making book purchases online. On 
one hand, Chapters could limit selection in order to focus on revenue 
                                                     
26 From an email with Jupiter MediaMetrix. Their data is hard to come by and is expensive. 
27 The Report went on to state: “Chapters accounts for more than 50% of the retail book market 
in Canada, and through its Pegasus subsidiary, accounts for more than 75% of the wholesale 
market. Chapters now charges for placement, a US practise that has come to Canada. 
Consequently, as the retail distributors increase their market power vis-a-vis the book publishers, 
they are demanding, and in most cases extracting, greater price discounts and more flexible and 
generous return policies. The Canadian book publishers’ profit margins are being squeezed 
further. (p.81)”.  
28 In Edmonton, Greenwood’s, a small specialty bookstore, relocated from its home on Whyte 
Ave. after Canadian chain Chapters set up a mega-store just several blocks away.  
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maximizing books, which could create a niche market for small booksellers. On 
the other hand, consumers might just expand their market electronically by 
purchasing from specialty sellers in other cities, provinces or countries. 
The greatest threat to publishers, however, comes in the form of Bit Torrent 
and peer-to-peer file sharing, which is best-suited to high-speed broadband. 
BitTorrent allows users to obtain a full file by downloading bits and pieces of a 
file to construct a full file. Currently, libraries in Alberta give notice that no 
greater than 20% of a book may be photocopied, but BitTorrent technology 
allows users to accumulate full copies through file-sharing. BitTorrent and file-
sharing sites like Suprnova.org have recently been the recipients of a legal 
crackdown by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) for 
copyright infringement.29 The legal battles will likely continue for some time, 
and programs similar to Bit Torrent will eventually come to the same 
conclusion as Napster, which has successfully incorporated property rights and 
copyright fees into its download technology. 
Conclusions 
Of all forms of media, Weekly newspapers stand to gain just as much as they 
stand to lose. Technological change demands new methods of generating 
revenue, and this can best be done by using the small-town newspaper as a 
promotional tool for broadband ISP providers. The SuperNet is a “to-curb” 
installation and some mechanism is necessary to generate a critical mass of 
subscribers in a small area, from which “network externalities” can be 
generated. Future study needs to examine panel (cross-series) data from AWNA 
fact sheets to examine a process over time. It is likely that the SuperNet will 
have a lag effect through time if ISP’s are slow to pick up on broadband 
connections in small towns. Studies should also examine the content of websites 
and their technological level of expertise. Judging from Lowerey’s positive 
response to a web-based survey instrument, these technical details could be 
gathered independently of the AWNA. Finally, newspapers studies offer an 
excellent choice for a study because newspapers are discretely observable, and 
the audit estimates appear to be very reliable. 
 Daily newspapers in Alberta seem to have partnered well with the Internet, 
especially if they are horizontally integrated with television broadcasters. 
Television broadcasters want to have up-to-the-minute news updates, 
something that the daily newspapers can provide. Since Canada.com is a media 
conglomerate website, operations data from the website would yield interesting 
results. 
Radio stations in Alberta appear to be slow to adapt to internet technologies. 
Likely, smaller centers do not feature a “listen live” feature because many local 
                                                     
29 MPAA Press Release for November 4, 2004. http://www.mpaa.org 
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listeners would do so on an inferior dial-up connection. These small center 
radio broadcasters could feasibly expand their footprints by taking advantage of 
such a feature, and may potentially have to expand their technological capacity 
to respond to rural demands for internet radio if relay signals are not strong 
throughout their relevant market. 
Book publishers in Alberta are adapting to the changes brought about 
because of the evolution of online book sales. Depending on how consumers 
behave over a particular dial-up connection, broadband might increase the 
likelihood of rural readers to purchase online, especially if selection is limited in 
their local area.  
Further research should look into community development literature within 
the framework of net impact analysis and conduct a cost-benefit analysis that 
incorporates or estimates non-obvious costs stemming from negative 
externalities.  
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Big Brother: 
Analyzing the Media System 
Around a Reality TV Show 
Tobia Fredberg 
Susanne Ollila 
 
Although decades have past with cross-media publishing held high in the media 
industry, the tidal wave of company activity in the area has let itself be waited 
for, leaving us with a good buzz word and applications of the concept that fall 
short of the great visions of how channels and content could be combined to 
create a new form of concerted storytelling. We see the gathering of multimedia 
content on the Internet, and notice the same material occurring in different 
channels, but the creation of new forms of media where the different channels 
reinforce each other seems to be sparse. This chapter makes an example of such 
a trial. It describes and analyses how different channels can be organized in a 
system around a piece of information, or in this case, the reality TV series “Big 
Brother” in its Swedish 2004 edition. It illustrates how the collective of 
different information and communication channels come together to create a 
media system in which the production of Big Brother, through its consumers, 
takes place just as much outside the televised series as in it. As such, this work 
aims to make a contribution to the literature in the fields of media 
management, innovation and business strategy, as the product concept which is 
in focus of the chapter influenced the whole set of activities and value creation 
efforts that create the strategy (Normann, et al., 1994; Porter, 1996). 
The much loathed reality TV series have evolved into an almost 
omnipresent phenomenon in the public sphere. Their presence and popularity 
can be noted through:  
 
• Their influence on language—to be “voted off the island” from reality 
series Robinson/Survivor seems to become an established expression in 
English, and to call something a “dokusåpa” is in Swedish a 
denouncing expression for something stupid and filled with conflicts.  
• Coverage in the press—scary as it might seem, during the first 26 
weeks of 2004, the phrase Big Brother occurred 254 times in 
Aftonbladet, Sweden’s largest newspaper. In the same time, the word 
statsminister (prime minister) occurred 199 times 
(www.mediearkivet.se, 2004).  
• TV Statistics—during 2004, reality TV-formats accounted for 3 of the 
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25 most seen television shows in Sweden. For Kanal5, which is the 
channel in focus of this article, the first and last Big Brother shows of 
the season were the two most seen shows in the first six months of 
2004 (Allt_om_Media/mms.se, 2005).  
 
When reality TV series are discussed in the academic literature, it is much in 
the terms of critical reflections on the content and effects of the shows. The 
reality TV genre has been heavily criticized for its character of “social 
Darwinism” (e.g. Murray 2001), its impact on the public (Breyer, 2004), and 
whether it is as real and authentic as the producers would like to claim (Bagley 
2001). Despite the loud critique towards the shows, some debaters argue that 
this form of entertainment bears with it the real development within the TV 
medium (e.g. Schultz, 2004). This chapter does not take moral, nor qualitative 
aspects into account. Instead, the chapter is exploratory and aims at describing 
the media system that was built up around the production of Big Brother 2004 
and how customers were involved in this system. 
New information and communication technologies provide existing media 
companies with vast opportunities for development of new media product 
concepts and a different kind of interface to customers (Danneels, 2003; 
Fredberg, 2003) than was earlier the case. With the introduction of new 
channels, the role and the storytelling of the established channels also change 
(Weibull, et al., 2000). The combination of different channels also provides a 
new form of combined storytelling which allows the development of content in 
new directions. When studies have been made of the Internet’s influence on the 
media business, they have to a large extent been focusing on the Internet’s effect 
on the development of different media channels in isolation (Brill, 2001; Chyi, 
et al., 2001; Saksena, et al., 2002; Singer, 2002; Thompson, et al., 2001) as well 
as the problems of finding viable business models for web media (Hendriks, 
1999; Hoffman et al., 2000; Picard, 2000).  
The involvement of customers in many channels seems to be less covered in 
the academic literature. Stone, Hobbs and Khaleeli (2002) discuss 
“multichannel management” but do not argue for customer involvement. Other 
authors have also treated the suitability of different channels for different 
purposes. Sabelström-Möller (2001) discusses the match between channels and 
information categories, van Dijk  (1999) media channels for different uses in 
work and Geyskens, Gielens and Dekimpe (2002) the impact of channel 
additions on the stock market valuation. Deery (2003) makes a very interesting 
expose of what she calls “participatory viewing”. She does many remarks in line 
with the arguments in this chapter, but her focus is on the “refashioning” of the 
TV and she argues pro et contra whether the two channels will converge and if 
so, how. TV becomes interactive, she says, when it is transferred to the web. In 
this new medium, viewers participate and take on new roles. She notes that 
television series get counterparts, both sanctioned and non-sanctioned on the 
Internet, and that it many times is the non-sanctioned sites that are the most 
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important for the production, seen in a larger perspective. Parallel to this 
development is also the development of digital newspapers, which bear with 
them the potential to become complementary, not substituting to the paper-
newspapers as they are developed into a new kind of media rather than a re-
write of the paper editions. The interactivity makes an important difference 
here, as the relation from the newspaper to the community and between the 
community members themselves is an important part of the strategic direction 
of the newspapers (Fredberg, 2003). 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: it begins with a theoretical 
background on channels and their relation to the creation of customer groups, 
followed by a description of the methodological approach that was used. The 
Big Brother case is then sketched out and discussed, and conclusions are drawn. 
Theoretical Background 
Since the introduction of reality-TV series just over a decade ago, the genre has 
literally exploded. Format makers such as the Dutch media giant Endemol 
(www.endemol.com) exploit any potentially spectacular aspect of human life in 
shows such as hysterical wedding planning in “Bridezillas” to free plastic surgery 
in “Extreme Makeovers”, to starving in South-East Asia in Survivor, to Ozzy 
Osbourne in “The Osbournes”, and naturally to people being locked up 
together for over three months in “Big Brother”, as in the case for this article. 
Breyer (2004), in a critical remark of the genre, traces the reality TV series’ 
antecedents back to shows such as “Candid Camera”, “America’s Funniest 
Home Videos” and “An American Family”, a 1972 show filming the everyday 
life of a family in California. The kick-off of the current trend in reality TV is 
probably MTV’s “The Real World”, starting in 1992 with the filming of seven 
young people getting together to share a flat on Manhattan (Bagley, 2001).  
When reality TV series have been in focus for academic scholars, it has 
mostly been in communication studies and political science. Many times the 
analysis has been done either from a critical perspective (Murray, 2001), from 
the point of identity formation in the reality TV series (Jones, 2003), or from 
the issue of authenticity in the shows (Bagley, 2001). Some literature makes the 
connection to other societal phenomena, for example political strategy (Jervis, 
et al., 2000).  
The Internet, a communication tool as much (if not more) as an 
information tool, increases the possibilities for customer interaction vastly and 
hence offers a model for the mass media alternative to the traditional passive 
one-to-many model (Poster, 2001) and the active one-to-one model (Peppers, 
et al., 1997).  The crucial step in the one-to-one model is the engagement of 
customers in an ongoing dialogue which enables learning more about their 
particular interests, needs, and priorities. There are TV shows, e.g. Song 
Contests, Bingolotto that use this model by letting the audience influence the 
show by voting or taking part in a lottery that is broadcasted live (a deep kind 
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of interactivity, according to Deery, 2003). The kind of communication 
included in these situations has more the character of so-called false two-way 
communication (Sjölund, 1979) as the viewers’ contribution of content is 
highly formatted – they are only allowed to interact by answering to questions. 
The many-to-many model that arises with the Internet provides new 
opportunities for interaction and also includes low-format interaction which 
comes closer to Sjölund’s  (1979) depiction of real two-way interaction, which 
allows for more mutual learning and closer relationships. Many companies use 
the Internet as a communication channel to increase customer involvement and 
customer interaction in business. This is especially popular in product 
development (e.g. Nambisan, 2002; von Hippel et al., 2002) and mass 
customization and personalization of products (e.g. Tseng et al., 2003).  Yet, 
little attention is given in newer models of strategy or marketing to the 
possibilities to integrate customers more than has been done previously (Achrol, 
et al., 1999; Porter, 2001), although some, especially coming from the service 
management side, acknowledge the central role for customers in the production 
of value (Chase, et al., 1983; Larsson, et al., 1989; Normann, et al., 1994). This 
is in line with Toffler’s (Toffler, 1980) discussion about prosumers. Toffler 
argued that the home would become the central institution of society, replacing 
the office and factory as a work center in the future. Tomorrow's society will be 
information-based and highly automated, and the TV would be a tool for 
increasing interactivity, making prosumerism possible since consumption in a 
future society is tightly coupled with production. Research made in customer 
relationship management (Nancarrow, et al., 2003; Stone et al., 2002) suggests 
increased customer communication, but to increase customer retention rates 
rather than to involve customers. On the development side, the use of 
customers as resources has been more common (Neale, et al., 1998; von 
Hippel, 1998; von Hippel, et al., 2002). Companies in e.g. the 
telecommunication industry (Magnusson, 2003) use sophisticated methods to 
involve customers in the product development process.   
The common view is that customers only are parts of segments and receivers 
of produced value (Ramírez, 1999). When customers are organized, it is in 
interest groups such as customer movements (c.f. Olson, 1965). One sort of 
interest groups are clans, which Ouchi (1980) and Alvesson and Lindkvist 
(1993) point out as tools for collective actions to achieve joint ends. Alvesson 
and Lindkvist argue that they exist to reduce transaction costs in this ambition. 
For Ouchi (1980), clans denote common values, beliefs and traditions that are 
created through a socialization process. According to Alvesson and Lindkvist 
(1993) they are held together by common views and social relations. The 
authors distinguish between three different kinds of clans through the ties that 
keep them together; Economic-cooperative clan, Social-integrative clan and 
Blood-kinship clan. Closely related to, or even a form of, customer movement 
or clan are customer communities that have been the sweetheart of both academic 
and more practice oriented management literature (Balasubramanian, et al., 
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2001; Hagel III, et al., 1997; Rheingold, 1994). Since a prerequisite for the 
forming of communities is communication, the rising popularity of customer 
communities is an effect of the introduction of the Internet that made it 
possible for people to connect with each other. Customer communities have 
most likely, however, existed for a long time with the identification of other 
customers that use the same kind of product.  
In Muniz and O’Guinn (2001), there are three core components of a 
community; consciousness of kind, rituals and traditions and a sense of obligation 
to the community. Another way to put this is to say that the formation of 
community builds on an awareness of belonging to it, events that community 
members gather around, and an obligation to support the community by 
contributing to its reinforcement (e.g. acting in it). This is consistent to how 
Weick perceives groups to be formed (Weick, 1979). Using Weick’s terms, the 
groups are enacted by acts of storytelling and routines. Without agreeing on or 
having a clear view of an end for the group formation, members settle around 
means for communication and action. Storytelling is a central vehicle for 
groups to make sense of the environment that they are in (Boyce, 1996; Weick, 
1979) and is a central tool in the creation of a storytelling organization, by Boje 
defined as a “collective storytelling system in which the performance of stories is 
a key part of members’ sense-making and a means to supplement individual 
memories with institutional memory” (Boje, 1991, p. 106). 
Media companies have always served communities of different kinds, for 
which the archetype perhaps is the local newspaper’s relation to the local 
community (Picard, 2002). Classic mass media, however, do not allow for 
interactivity (Luhmann, 2000). Still, they are central in community building as 
the media reinforces the creation of social ties. The social ties are built around a 
central phenomenon, for example nationality (Park, 1923) or an interest 
(Muniz, et al., 2001a). The media has an information brokering role in the 
creation (or reinforcement) of the community as it provides the knowledge 
about central activities in the community life – newborns, deaths, traditions, 
meetings and different kinds of identity creating information. Communities 
become an issue in a new respect as different media, in McLuhan’s (1964) 
language, become “colder” (high in participation). The strengths of social ties 
arising in communities that are created through the media (and not only helped 
by the media) is debated (e.g. Wellman, 2001), but they do include many of 
the ingredients normally attributed to communities such as traditions, sharing 
knowledge and participation in the proliferation of the community. Deery 
(2003), assessing the increasingly colder television medium, finds that television 
programs that offer a parallel web channel use the Internet for depth, where the 
web’s spatiotemporal vastness is being used to provide more information, and 
for extension, where for example extra footage or games are being offered.  
The ways in which media companies involve customers include (extended 
from Fredberg, 2003): 
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• Polls 
• Comments 
• Direct questions on content  
• Chat boards 
• Debate articles 
• New ideas for content 
• Pilot program testing 
• Citizen reporting (“Are you close to the accident? Call us!”) 
• SMS & telephone voting  
 
The use of communication technologies in the production of media means that 
a product system of media is created. In such systems, the storytelling around 
the same phenomenon takes place through several channels. The storytelling 
also evidently becomes a joint effort, since two-way communication is included. 
Mass media researchers have addressed this question as an issue of how the 
analysis of audiences changes with the introduction of new technology 
(Webster, 1998). Deery’s assessment (2003) of what she calls “participatory 
viewing” is fairly similar to customer involvement or integration in the media 
system.  
Method 
The research for this chapter was done in a case study of the production of the 
2004 Swedish version of the reality television series Big Brother. The research 
project had two focuses: the planning and control of real time productions and 
the use of a multi media system in the interface to the costumers. To study the 
actual product development and customer involvement, the research took place 
during the period under which the TV series was produced (one interview was 
conducted after the production ended). Reality TV series are often seen as the 
lowest form of entertainment, and the critique against them has bee loud. 
There seems to be very few studies of reality TV series. Most literature to be 
found has a column character and addresses them as shallowly as the content of 
the shows themselves. In deed, the production of a series of Big Brother’s 
character is produced under demanding circumstances—daily shows, 24/7 
cable-TV subscriptions available, story develops during the rime of production 
etc, and involves customers extensively. The research project was an attempt to 
take a serious grasp on reality TV series and we chose to focus on the most 
loathed of them all, Big Brother.  
Qualitative data was collected by means of open-ended interviews with 
seven persons involved in the central management of the production of Big 
Brother Sweden 2004. The Big Brother TV format is owned by Endemol, one 
of the world’s largest format developers. Kanal5 has the Swedish broadcasting 
rights for the show and ordered the production from Meter Film & Television. 
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Meter is included in Metronome Film & Television which is owned by 
Norwegian media conglomerate Schibsted (65%) and Endemol (35%). 
Everything outside the TV-production (e.g. web site, voting by SMS) was put 
in a separate holding company, Big Brother KB, owned by Metronome and 
SBS (the owner of Kanal5). The CEO of BBKB, Eva A, as well as the head of 
web services, Marcus J were interviewed. Two of the respondents, the program 
manager Johan W and the project manager Sara G were from Kanal5. Sara G’s 
responsibility was to supervise the production of Big Brother. Three 
respondents were contracted by Meter and belonged to the top management 
team of the production. They were the producer, Mattias B, the project 
manager Sanna G and the line producer/head of casting Matilda S.  
The persons were selected out of their roles in the central management of 
the TV series. Interviews were held at the production site and lasted up to two 
hours each. The interviewer made notes about the answers and all interviews 
except one were recorded. The interviews were all transcribed and analyzed 
systematically. The questions departed from the production itself and used 
examples from the on-going production to grasp complex issues that the 
management team (both at Kanal5 and Meter) dealt with. A choice was made 
to work with a combination of induction and deduction, in which the 
researcher creates intermediate theories during the time of study on the basis of 
observations. According to this method, new observations are continuously 
tested for consistency against the intermediate theory, which is also developed 
with each observation added. During the studies, the intermediate theories 
become structured and are saturated with regard to the empirical data gathered 
(Alvesson, et al., 1994, calls this abduktion). This systematic approach, being 
widely practiced in qualitative research, has also been argued for recently in 
highly respected journals (Gephart et al., 2004). The collective description 
emerged continuously and the interpretation of the data was validated. The 
respondents had a concordant view which made the use of an intermediate 
theory uncomplicated. A research seminar was also set up at the end of the 
research project with the program manager, Johan W, and the supervisor, Sara 
G, to test and develop conceptual models. 
Big Brother 2004 
Big Brother basics: a number of people are filmed and shown in daily TV shows 
as they live isolated in a house for a number of days. They are voted out one by 
one by viewers during the time of production. Big Brother takes similar forms 
in different countries, but the examples here are taken from the Swedish 
production of Big Brother 2004. In this particular case twelve people walked 
into the Big Brother house at the end of January, 2004. After 108 days, one 
winner was selected through viewers’ votes and walked out with SEK 500,000 
(just under € 55,000). In the house, 48 microphones and 31 cameras were 
installed. The production team pointed out that it is a central ingredient of the 
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format that the participants are kept under complete surveillance. No corner of 
the house should be out of sight for the cameras. To ensure that there would be 
some activity in the house and hence that there would be something to build a 
television show on, the participants were given assignments to fulfill. “You have 
to be aware of that the participants might just sit around and eat an egg for ten 
minutes”, Johan W, the program manager of Kanal5, said. What assignments 
they would be given was decided by the producer Mathias B, mainly on short 
notice on the basis of the amount and quality of actions that took place in the 
house.  
This section aims at describing the system of different media channels, often 
building on interactivity, around Big Brother. In this system, the daily televised 
airtime is only a small part. Even though the observations in this article are 
taken from the Swedish 2004 edition, the show has gone on for many years in 
several countries (this was the fourth Swedish version), so the results may be 
general for several editions. They do serve as an example of the management of 
a reality TV-media system.  
The production staff produced material for several different media products 
and services, as can be seen in Table 1. Products and services included in table 
should be understood as contact points between the producer and the audience; 
therefore, SMS-voting is seen as a service, even though the customer does the 
work. To come past the issue of wording, the term channel is used for both 
products and services. 
Table 1 shows that the produced material was far from restricted to the 
traditional television channel. The storytelling about the actions in the house 
took place in all the channels that were offered by the production team. The 
creation of the media system of Big Brother was not limited to these channels, 
however. The media that could be consumed formed the basis for channels of 
interaction that were only partially in control of the production team, but just 
as important for the creation of the media system. Such was the coverage in the 
tabloid press and the storytelling among customers both offline (here called 
coffee table production) and online (web chat and discussions).  
According to the interviewees, there existed no formal agreements of 
cooperation between the channel and the tabloid press, but:  
 
All commercial TV channels have a non-official, but intimate relationship with 
the press. The reality TV shows have been very useful here, because they are 
broadcasted with the same rhythm as the newspapers. The formats we broadcast 
are very tabloid to their character. (Program manager Johan W) 
 
Before the participants entered the house, they gave a press conference. Small 
pieces of possible news were “leaked” from the production team to journalists 
who  were  allowed to  make  interviews  with  the  participants.  The  
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Table 1. Different Media Channels Produced by the Big Brother Production 
Team 
 
Media 
format 
Channel 
TV - a 45 minute TV show Monday through Thursday, in the team lingo called 
the “Reality”.   
- reruns of the “Reality” each day, and a 2 hour special on Saturdays   
- a 2 hour talk show each Thursday with a live audience, where participants 
in the house are nominated by their fellow inhabitants and voted out by 
viewers, either through SMS or by phone calls 
- a weekend special each Sunday, produced in the same way as the “Reality”, 
based on the happenings in the house 
- a kick-off program in which the participants entered the house with a live 
audience outside. The program was produced as a gala with music 
performances. People in the audience needed tickets for the show  
- a Grand Finale in which the winner was selected. This was also produced as 
a gala outside the house with music performances and audience interviews, 
and comments by former participants. Also for this show, people acquired 
tickets.  
- a 24/7 cable TV service constantly sending pictures from the house to 
which people could buy subscriptions 
Web - a chat room service where viewers chatted with each other 
- former participants or participants that have been voted out were available 
for chat debating forums 
- “news” from the house, published every hour 
- personal facts about the participants 
- possibility to send mail to the participants, of which some were read out 
loud in the Thursday talk show (the participants received all the mails sent 
to them when they left the house) 
- a news ticker service that viewers could install on their desktop. If 
something deemed of special interest happened in the house, the viewer was 
alerted through the service 
- a digital newsletter  
- 24/7 live web camera from the house (available for subscription) 
Phone - SMS voting services 
- SMS services that functioned in the same way as the  news ticker service 
- Phone voting services 
- Live broadcasting of the show in third generation mobile telephony phones 
Other 
media 
 
- a Big Brother theme song was recorded by a pop artist and publicly released 
- the participants recorded their own song from the house. Also this was 
publicly released in a Big Brother CD 
- a Big Brother DVD purchasable through the web page  
 
 
pieces of news were not published the day after, but after some weeks or 
months, when the participants had become known to the public. The tabloid 
press coverage was very important to invoke conversations in areas of social 
interactions. Production of the show, via storytelling, took place also in these 
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meetings among people, for example at the coffee table or water cooler where 
they would talk about the show and its participants, rage over the immorality of 
the show as they would read about it in the press, etc. It may be important to 
note that the producers of the TV show could not exercise much influence on 
these debates other than providing wood and sparks for the fires to keep them 
burning. An important ingredient in keeping up attention was to choose the 
“right” participants. “After all, how interesting and fun people are determines if 
the series becomes successful or not”, said Sanna G, project manager of the 
production. In accordance with this, the casting process was handled cautiously, 
not only to have participants that would create an interesting “story” together 
with others, but to have participants that would create attention in other media. 
If the casting turned out well, this drastically reduced the need to exercise 
control over the actions in the house by giving the participants assignments, 
according to Matilda S, line producer of the production. The urge to get 
attention stood against the risk of being perceived as too cheap; “You could say 
that all press is good press, but there is always a risk of becoming trashy”, said 
line producer Matilda S.  
The production through social interactions in physical settings was of 
natural reasons hard to monitor from the producer point of view. The digital 
counterpart of the “coffee table production” can be said to be the internet 
discussions around the production. A customer that had watched the daily 
reality show might find it important also to take part in the discussion on chat 
afterwards. The internet discussions both took place in discussion forum and 
chat room provided by the Big Brother production team at www.bigbrother.se, 
and in other sites, such as the well frequented discussion site www.alltomtv.se, a 
reality TV fan site in which scandals leaked out. The production team argued 
that instead of trying to influence the debate in such forums, it was useful to 
learn to react to the debate taking place or monitor the debate. This 
information could be used to improve the TV show. At one point some fans 
chatted about possible future assignments for the participants. The production 
team decided to put one of the ideas into practice. Only some minutes after this 
was sent on the television, the assignment and the fact that it was created by the 
fans were discussed on the chat.  
As has been described above, Big Brother was not only consumed via 
television. There was a mutual dependency between the different media 
channels, as they fed back attention to each other. The Big Brother production 
offered several other ways for its audience to consume the program. Together, 
they created the “Big Brother world”—the media system in which the house 
and the participants were in the centre. In this system, the channels were 
mutually dependent. The structure behind the media system did not only build 
on the mutual dependency. They were also meant to contribute to an increased 
level of commitment among the customers. The different channels in the 
system corresponded to different levels of commitment, as described in figure 1 
which was created by the program manager Johan W and the supervisor Sara G 
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during a research seminar. As can be seen from Figure 1, the producers offered a 
multitude of channels that corresponded to a high level commitment. Hence, 
there were always opportunities for customers to engage more and more in the 
show.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by program manager Johan W and project supervisor Sara G at research meeting 
 
Figure 1. Different Channels of Interaction and Their Corresponding Levels of 
Customer Commitment 
 
 
Increasing to the right in figure 1 is not only the level of commitment but also 
the revenue from the customers. There was hence an incentive for the producers 
of the show to pull people deeper into the system. Customers with a higher 
level of commitment were of a greater value to the producers, not only as they 
would spend more money through the purchase of subscriptions or voting, but 
also indirectly as they were more exposed to advertising, and directly as they 
were a sort of “expert consumers” through which knowledge could be gained as 
for how to develop the show.  
Analysis and Discussion 
For the Big Brother case, the product is the whole system of media, of which 
the daily television show is only a minor product. Of this reason, it is fair to say 
that the model differs slightly from traditional models in marketing, where the 
goal is to create an augmented product through adding services and extras 
(Kotler, et al., 1996). Here, the whole system is the product. The core 
component are the actions in the house, but the value-creating system 
(Normann, et al., 1994) is much larger than this. Since the production of the 
Talk show Coffee break, Water 
cooler talks 
Tabloid press 
Reality shows, 
1-2 per week 
Voting via SMS 
or phone 
Visitors to the 
grand finale 
Internet 
information 
Web Newsletter 
Part taking in  BB 
chat room 
Record 
Low commitment High commitment
Reality shows, 3 
or more per week 
Visitor to the 
premier  
Talk show live 
audience 
Chat with those 
voted out 
24/7 subscriptions 
Merchandise 
Mail to participants 
News ticker 
service News via SMS 
Jönköping International Business School 
 66
whole media system involves also the customers and they are indeed involved in 
the system which is continuously being produced and renewed, it is fair to 
speak about customer involvement in a whole system rather than in a few 
functions (as in product development). The commitment of customers on 
different levels also results in an organization of customers where the interaction 
with the customers about the whole product is the crucial issue (c.f. Toffler, 
1980). Since the value co-production from the customers’ side is such an 
important part of this system, value is primarily produced outside the control of 
the firm. It is interesting to compare this kind of model (as Normann, et al., 
1994, for example do) with Porter’s (1985) value chain analysis. The value 
chain model is not applicable in the same way in a system where customers co-
produce content and contribute to the storyline. It is implicitly assumed in 
value chain model that customers consume, destroy, the value that the company 
has created, rather than that value is created when the product leaves the 
company’s borders (Ramírez, 1999). 
The media system built not only on the communication between the 
production and the customers, but also on the communication between 
customers. Through this interaction, social ties and hence a community may be 
formed. The producers of the show helped to fuel interaction by offering 
services that were continuously updated, not only everyday, but every hour 
through the “news” published on Big Brother web site and continuously 
through the 24/7 subscriptions. People taking part of this information were one 
step ahead of their peers during coffee breaks or water cooler talks, Johan W, 
the program manager of Kanal5 argued. In the words of Balasubramanian and 
Mahajan (2001), the customers increased their social interaction utility by 
increasing their knowledge about the program and its participants.  
The social interaction utility is dependent on the quality of the 
communication. The production team provided tools for the interaction 
between customers. The communicative quality is also an issue for the 
relationship between the producer and the customers. Even though two-way 
communication was included in the case of Big Brother, most of it is so-called 
false two-way communication (Sjölund, 1979). The partaking and involvement 
of customers in the actual show was primarily facilitated through the voting out 
of participants that they did not like. They could also influence the experience 
of Big Brother by taking part in discussions in the home page (in  Deery, 2003: 
shallow interaction).  Not all interaction between media companies and the 
consumers of media products today are such that the companies communicate 
in real terms. This is the case for polls or telephone voting, for example, where 
interaction takes more the form of reactions than true communication. 
Research in psychology points to the fact that the quality of interaction, the 
following relation between the parties and the possibilities for learning increase 
the closer to real two-way communication two parties get (Sjölund, 1979). In 
one case the producers allowed customers to influence the assignments given to 
Big Brother 
67 
participants, which is closer to real to-way communication and a deep form of 
interaction, according to Deery (2003). 
The coming of new ICT technologies provided great hopes for the creation 
of new media. The harsh advertisement business cycle created demands for new 
ideas and management innovations in the media industry. To create new forms 
of business offers to an increasingly fragmented audience (Biltereyst, 2001), 
media firms have tried to combine different media channels, hoping that the 
combined offer would create a greater whole than the sum of the parts. There 
seems to have been two major problems with this. First, the technological issues 
have not been easily solved. An example is that it has taken a very long time for 
newspapers to find publishing systems that allow them to automatically transfer 
texts from the paper-newspaper to the electronic version. Instead, a copy-paste-
solution has had to do in many cases. The second problem is organizational. 
The text-sound-picture producing parts of media companies are traditionally to 
be seen as professional organizations (Kärreman, 1996). In large media 
conglomerates in possession of several media companies, the single companies 
often enjoy a high degree of independency towards their owners. The examples 
of how media conglomerates have failed to create an integrated solution 
includes the giant Bonnier project “Koll” which lacked the support from the 
contributing organizations and therefore never became the multimedia meeting 
place that the Bonnier executives wanted it to become. It is likely that the 
young commercial TV channels in Sweden (the oldest of them is less than 20 
years old) is less affected by the organizational issues that influence the actions 
of for example newspapers. Of this reason, they might have been more adaptive 
to taking in alternatives to the traditional production.  
Conclusions 
This article has dealt with the organization of customers in a media system. The 
different channels of interaction were used by the producers to pull people 
inwards in the system. The background intention was to describe the use of 
several media channels in collaboration to understand how a media system can 
be built up. The case of Big Brother served as an example for what reality TV 
series do that contributes to their success.  Deery (2003) argues that reality TV 
series use the logic of the Internet and that they therefore are particularly 
successful in creating interaction. Hence, there might be possible learning to be 
made from this case for other kinds of media productions.  
When customers are involved in the system which is your product, you are 
likely to have a closer relationship to them, which can benefit learning and 
sustainability in customer relations and through the incorporating customers 
deeper in to your system, also profitability. More research and more cases are 
needed to further deepen the understanding of the value and possible leverage 
of customers in organizations, or perhaps also customer as organizations. 
Coming back to the most popular TV shows in Sweden, the top programs 
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during 2004 (Allt_om_Media/mms.se, 2005) were reality TV series (3/25), 
sports events (13/25), the Eurovision Song Contest (6/25) and a Swedish 
musical quiz show called “Så ska det låta”  (2/25), based on the Irish program 
“The Lyrics Board”30. All of these TV-phenomena are based on people watching 
together and being able to share interests. The reality shows have been described 
already, sports events gather an enormous public of sports interested often 
gathering to share the fates of the idols, the Eurovision Song Contest has 
become an event for which people bet with each other and make parties 
around, and in “Så ska det låta”, the main point is that everyone in the program 
ends up singing together, and people at home can join in. According to Deery 
(2003) this is how TV worked in the first part of its history. Hence, to a certain 
extent, the community building and its supporting system of channels is a 
natural heir to the TV-medium as such.  
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Integration Strategies of  
a Niche Communication Company: 
The Case of Gambero Rosso 
Benedetta Prario 
Giuseppe Richeri 
 
This chapter presents the case of Gambero Rosso, a still small communication 
firm operating in a thematic industry that can be labeled food and wine. This 
case has been chosen for the dynamism showed in the last years. As we will see, 
the firm has adopted an expansion strategy on three different levels: 
 
1. horizontal, creating ventures in foreign countries; 
2. vertical, backward integrating phases of the value chain, and  
3. diagonal, launching activities in media sectors different from the original 
one.  
 
From the newspaper publishing sector, Gambero Rosso moved to the book 
publishing and, expanding abroad, to the television diffusion, audiovisual 
production and to Internet. Recently, the firm entered the creation of media 
events and formation’s activities. All these activities have been treated not only 
with an informative, but also with an analytical and critical slant in all the 
different aspects related to food and wine: from the connoisseurship to the 
traditional and innovative refreshment, from the wine’s production and 
distribution to the creation and certification of quality parameter.  
This case is significant for 3 major reasons. Firstly, Gambero Rosso shows 
how successfully the strategic models of the big media groups can be adopted to 
describe the behavior of little firms having a low turnover (Doyle, 2002). 
Consequently, to create horizontal, vertical and diagonal expansion strategies 
there is not the need to reach a relevant critical mass. Secondly, operating in a 
thematic niche through different publishing initiatives, Gambero Rosso has 
innovated the way of dealing with topics, media, languages and targets within 
that niche. The third reason regards the ability to integrate the core business 
activity of a media company with other businesses concerning the events’ 
production and the education at different levels of specialization.  
Over the years Gambero Rosso has been transformed from a media 
company to a knowledge company, as its core business has become the 
production of knowledge concerning food and wine. These issues are exploited 
through different media and synergic activities, so that “economies of 
multiformity” are realized (Albarran & Dimmick, 1996). In this prospective 
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Gambero Rosso has not limited itself to launch one or more initiatives in the 
media industry, but it has done more. First of all, it gave importance to food & 
wine components that did not have media relevance before. It highlighted the 
people behind famous restaurants, the chefs, and it created around them an 
entrepreneurial and cultural prominence. It made comparisons between them, 
telling about their life and underlining their education. The same thing has 
been done with the wine producers, emphasizing how it is important to unify 
technical competence and commercial qualities. In both cases—chefs and wine 
producers—Gambero Rosso has introduced variables never taken into 
consideration, such as the ability to test, to invent new combinations and tastes, 
to apply scientific knowledge and innovative techniques (like the wine-making 
experts), and the ability to gather the connection between the products’ 
development and new trend of life style. In this way the firm gives a “cultural 
and professional emphasis” to activities which have never been object of a 
systematic attention before.  
The first step was to thematize an activity field and to transform it into a 
media subject.  
Gambero Rosso was a widespread publication edited as an insert of a left-
wing newspaper. However, the contrast between food and wine issues, far from 
the political and social commitment, and a newspaper addressed to left-wing 
militants gave visibility to the initiative within broader environments than the 
traditional readers of the newspaper. To follow food and wine issues 
periodically, these readers were prepared to buy a journal without sharing its 
political ideas.  
As a second step, after reaching a good level of fame and a faithful target, 
Gambero Rosso became an independent publishing company with a specific 
identity and distribution. In a short time, it turned into a publication addressed 
to specialists of food and wine and to a generic public interested in improving 
their knowledge and ability of choice in this field. This public transformed the 
issue of food and wine in a conversational topic enhancing social relationships.  
After some years, around Gambero Rosso emerged a community of 
producers, professionals and consumers interested in food and wine from a 
cultural and social perspective. This community was ready to use different 
media related to the issue: from gourmet guides to yearbooks with the wine’s 
classifications, from Internet to television. Around the television business the 
audiovisual production specialized in advertisement and commercials of food 
and wine products developed.  
As third step, Gambero Rosso diversified its business in foreign sectors, 
localizing some publishing products (this is the case of the wine’s yearbook) or 
selling their exploitation’s rights (this is the case of audiovisual products). But 
until now it does not seem that all the potentialities have been already 
exploited, due perhaps to the absence of the economic, the organizational and 
entrepreneurial requested dimensions. The last step concerns the creation of a 
large infrastructure addressed to three specific and integrated activities. The first 
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one is the organization of events regarding the connoisseurship (public tasting 
of products, public preparation of foods by famous chefs, etc) in dedicated 
spaces. The second activity is the audiovisual production and broadcasting from 
specialized studios able to transform public events into media events, too. The 
last one is the education activity in different fields: from the kitchen with 
various levels’ courses (from amateurs to professionals) to the formation of 
journalists specialized in food and wine.  
All these activities have been driven by a specific strategy aimed at 
consolidating and expanding a public of professionals, specialists and amateurs. 
This public has already assumed the form of a community using a variety of 
print and audiovisual media, diffusive and interactive, distance media and live 
media.  
The core business is the production and the setting-up knowledge in the 
thematic field of food and wine using different spaces, media and languages that 
allow to better exploit synergies and economies of scale and scope.  
The following pages illustrate the main phases of the development of 
Gambero Rosso and analyze its activities.  
The History of Gambero Rosso 
Gambero Rosso made its debut at the end of 1986 as the title of a supplement 
of the left-wing daily newspaper, il Manifesto. It was a supplement of 8 pages 
dealing with food and wine connoisseurship. Created by Stefano Bonilli and 
graphically made with care, Gambero Rosso represented a total novelty, because 
it was the first time that a political daily newspaper assigned such a wide space 
to a frivolous issue at that time unrelated to the committed culture.  
This initiative, initially accompanied by skepticism and polemics (because of 
the frivolity of the subject), had a great success since its first number. At that 
time the only Italian competitor of Gambero Rosso was the monthly magazine 
La Gola, dealing with the same issues, but in a more intellectual and cultural 
way.  
In 1987 the publishing house with the brand Gambero Rosso was created. 
This company began its activity with Vini d’Italia, a guidebook of the best 
national wine production that in only a few years became the reference book for 
wine lovers. The value system of the “Three glasses” (symbol of excellence) is 
now a sort of codex, a standard to measure wine quality and a way for 
consumers, restaurants and wine shops to choose products. In the following 
years the guide will have German and English versions, too.  
In 1989, due to the good results of the supplement of il Manifesto, Gambero 
Rosso became an independent monthly magazine of 48 pages sold together 
with the daily newspaper. Following the success of the wine’s guide, the now 
publishing company Gambero Rosso launched the Guida dei Ristoranti d’Italia, 
introducing with it a particular hundredth value system for restaurants based on 
four items (kitchen, wine vault, service and atmosphere). Reviewing Italian 
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restaurants, this guide has now become a reference book in the sector, too. 
Further, Gambero Rosso edits the Almanacco del Berebene, an annual guidebook 
dealing with wines whose price is lower than €8, and the guide I Vini 
Intelligenti del Gambero Rosso, a review of 500 delicious wines selected in 
relation to the quality and the price. 
The guides of the main towns dealing with restaurants, pizzerias, small 
restaurants (trattoria), grocery shops and hotels represent an addition to these 
publishing products.  
In 1991, the publisher group L’Espresso acquired the brand Gambero Rosso. 
Carrying out an expansion project in this sector, the company forecasted big 
investments in the next three years. The idea was to unify the Gambero Rosso’s 
guidebooks with the already famous and well diffused Guida Espresso and to 
maintain the monthly magazine Gambero Rosso as a complement. However, 
after a short time, the outcome of the new initiative was disappointing and the 
accumulated deficit was so high that the Group decided to change strategy, 
dropping off the project of expansion in the sector. Gambero Rosso was sold for 
a lower value than the purchasing price, to its creator Stefano Bonilli. He was a 
journalist at il Manifesto and the brand director when Gambero Rosso was 
acquired by the group L’Espresso.  
In 1992, after five years, Gambero Rosso became an independent publishing 
group owing a monthly magazine of 116 pages and the connoisseurship guides. 
The issues were always food, wine, and gourmet tourism, all of which presented 
and evaluated in relation to their quality and price.  
In the following years, Gambero Rosso launched Gambero Rosso Wine, 
Travel & Food, an English quarterly review edited in the United States. Its aim 
was to initiate the Americans to the Italian kitchen, to its receipts and its 
famous wines. Nowadays, it is possible to find this review in newspaper kiosks, 
in bookshops and by subscription in the States, Australia, Great Britain and 
Canada.  
Between 1993 and 1995 Italy was in difficulty due to the negative economic 
cycle and to a broad political indecision (as an effect of the Tangentopoli 
scandal). The situation negatively influenced Italian consumption and, in 
particular, the consumption of not indispensable articles. Consequently, there 
was a minor inclination of people to high gourmet products. This situation 
brought inevitably to a diminution of advertising and sales in general and 
consequently for Gambero Rosso, too.   
In July 1997 one of the first Italian web sites dedicated to food and wine was 
launched: www.gamberorosso.it. In a few months, the site became a reference 
point for “greedy and curious” surfers.  
Today Gambero Rosso operates in the television sector, too. In fact, in 1999 
it launched the first Italian thematic channel dealing with food and wine 
connoisseurship, Raisat Gambero Rosso Channel. Produced with Raisat, a 
venture of RAI, the public Italian television broadcaster, the Channel is part of 
a group of seven thematic channels edited and transmitted on the digital 
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satellite platform Tele+, now Sky Italia. Today it is one of the most successful 
satellite channels. The rating for the channel in prime time every week is 
around 450,000 viewers.  
In 2001, Gambero Rosso further diversified its supply entering the 
advertising industry: the Group decided to promote its products by itself (for 
example, television channel, books and guides) and the products of clients. 
Finally, in 2002 Gambero Rosso invested €10 million in the construction of 
the so called Città del Gusto, a six levels building in Rome, where the television 
studios for the production of the channel’s programs and the advertisement are 
located. Città del Gusto is the venue of the education activities and various 
events, too. In particular, there are cooking classes, courses addressed to 
journalists specialized in gourmet, and conferences.  
Today Gambero Rosso is a well-known brand all over the world. The 
greatest common denominator of all its editorial, educational and promotional 
activities is the capability to exploit the big Italian agro-industrial estate and 
catering as well as to identify the cultural value of the issue. Gambero Rosso is 
today the leading brand in the connoisseurship sector, becoming the password 
of lovers and experts who want to learn how to travel, eat and drink with taste 
and intelligence.  
Summing up, Gambero Rosso is an economic group with diversified 
activities within the communication field, including: 
 
• the monthly magazine of “greedy and curious consumers” that since 
1986 has been analyzing and describing a lot of connoisseurship novelties 
addressed to food lovers and skilled people; 
• guides of restaurants, products, towns and hotels. The Gambero Rosso 
value system of the “Three glasses” has become the measure of Italian 
wines at international level; 
• the web site www.gamberorosso.it, which has become a meeting point 
for a community interested in and informed about all thematic novelties; 
• the Raisat Gambero Rosso Channel, the digital thematic television 
channel of the satellite platform Sky Italia that supplies a programming 
specialized in food and wine; 
• a television production centre equipped with studios for shooting 
commercials and specialized in events and activities related to the 
preparation and presentation of food; 
• Città del Gusto—the only town founded on the taste—where all the 
educational activities (for journalists, professionals and amateur chefs) 
and the promoting activities linked to connoisseurship take place. 
 
The business of Gambero Rosso can schematically be represented as following 
(Figure 1): 
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Figure 1. The Business of Gambero Rosso 
Business Activities 
Nowadays, Gambero Rosso is the only communication group in Italy that has 
developed a multimedia integrated strategy, specialized in a well defined field 
like the gourmet one and articulated in editorial, television, educational and 
cultural activities. In the following sections we will briefly describe these 
activities. 
 
Publishing 
The main editorial products are: Gambero Rosso, Vini d’Italia, Ristoranti d’Italia 
del Gambero Rosso, and the tourist guides of the most important Italian towns. 
Since 1986 “the monthly magazine of greedy and curious consumers”, 
Gambero Rosso, has been following the evolution of Italian and European 
gourmet, illustrating the trends.  
Totally renewed in the graphical and content aspects, the magazine is 
divided in detailed lectures and spreadsheets about wines and restaurants, 
receipts and itineraries. It is a rich and well made product that gives to the 
reader good suggestions, contacts and information linked to gourmet and 
everyday life. In 2003 its privileged target, as mentioned by the last Eurisko 
survey, were readers between 25 and 54 years old.  
In 2003 the magazine had a diffusion of a bit more than 42,500 copies, a 
figure which increased by 20% in April during the Vinitaly, the international 
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wine exhibition taking place every year in Verona. The main distribution 
channels are bookshops, newsagents, large-scale retail trade and exhibitions.  
In 2003 the turnover of the monthly magazine Gambero Rosso was almost 
600,000 Euros (see Figure 2), confirming the negative trend created by the 
general contraction of advertisement funds after the September 11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Turnover of Gambero Rosso (1999-2003), in Euros 
 
 
In the last five years the turnover of books and periodicals of Gambero Rosso 
(Figure 3) presents a growing trend (+56%), even if in the last year it registered 
a decrease that moved the turnover of 2003 to €1.88 million.  
 
 
Figure 3. Turnover of Books and Guides (1999-2003), in Euros 
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The other main editorial products of the Group are Vini d’Italia and Ristoranti 
d’Italia del Gambero Rosso, that in year 2003 respectively sold 85,000 and 
82,000 copies respectively.  
Vini d’Italia, published by Gambero Rosso and Slow Food Editore, is the 
leading guide of Italian enology and is enriched and revised every year. 
Reviewed are around 1800 wine’s producers and more than 12 thousands 
wines, evaluated with the system of “The Three Glasses”. This yearbook 
presents regional introductions and specifications comprehensible by everyone, 
without using a too technical register.  
For its part, Ristoranti d’Italia del Gambero Rosso is the most detailed map of 
Italian restaurants, articulated in 800 pages and 2600 mentions of different 
typologies of restaurants, pizzerias and wine bars. The reader can find different 
typologies of places. 
In both cases the main distribution channels are bookshops, large-scale retail 
trade and exhibitions.  
 
Internet 
As we have seen, Gambero Rosso operates in the Internet industry, too. 
Nowadays, there are 150,000 subscribers, who daily exchange their opinions in 
the forum and who represent an attentive community. Gambero Rosso created 
a card for Special Subscribers of the web site and the possibility to request the 
Visa Electron credit card “Gambero Rosso Card” (€56) that presents special 
offers, promotions, booking and purchasing of products and services. 
The main advantages of the Special Subscriber are: 
 
• login for the community of the web site www.gamberorosso.it ; 
• 12 numbers of the monthly magazine Gambero Rosso; 
• 30% discount on the events organized by Gambero Rosso; 
• 20% discount on the kitchen and wine courses; 
• 15% discount on the Restaurant Gambero Rosso; 
• 20% discount on the full-dress dinner of Gambero Rosso; 
• 15% discount on the purchase of the Gambero Rosso books in their 
bookshops;  
• 30% discount on the purchase of the Gambero Rosso books on the web 
site www.gamberorosso.it. 
 
From 1999 to 2003 the revenues coming from Internet had an uneven trend 
(see the following figure) reaching in the last year around €66,000 (Figure 4) 
   
Città del Gusto 
As previously illustrated, in the Città del Gusto it is possible to eat, drink, but it 
is also possible to attend classes and to take part in events and discussion forums  
Gambero Rosso 
81 
 
 
Figure 4. Internet Turnover, 1999-2003 (in euros) 
 
about connoisseurship. To allow a multimedia use of all activities taking place 
in the different spaces, the building is all cabled. The Città del Gusto of 
Gambero Rosso can be considered as a real “audiovisual content firm”. Besides 
two technologically advanced television studios used to produce the channel 
scheduling, the building has areas assigned to cooking courses targeted to 
general public but also to skilled persons. There is also a part assigned to a 
bookshop where customers can buy all editions of Gambero Rosso, but also 
high quality connoisseurship products, cooking books and gourmet products. 
There is also a so called “kitchen theatre” and “wine theatre” realized as an 
amphitheatre and furnished as a 9th century theatre. In these places the best 
Italian and European chef troupes cook for the public that takes part to the 
preparation of the receipts and who tastes different high quality wines. Both 
theatres can be transformed in conference rooms.  
The growth of the turnover from the first and the second year of all 
activities related to Città del Gusto is considerable: it moves from €358,000 to 
just over €1.77 million in 2003. Città del Gusto, as said before, deals also with 
education, offering a Master in gourmet communication and journalism. The 
turnover of this activity was in the last year €258,000.  
 
Advertising Production  
With the collaboration of Interact s.r.l., Gambero Rosso produces 
advertisements and billboards, too. Since 2001, thanks to its structures and 
technologies, Interact has been supplying the advertising department of 
Gambero Rosso with a service able to create an advertisement in all its phases, 
from the planning and editing to the broadcasting.  
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Television  
Last but not least, Gambero Rosso is active in the television sector, too. 
Gambero Rosso entered the television sector in 1998, when Raisat, a RAI 
venture responsible of the free and pay-TV television channel transmitted via 
satellite, created a thematic channel dealing with food & wine. Gambero Rosso 
Channel daily broadcasts for 4 hours an original programming regarding food 
& wine’s topics. The editorial staff, composed by employees of both firms 
Gambero Rosso and RAI, has the responsibility of the programming, but 
Gambero Rosso holds a contract for most of the productions. 
Gambero Rosso publishing collects a part of the television channel’s 
incomes, creates many programs that, as supplier, offers to the Gambero Rosso 
Channel company, manages an advertising dealer, creates many advertisements 
and collects part of the rights coming from the selling of thematic programs 
addressed to foreign broadcasters.  
The programs and events’ creation lively shooting, which since 2002 has 
been done in the Città del Gusto, allows the acquisition of “knowledge” to be 
exploited in magazines, guides and other publishing activities.  
Since its launch, the television initiative has reached a good success. 
However, it has been influenced by the slow penetration of the digital satellite 
television in Italy, which reached more than 2 million subscribers in 2003 and 
2.7 million in 2004.  
The main advantage of this channel, compared with other satellite thematic 
channels, is the fame and visibility of Gambero Rosso. In fact, it has already 
created a keen public that usually reads its magazines and guides and uses the 
Internet, too. It is important to remember that in Italy, thanks to the diffusion 
of the slow food in contrast with the fast food style, the interest in 
connoisseurship has been strengthened during the last years.  
The Channel reaches around 450,000 habitual viewers, that is, people who 
watch its programming at least once a week. Referring to a survey conducted in 
the first half of 2004 by Makno, a company specialized in media research, the 
audience has the following features: 
 
• young adult: 55% of the audience is between 25 and 44 years old; 
• 50% are females and 50% males; 
• it has a middle high school education: 75% has a high school or college 
degree (17%); 
• it was already interested in food and wine topics before the launch of 
Gambero Rosso Channel (60.4%); 
• it gives importance to the research of genuineness and quality of gourmet 
products (84%); 
• it is willing to pay a lot for high quality products (86%).  
 
Gambero Rosso 
83 
 
478,731 
1,094,762 
1,268,036 1,388,215 
1,601,917 
0 
200,000 
400,000 
600,000 
800,000 
1,000,000 
1,200,000 
1,400,000 
1,600,000 
1,800,000 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
This synthetic audience description emphasizes that the channel addresses an 
“established” public already interested in food and wine information and that 
watches the channel to improve its competences and its consumption in the 
field. 
The most relevant economic data concerning the television channel regards 
the progress of advertising as showed in the following table (Figure 5):  
 
Figure 5. Turnover of Advertising Channel, 1999-2003 (in euros) 
 
The Mission 
The entrepreneurial orientation of the Group is represented by its ability to 
transform the “well living” passion in a business. The idea of “well living”, 
which widely spread among Italians in recent years, stands for a good-quality 
life-style, with main reference to the exploitation of free time. More precisely, 
its aim is to offer to a well-read and critical public the best proposals for leisure 
time, suggesting the following choices: 
 
• gastronomic 
• enological 
• touristic 
• cultural. 
 
According to the different products offered and the various sectors where it is 
active, Gambero Rosso has different targets:  
 
• the producers and firms in the connoisseurship sector 
• the viewers of the thematic channel Raisat Gambero Rosso Channel 
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• the readers of magazines and books 
• skilled persons and lovers of Italy and its products. 
Conclusion 
It is now possible to identify some key success factors of Gambero Rosso. 
First of all, its promoters have been able to identify a still not completely 
exploited communication sector, giving to its content a cultural relevance. In 
this way, they have transformed the knowledge and the information about the 
food & wine field into an element of identity, characterizing a specific life style.  
The second key success factor is the ability of Gambero Rosso to link to this 
new field a powerful brand, known as a certification brand (especially for wines) 
thanks to the objective behavior assumed by Gambero Rosso with the wine and 
gourmet producers who often are advertisers within Gambero Rosso’s titles.  
Indeed, Gambero Rosso created a unified management of know-how 
regarding food and wine events and expert people. From this knowledge emerge 
all data, elements and information needed to create the different products. 
Thanks to its editorial products and other activities, Gambero Rosso has also 
been able to create a professional spirit recognized by many people active in the 
field of the connoisseurship of wine’s production. Before Gambero Rosso a 
shared identity, an identifiable community within this field did not exist. 
Gambero Rosso raised to nobility a job, which belongs not only to material 
work but also to culture.  
With the launch of the television channel, Gambero Rosso created one of 
the most important international television stocks representing nowadays a 
strategic asset of the group. For this purpose it could rely on the narrow 
collaboration with RAI, which has size, financial and promotional capabilities, 
unreachable for a small and new company such as Gambero Rosso. 
Another key success factor regards the direct management of the advertising 
dealer and the opportunity to offer to the advertisers a variety of 
communication tools that favor the creation of promotional campaigns 
according to the advertisers’ needs.  
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The Changing Structure of  
Media Organizations and its Meanings 
during the Transformation of the 
Social and Economic System in China 
Xin Xun Wu 
Ji Yin Chen 
 
After the transformation of the economic system from a planned into a market 
economy, the organization of media companies has been changing a lot in 
China. In particular, the leadership structure of newspaper companies changed. 
At first, the chief editor and the owner were managing the business together 
under the supervision of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committee. 
Afterwards the chief editor became the leader and general manager of the 
company, always under the supervision of the CCP committee. The key 
element of the change relies on the higher stress laid on management, which 
gained equal importance than the editorial side of the business. The 
organizational structure of the television industry changed more or les in the 
same way. However, the organizational structure of the Chinese media industry 
altogether still needs to explore alternatives to benefit from the transformation 
of the economic system and its further reforms. In this paper we will describe 
the major impacts of the economic transformation on the organizational and 
leadership structure of the Chinese newspaper and television industry.  
The Organizational Structure of Newspaper Companies and its 
Meaning during the Planned Economy System (1949-1978) 
 As we all know, the planned economy system represented the main economic 
system in China from the foundation of the people’s republic of China in 1949 
till the year 1978. Under this system, media were more a propagandistic 
organization of public opinion for the government than a business enterprise. 
In this environment, media organizations were more focused on generating 
public benefits rather than on making money. Therefore, within a newspaper 
company, the editor-in-chief—responsible for the content management—was 
much more powerful than those who were responsible for the management of 
the company. At that time, all employees in the newspaper office were under 
the leadership of the editorial board, while the editors and reporters were under 
the leadership of Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This “division of power” 
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could be addressed in two forms. One form saw the chief editor as leader under 
the supervison of the CCP. According to the other form the chief editor and 
the owner managed the newspaper company together, always under the 
supervision of CCP (Tang Xu jun 2003). 
In the first case the committee of the CCP represented the highest policy-
making actor, and the chief editor carried out the policy made by the 
committee being in charge of the concrete business of the newspapers office. 
However, the non-editing departments, such as the personnel, printing and 
distribution departments, were merely in charge of the internal business affairs 
of the newspaper office and acted as a link between the newspaper office and 
the related departments outside the office. In this case the newspaper was a 
non-profit company (see Figure 1). 
In the second case the owner was in charge of managing the business under 
the supervision of the committee of the CCP. The editor helped the owner to 
manage the content side of the business (see Figure 2). 
One advantage of these two forms of leadership relies on the fact that the 
newspaper could guarantee an effective propaganda of the government policy 
under the supervision of CCP.  
Personnel department
Finance department
Others 
Distribution department
Printing department
News department 
Economic department
Social activities dep.
Special subject dep.
Others
Editor-in-chief
Committee of 
Chinese 
Communist party
Figure 1. The Structure of a Newspapers Company within the Planned 
Economy System of China, in which the Chief Editor is in Charge of 
Managing the Businesss under the Committee Leadership of CCP 
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Figure 2. The Structure of the Newspapers in the Planned Economy System of 
China, in which the Chief Editor and the Owner Manage Together the 
Newspaper Company under the Committee Leadership of CCP 
The Organizational Structure of Broadcasting Companies and its 
Meaning during the Planned Economy System  
Within the broadcasting companies during the planned economy system the 
president of the company was responsible for managing the broadcast 
organization under the supervision of the CCP committee. The president 
arranged the daily business and managed the broadcast organization in general. 
Under the position of the president, there were other departments that helped 
the president to cope with the daily business within the organization: among 
them the department for general editing, for financial affairs, for broadcast or 
television programming, and the technical department. At that time, the main 
characteristic of television companies was that they had no marketing or 
advertising department. Their main structure can be found in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The Main Broadcast and Television Organizational Structure under 
the Planned Economy System of China 
The Organizational Structure of Chinese Newspaper Companies 
within the Market Economy System 
The Organizational Structure of Newspaper Companies before the 
Newspaper Industry Groups were Founded (1978-1996)  
After 1978, the newspaper companies started to be run as “government’s units 
with business management”. The newspaper industry went on accepting the 
dual leadership of the CCP and the news department, as the newspaper was still 
one of the government’s units in charge of propagandizing the government 
policy. However, newspapers became for profit companies. Each journalistic 
unit became an independent corporate body with the power to authorize the 
post, hire the needed people, model the organization and dispense the staff. The 
unit also took on the sovereignty to distribute wages, bonus etc. 
At this time, the organizational structure of the newspaper companies was 
based on the owner leading the editor-in-chief and the general manager (or 
editor-in-chief, general manager and vice-presidents) and managing the daily 
work. The owner was responsible for the division of labor under the supervision 
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of the CCP. Separating the management function from the editorial one, the 
owner became the highest officer, always under the supervision of the 
committee of CCP. He was responsible for the upper committee of CCP and 
the lower management sections from the editorial department to the 
administrative department. 
Usually the leadership layer was composed by editor-in-chief, general 
manager and vice-president. The editor-in-chief was responsible for the content 
of the newspaper, while the general manager was responsible for the 
management of advertising, distribution and printing within the newspaper. 
The vice-president was responsible for the administrative departments, such as 
the personal department. The concrete structure of the newspaper office would 
be different according to different newspapers (see Figure 4). 
Thank to this organizational transformation the management part of the 
business gained equal power as the editorial one and began to play a very 
important role within newspaper companies.  
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Figure 4. The Structure of Newspaper Industry Organization in the 
Background of the Market Economy System but Before the Newspaper 
Industry Groups were Founded (1978-1996)  
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The Organizational Structure of Newspaper Companies after the 
Newspaper Industry Groups were Founded (1996- ) 
After China established the first newspaper industry group in 1996, the Chinese 
newspaper industry fell into the cyclone of merging small newspaper offices and 
turning them into one big newspaper group. All these newspaper groups were 
set up in its original province. The new owner was responsible for the whole 
group under the supervision of the CCP. 
Mostly, the leadership of the unit was composed by the owner, the vice-
president, a general manager, an assistant manager, an editor-in-chief and 
assistant editor-in-chief etc. These people formed the committee of 
management for the newspaper group, which represented the highest decision 
center. This committee was composed by three subsidiary organizations: the 
editorial committee, the economic managing committee and the committee of 
CCP (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. The Organizational Structure of Newspaper Companies within the 
Market Economy System after the Newspaper Industry Groups were Founded. 
Made on the Basis of the Structure of Guang Zhou News Group and Shang 
Hai Wen Hui , Xin Min Evening Newspaper Group                              
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The Advantage of the Organizational Frame after the Newspaper Groups 
Were Founded 
First of all, the new organizational frame of the newspaper industry turned 
many scattered newspaper offices into one big newspaper group which force 
was greater than any one of them before the group was founded. This 
transformation enhanced competition between different newspaper groups.  
Second, together with the merge of newspaper companies, this 
organizational change urged also the bankruptcy of those newspapers which had 
low efficiency. Third, establishing newspaper groups helped the exploitation of 
synergies and the sharing of resources.  
Last but not the least, it was easier for the staff to learn and absorb the 
advanced management experiences and results. 
 
The Disadvantage of the Organizational Frame after the Newspaper 
Groups were Founded 
The creation of newspaper groups was forced by a government decision and not 
by market mechanisms. Therefore the re-organization of the newspaper 
industry did not necessary lead to greater efficiency or better quality of 
management or performance. The overall quality of the newspaper did not gain 
very obvious improvements. Management mechanism, circulation, and 
advertising revenues of the newspaper did not obtain obvious amelioration 
either. 
The newspaper groups are still public enterprise units in which the 
committee leadership of the CCP is still the highest policy-making agency. This 
doesn’t support the application of market oriented management tools to 
manage the groups thoroughly. As a result, it is hard for the newspaper groups 
to improve their performance. 
Some newspapers groups rushed unreasoningly into differentiation strategies 
and wasted huge capitals in investing in projects which had nothing to do with 
the newspaper business.  
The newspaper groups were created to cover news within a province. A few 
of them though could break through the boundary of the province. These 
became monopoly newspaper groups which appeared in many regions, 
therefore hindering competition among different provinces. 
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The Organizational Structure of the Chinese Broadcasting 
Industry within the Market Economy System (1978- ) 
The Organizational Structure of the Broadcast Industry before the 
Broadcast Groups were Founded (1978-1999) 
After the Year 1978, the Chinese economic system changed from planned 
economy to market economy. During that period, but before 1999, in which 
the first Chinese broadcast groups were founded, the structure of the industry 
mainly showed two forms. 
One form saw the president as responsible for the whole company with the 
help of different channel directors and under the supervision of the CCP. 
According to the other form the president was instead responsible for the whole 
work with the help of different directors of functional departments, always 
under the supervision of the CCP. Generally speaking, the great change within 
broadcasting organizations during that period was the increase of positions 
related to the management of the company such as advertising managers or 
production managers who held the economic responsibility. In the following 
sections we will describe these two organizational forms more in detail.  
 
The president is responsible for the whole work with the help of different 
channel directors under the supervision of the CCP. 
 
This organizational structure was mainly based on the channel directors’ 
relatively dependent management power. The structure included many 
departments such as the editing department, the channel departments, the ad- 
vertisement center, the technology center and so on. The task of the editing 
department was to censor, review and rearrange the order of the programs of 
each channel. The programs were produced by the channels and not by the 
editing staff.   
Generally speaking, each channel had a general channel director and an 
editor in chief. The former was responsible for the channel business as a whole, 
mainly including staff related matters, the inside business adjustment of the 
channel and the financing of the channel; the latter was responsible for the 
program production of that channel. The chart of the organizational structure 
can be found in figure 6.  
On one hand, this kind of structure enhanced the go-aheadism of the staff 
within each channel. On the other hand, it led to a vicious competition among 
the internal departments of the broadcasting organization.  
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Figure 6. The Organizational Structure of Broadcast or Television Companies 
in which the President is Responsible for the Whole Work with the Help of the 
Different Channel Directors under the Leadership of the CCP 
 
 
The president is responsible for the whole work with the help of the different 
directors of functional departments, always under the supervision of the CCP. 
 
This organizational form was characterized by the channel directors not having 
management power. The directors of each functional center on the other hand 
had great power. Under the leadership of the president, there were a general 
department for editing, some program working centers, an advertisement 
center, a technology department and so on. After the programs were produced 
by the working centers, they would be sent to the general staff for editing and 
be played by channels according to the characteristic of the program. Instead of 
taking part in the production of the program, each channel was merely 
responsible for playing the program. 
These working centers included different programs such as the news 
program, literature program, economic program, science and technology 
program, legal system program, young program, athletics program etc. The 
concrete organizational structure can be found in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. The Organizational Structure of Broadcast or Television Companies 
in which the President is Responsible for the Whole Work with the Help of the 
Different Directors of Functional Departments under the Leadership of CCP 
 
 
Within this kind of organizational structure it is easy for each working center to 
exert the professional function, arrange the program appearance as a whole, and 
keep the channels in one broadcasting organization away from malicious 
competition. 
 
The Organizational Structure of Broadcast Companies after the 
Broadcast Groups were Founded (1999- ) 
After the first broadcast television industry group was established in China in 
1999, the Chinese broadcast or television industry started to merge small 
broadcast or television stations into several big groups which management 
followed the market mechanisms instead of always applying what the 
government ordered.  
The first broadcast group located within a city was founded in June 9th, 
1999. That was the Wu Xi Broadcast and Television Industry Group in the 
Jiang Su Province. The first group at province level was established in the Hu 
Nan province on December 27th, 2000. That is Hu Nan Broadcast and 
Television Industry Group, which became the mark for the broadcast industry 
group and its system. On April 19th, 2001, the Shanghai Media and 
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Entertainment Group was founded, while at the end of the year 2001, the 
Chinese Television and Film Group, the biggest media group in china, was 
started. 
In the process of establishing television groups, the key organizational 
change relied on the merger of the cable television stations into one if there 
were more than one cable television stations in a big city. Further, this 
transformation integrated the cable television and the wireless television stations 
into one group if there were more than one of them in a big city in the 
province.  
Last but not least, the integration happened between the television industry 
and other cultural industries such as the movie and the cultural performance 
industry. Up to now the television industry groups are mainly composed of the 
following organizational parts (see Figure 8) (Huang Shen Ming Ding Jun Jie 
2001). 
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Figure 8. The Organizational Structure of Broadcast or Television Industry 
after the Groups were Founded (1999- ) 
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The Merits of the Group Structure of the Chinese Broadcast Industry 
under the Background of Market Economic System  
The integration of the broadcast industry and other cultural industries helped 
to increase the power of the groups and make them highly efficient, well-
coordinated and standardized broadcast companies.  
 
The Shortcomings of the Group Structure of the Chinese Broadcast 
Industry under the Background of Market Economic System 
The shortcomings of the transformation of the broadcast industry in China are 
similar to the ones previously discussed for the newspaper industry after the 
newspaper groups were founded. However, the broadcast industry had more 
influence and a more complicated organizational structure compared to the 
newspaper industry. Further research could therefore focus on whether the 
broadcast industry should concentrate or scatter its power in its developing 
process.  
Conclusions 
We can say that the Chinese media industry has undergone a transformation in 
line with the transition from a planned to a market economy system. The 
management side of the business has gained more and more importance, even if 
ultimately the CCP still controls the editorial content. The increased attention 
to managerial issues has fostered the economic efficiency of the companies and 
had led to a first, government piloted, concentration process. The seeds of 
market competition within the media industry have now been spread out and 
the first “fruits” of this sowing can be seen in the current development of the 
media industry, which is attracting high investments both internal and from 
oversea.  
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Past, Present, and Future of the 
Telecommunications Industry 
Jacqueline Pennings 
Hans van Kranenburg 
John Hagedoorn 
 
The telecommunications industry has made its mark in history. It has 
experienced a series of dramatic changes since its inception in the 1880s. After a 
flourishing start, wide-ranging in form and structure, the telecommunications 
industry developed gradually into a public-owned industry without 
competition. Moreover, during the first half of the 20th century, the 
telecommunications industry became a relative stable industry worldwide. 
Nonetheless, in the 1950s, thoughts of deregulating the telecommunications 
industry started to develop gradually. The United States of America (USA) were 
the first country to deregulate the telecommunications market. Many decades 
later other countries also started to deregulate their telecommunications 
markets. During the past three decades, due to the latest liberalization and 
privatization wave in the world, the telecommunications industry has turned 
into a dynamic environment and is rapidly growing (Graack, 1996). In 
addition, new technological developments have created new opportunities, but 
also threats in the telecommunications industry. These developments have 
stimulated the convergence of previously distinct industries such as the 
telecommunications, information, entertainment, media, and consumer 
electronics into a new industry, the so-called multimedia information industry 
(Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, 2001). 
In this rapidly changing industry, the availability of state-of-the-art 
technological know-how, innovations and domestic and international market 
access are critical to a company’s competitive success. As a result of a number of 
radical political and technological developments, telecommunications 
companies needed new or complementary capabilities and resources to fulfill 
the new demands and requirements. Therefore, extensive use was made of 
alliances, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, 2001; 
Waverman & Trillas, 2002). Companies had to reconsider their strategies and 
their product and market portfolio. This is probably one of the main reasons 
why the strategic behavior of telecommunications companies has attracted so 
much attention in recent years, both in the academic literature and in the 
popular press. Against this unique historical background, we provide an analysis 
that gives insight into the most important historical events and their impact on 
the telecommunications industry since the innovation of the telephone in the 
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1880s. The analysis is confined to the strategic behavior of telecommunications 
companies in order to deal with internationalization, economies of scale, 
competition, and recent needs of the consumers for an integrated product 
(Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, 2001). The paper discusses inter-firm partnerships 
and acquisition patterns, because these integrative modes have frequently been 
used in the telecommunications industry, especially in the 1990s. 
Telecommunications companies needed to develop or acquire specific 
technological capabilities and resources to deal with the rapidly changing 
environment. These companies allied with and acquired new companies, in 
particular, young innovative companies from the New Economy with a 
distinctive technology (Li & Whalley, 2002; Stubbs, 2004). The integrative 
modes were also used by incumbents to enter new markets (Jamison, 1998). 
This study is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the early 
development of the telecommunications industry. Section 4 discusses the 
deregulation actions in the world and their implications on the 
telecommunications industry in the second half of the 20th century. This is 
followed by a discussion of the technological developments in the industry and 
the emergence of the multimedia information industry. Although the 
innovations are numerous, the attention is restricted to the general impact of 
the technological development on the industry. Section 6 describes the general 
trends of companies’ strategic actions to adjust to the new demands and 
requirements. It presents a historical distribution of partnerships and 
acquisitions with special reference to internationalization and industries. Some 
conclusions to be drawn from this study are discussed in the last section. Here 
again, a link to the new economy would be nice. An important finding is that, 
next to the increase in M&A and alliance activities, the New Economy 
industries have developed tremendously. These developments created 
opportunities for telecommunications firms to access new markets and enter 
into each others business. 
The Impact of the Telephone Technology 
In 1884, Alexander Graham Bell invented the first telephone. This innovation 
introduced a complete new way of communication. It made communication 
more efficient and faster. The innovation altered not only the types of 
communications services available, but also the industry’s cost structure and the 
degree of substitutability and complementarities of services and products. 
Before the telephone could be put in use, however, an extensive infrastructure 
had to be constructed and the technology had to be made more robust to 
handle long-distance calls (Casson, 1971; Wallsten, 2001a). These conditions 
required huge and risky investments. As a consequence, these investments were 
carried out by the government. The government of the USA was the first to 
adopt and implement the telephony technology next to the telegraph system. 
Because of privately owned telegraph system in the U.S., the government was 
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less obligated to protect this industry (Wallsten, 2001a). The policy of the U.S. 
was to stimulate fair market competition. The competition in the USA 
increased when the Bell patents expired in 1894. Due to these developments 
the U.S. showed the highest telephone penetration at that time (Wallsten, 
2001a). However, other countries were reluctant to accept the new 
communications system. Their governments rather wished to remain with the 
telegraph services, since this was a state monopoly that provided power and 
high pay-offs. When telephone technology became legitimate, the governments, 
particularly in Europe, were also forced to incorporate the new communications 
technology within their system. Some governments introduced the technology 
in their own control and the use of the telephone under strict measures, while 
others let private companies take their chances. In Germany, for example, the 
public was not allowed to lend their telephone to the neighbors. If they did, 
they risked a punishment of six months in jail (Casson, 1971). In other 
countries, such as those in Scandinavia, a more liberal approach was taken.  
Throughout the world, three industrial structures emerged within the 
industry at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. 
The first group of countries allowed competition amongst private companies. 
For instance, the government of Denmark did not wish to enter into the 
telephony business. Thus, only private companies operated in the market. The 
only area where the government did participate in was the construction of long 
distance lines (Wallsten, 2001a). In the USA, the industry started with two 
competitors, fiercely competing over customers. Western Union had the 
advantage of being a national established prestigious company, it owned a wire 
infrastructure all over the country, and had the unique right of building wires 
along roads and on top of houses (Casson, 1971). The Bell Company, on the 
other hand, had the advantage of owning the Bell patents.  
The second group showed a significant overlap with the first group but 
included a state-owned company that was competing with the private 
companies. Norway, Sweden and Finland were the best examples of this 
scenario (Andersson-Skog, 2000). These first two groups were characterized by 
significant competition within the countries. The third group of countries only 
allowed a state-owned company that had a monopoly position (Wallsten, 
2001a). In general, countries from the third group were hesitant to invest in 
infrastructure, therewith hampering the development of the industry. This 
structure was preferred in continental Europe. For instance, France operated a 
monopoly structure of the telecommunications industry since 1889. At that 
time, it was lagging behind in telephone connections. In 1914, France had 
invested in 0.8 telephones per hundred inhabitants compared to 4.5 telephones 
in Denmark (Wallsten, 2001a). 
As mentioned above, in the early stage of the industry, two significant 
differences could be observed between countries with on the one hand, only 
state-owned telecommunications companies and on the other hand, countries 
with free competition in the telecommunications market. Countries allowing 
Jönköping International Business School 
 106
for competition had a higher telephone penetration then countries that had a 
state-owned monopoly in telecommunications. Contrary to general 
expectations, some countries with competition among telecommunications 
companies even had higher telephone penetration in rural areas than countries 
with state-owned telecommunications companies (Wallsten, 2001a). With 
regards to pricing for long-distance service, the countries with competition 
charged lower prices for telephone services then countries with state-owned 
monopolies (Wallsten, 2001a).  
Trend Towards a Monopolistic Market Structure 
Mixed competition structures were present in the first development stage of the 
industry.  After a successful start, the telecommunications industry developed 
gradually into a state-owned industry without competition. The reason for this 
development was that private telecommunications companies concentrated 
their activities on the profitable areas. They only built sophisticated network 
infrastructures in the high population-density areas (Casson, 1971; Thimm, 
1992). The focus and strategy of the companies created an increasing gap 
between the regions. Because a sophisticated communications system 
stimulated the economic and social activities in a region, it was important to 
have an up-to-date network for the whole country. Without a solid and 
innovative infrastructure, the country could not reach the optimal welfare level 
(Chandler, 2001). Due to these developments governments felt the increased 
need to take up responsibility and control the telecommunications industry. In 
the second half of the industrial revolution, the telecommunications industry 
turned into a government-owned business31. The monopolization of the 
industry was a global trend. The monopolist was now solely responsible for the 
technological and economic environment, introducing new technologies and 
coping with changing markets (Chandler, 2001). In this period, the national 
telecommunication markets were characterized by stable growth. The only 
regulatory framework was the government. This situation continued through 
the mid 20th century.  
The 1950s signaled a change in the governments’ perception of the proper 
telecommunications structure. Particularly, the government of the USA wanted 
to allow competition in its telecommunications market. At that time, American 
Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) and its Bell System Operating Companies 
had a monopoly position in the USA. It was created after the establishment of 
the Communications Act of 1934 (Chakravarthy, 1991). In 1968, the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (FCC) 890 Ruling allowed one fixed-lines 
competitor into the market (Kennedy, 1989). In 1969, the USA introduced a 
competitor to its monopolist AT&T. The first competitor that was allowed to 
                                                     
31 This was a logical step because all utilities, like electricity and water, and train services were 
government-owned at that time. 
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enter the market was Microwave Communications International (MCI) 
(Chakravarthy, 1991). It was only allowed to enter the fixed-lines business 
between two cities. AT&T stayed the key provider of fixed-line services. Hence, 
the FCC had imposed regulations to the industry players in order to advance 
equal competition, like asymmetric price regulation and access charges (Green 
& Teece, 1998).   
During the period when a deregulated telecommunications market was 
created, the USA was invaded by many non-USA equipment vendors. In 
reaction, other countries were urged to open their markets in line with the USA 
model (Thimm, 1992). The USA government threatened with trade reciprocity 
(Snow, 1995). The reformation of the United States telecommunications 
industry triggered open competition and the establishment of independent 
regulatory agencies worldwide (Wallsten, 2001a), although it took a couple of 
decades before other countries followed competition in their telecommuni-
cations market. 
The debate for worldwide agreements on liberalization of the basic and 
enhanced telecommunications services took place under auspices of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Particularly, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) was concerned with these negotiations. The importance of 
trade agreements in services was recognized in 1986, when the Ministerial 
Declaration on the Uruguay Round was made public. In 1994, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services was formed, in which all members agreed to 
liberalize their telecommunications industry (McLarty, 1998)32. The General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was developed next to many other 
agreements on the deregulation of the industry, such as the EU Liberalization 
Directives. In many countries, governments allowed one competitor at first in a 
restricted setting, and later on introduced open competition. They also reduced 
gradually their stake in their telecommunications companies after the 
liberalization (Wallsten, 2001b). Furthermore, an independent regulatory 
agency was created to protect fair competition and equal opportunities for all 
companies in the telecommunications market. It was responsible for the 
adherence of telecommunications companies to competition rules. 
                                                     
32 Three goals were apparent in forming an agreement in the telecommunications sector: 
nondiscrimination among all members, market access, and, transparency of laws and regulations 
(McLarty, 1998). Nondiscrimination among all member countries basically means the allowance 
of foreign competition in the member countries’ home market without any discriminatory favors 
to domestic service providers. The market access commitment takes this requirement too a higher 
level, and requires countries in all circumstances to allow the most liberal access too foreign 
providers in their home countries. This means releasing all tariff and non-tariff barriers.  
Furthermore, the member countries were required to employ the Schedule of Commitments in 
1998. This schedule consists of an adherence to the General Obligations, the Specific 
Commitments, and the Reference Paper. The Specific Commitments, such as national treatment 
and market access, pertain only to the service sectors embraced by the Member countries. The 
Reference Paper consists of additional commitments of a Member country (McLarty, 1998).  
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Telecommunications Industry and Open Markets 
In the last three decades, the environment in which the telecommunications 
industry was operating started to change. As globalization set the stage, the 
telecommunications industry became gradually a more global industry with 
increasing competition. In addition, new technological developments such as 
mobile telecommunications and digitalization have had a significant impact on 
the restructuring of the industry. Consequently, governments have started to 
privatize their state-owned telecommunications companies to open competition 
and to establish independent regulatory agencies. As mentioned above, the pace 
of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization however differed between 
regions. The next sections describe these differences. 
 
North America 
In 1984, the U.S. Justice Department’s Consent Decree declared the divestiture 
of AT&T’s operating companies into seven Regional Bell Operating 
Companies (RBOCs), the Baby Bells. These RBOCs became providers of local 
telecommunications services and related telecommunications equipment 
(Kashlak & Joshi, 1994). Their regional character was evident from the names 
the RBOCs had, like BellSouth or Southwestern Bell. AT&T was left with its 
long distance telephony, network, equipment subsidiary and the Bell labs 
(Snow, 1995). The advantage of the new situation for AT&T was the fact that 
they were now allowed to enter the information services market (Kennedy, 
1989). Although the split up of AT&T was an important step in the 
liberalization process of the industry, the RBOCs were still government 
regulated. This was partly due to their legacy of a monopolistic position in their 
core business. This competitive advantage had been balanced with restrictions 
in order to ensure a competitive market. For example, they were not allowed to 
enter the information services market. Even though RBOCs had similar starting 
points, over time, they developed their own strategy and competitive position 
(Kashlak & Joshi, 1994). This development was affected by diverging regional 
regulatory strains and core business growth. Technology has further stimulated 
the dynamics of the industry. Particularly, the mobile telecommunications 
development has changed the environment substantially. The mobile telephony 
industry in the USA was launched in 1984 and grew enormously since 1988. 
Wireless communications was first adapted in the professional business and 
later by the consumer market. (Manova, Brody, Madhavapeddy & Gylys, 
1998).  
 
Europe 
The European mercantilist state monopolies faced a completely new situation 
in the liberalization era. In 1985, the ‘Liberalization Directives’ under Article 
90 of the Treaty of Rome launched the deregulation of telecommunications 
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market in the European Union. The European Union decided to create an 
open and competitive telecommunications market (Watson & Wheadon, 
1999). The consequential re-regulation of the industry was formulated in the 
‘Harmonization Directives’ under Article 100a of the Treaty of Rome (Watson 
& Wheadon, 1999). However, the Directives did not stress the pace of 
harmonization in the European Union. Consequently, countries have 
implemented these directives into their existing structures in a different way and 
pace. However, the creation of an open market has actually started after the 
acceptation of the Full Competition Directive in 1996. This Directive required 
all member states to have a completely liberalized telecommunications market 
in 1998. Table 1 presents an overview of the dates on which the European 
member states privatized and liberalized their telecommunications market.                         
Most EU countries have fully liberalized their telecommunications industry 
in 1998. Still, the table also shows that not all countries have fully privatized 
their telecommunications incumbent. Switzerland and Greece are some of the 
countries that have not fully privatized their telecommunications market yet. 
The UK, on the other hand, was the first EU member state that privatized and 
liberalized its telecommunications industry. The acceptance of the 1984 
Telecommunication Act has started the liberalization process of the industry in 
the UK (Thimm, 1992). Nonetheless, the United Kingdom gradually 
liberalized its telecommunications structure starting from a monopoly to a 
duopoly to partial liberalization and then full liberalization over a time span of 
12 years. Regulation during this period was tight. For instance, the duopolists, 
Mercury and British Telecom, both were subject to regulation to ‘level the 
playing field’, like interconnection price regulation, and a broadcast-
entertainment-services entry restriction. But also asymmetric regulation was 
present, like retail price caps (British Telecom only), and network development 
restrictions (Mercury only). All restrictions were administered by OFTEL, the 
independent regulatory agency for the UK (Cave & Williamson, 1996). In 
1996, full liberalization set in, and OFTEL repositioned itself as a body 
concerned with competition issues, instead of a regulatory institution. It 
concentrated on eradication of anti-competitive behavior (Cave & Williamson, 
1996). 
EU community policies were needed to guide the liberalization and 
standardization of the industry. The community policies were formed for the 
so-called radio spectrum. The radio spectrum consists of mobile and satellite 
communications, broadcasting, transport and R&D. These community policies 
were translated into regulations and downwards communicated by the 
European Conference of Telecommunications administrations (CEPT) to 
independent regulatory authorities, like OFTEL, and the community 
(Economic Commission, 1998, p. 14)33.  
                                                     
33 This section reports issues discussed in a green paper. Green papers are studies that give 
recommendations and are a basis for debate on the subject, whereas White papers contain the 
directives for realization of certain policies in the European Union (Thimm, 1992). Green papers 
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Table 1. Dates of Privatization and Liberalization in the European Countries, 
1984-2004 
 
Year Partial privatization Complete 
privatization 
Liberalization 
1984 United Kingdom 
(52.4%)34 
  
1987 Spain (66.8 %)   
1991 United Kingdom 
(78.2%) 
 United Kingdom 
1993  United Kingdom Sweden 
1994 Denmark  
Netherlands 
  
1995   Finland 
1996 Germany (26 %) 
Portugal (49 %) 
  
1997 Austria  
France 
Italy 
Spain Denmark  
1998 Switzerland (49.99 %) 
Finland (22.2 %) 
Denmark Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Switzerland 
1999 Finland (42.4 %)   
2000 Austria (55.6 %) 
Finland (47.2 %) 
Norway (22.3 %) 
Sweden 
Portugal  
2001   Greece 
2002 Belgium (50 % - 1 
share) 
Switzerland (40 %) 
Finland (19.4 %)35 
Italy  
2004 Greece (66.3 %) 
Switzerland (33.9 %) 
  
Sources: Annual reports and websites of the formerly state-owned companies. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
give an accurate description of what is relevant in the discussion about this industry, which 
objectives the European Committee embraces as imperative for this business, and the European 
governments sincerely draw on the suggestions. 
34 (..%) = percentage privatized. 
35 In 2002, the Finnish state had a 19,4 % stake in TeliaSonera and the Swedish state had a stake 
of 46 %. 
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The changes in the telecommunications environment of Eastern European 
countries were relatively similar to Western European countries. Their 
telecommunications industry showed comparable developments as in the 
Western European countries, although on a more gradual level. Next to the 
introduction of competition, the CEE countries also needed to modernize 
telecommunications services and develop a network (Holcer, 1995). Currently, 
most former state-owned telecommunications companies in Eastern Europe 
and the Baltic States are owned by foreign companies, in particular Western 
European telecommunications companies (Telcap, 2005).  
 
Asia and Pacific Region 
The GATS at the Uruguay Round also forced the Asian governments to 
liberalize their telecommunications industry, although the Asian region 
generally lagged behind in starting this course of action in comparison with 
Europe or North America. When competition was introduced in Asia, it 
happened only partially for certain regions or certain services (Fink, Mattoo & 
Rathindran, 2003). Unrestricted entry, limitless private and foreign ownership, 
and independent regulatory bodies are still far away from realization of the 
agreements. (Fink et al., 2001). Table 2 presents the privatization policy of the 
fixed-line monopolies, considering local, long-distance and international 
services; and the presence of mobile operators in 17 Asian countries in the 
period 1989-1999.  
Table 2 illustrates the mixture of methods used in telecommunications 
reform, too. Countries, like Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam 
showed limited or no privatization efforts. In China, India and South-Korea a 
few privatization barriers were removed. They maintained the position of the 
incumbent as a fully state-owned company while allowing some competition in 
certain fixed-line divisions. A more liberal situation was observed, for example, 
in Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Pakistan and Singapore. However, this group 
of countries has also kept their competition restricted to particular areas and 
time periods. For instance, Japan opened parts of its telecommunications 
market in 1985. The new entrants were allowed in all markets, except for the 
local communications networks, even if also the latter was gradually liberalized 
over time (Omura, 1997; Tanaka, 1997).  
Furthermore, foreign ownership of the telecommunications companies was 
not allowed or limited (Fink et al., 2001). For instance, in the first years of 
deregulation in Japan, foreign ownership was restricted to one-third (Omura, 
1997). In general, governments in Asia believed that especially the local 
providers generated the highest pay-offs and contributed most to the economic 
and social development of their country. A key industry as the 
telecommunications industry should therefore be fully controlled by the 
government or fully domestically owned. When foreign competition was 
allowed it was in the form of equity joint ventures to increase the knowledge of 
local companies.  
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Table 2. Stages of Telecommunication Reform Policy in 17 Asian Countries, 
1989-1999 
 
Fixed-line services Country 
 
 
% 
Privatization 
state-owned 
monopoly 
Local Long-
distance 
International 
Number 
of Mobile 
operators 
Bangladesh  Monopoly, 
Competition 
in selected 
rural areas 
Monopoly Monopoly 1999: 4 
Cambodia  Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 1999: 4  
China 0% Monopoly 1997: 
Duopoly 
Monopoly 1989: 1 
1996: 2 
Hong 
Kong 
 1999: Fixed 
competition 
n.a. 1999: 
Competition 
1999: 6 
India 0% 1998: 
Regional 
duopolies 
1999: 
Competition 
Monopoly 1995: 8 
1999: 20 
Indonesia 1995: 19% 
1997: 23% 
1999: 
Monopoly, 
joint 
ventures in 
selected areas 
Monopoly 1999: 
Duopoly 
1989: 1 
1996: 7 
Japan  1999: 
Competition 
1999: 
Competition 
1999: 
Competition 
1999: 
Competitio
n 
Korea 1993: 10% 
1996: 29% 
Monopoly 1996: 
Duopoly 
1991: Fixed 
competition 
1989: 1 
1997: 5 
Malaysia 1990: 25% 1996: Fixed 
competition 
1996: Fixed 
competition 
1994: Fixed 
competition 
1989: 2 
1997: 8 
Nepal  Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly n.a. 
Pakistan 1994: 12% Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 1990: 2 
1995: 3 
Philippines 1989: 100% 1995: Fixed 
competition 
1995: Fixed 
competition 
1992: Fixed 
competition 
1991: 2 
1994: 5 
Singapore 1993: 11% 
1996: 17% 
1999: 
Duopoly 
Monopoly 1999: 
Duopoly 
1989: 1 
1999: 3 
Sri Lanka 1997: 34% 1996: Fixed 
competition 
1996: Fixed 
competition 
Monopoly 1989: 1 
1995: 4 
Thailand  Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 1999: 5 
Taiwan-
China 
 1999: 
Competition 
1999: 
Competition 
1999: 
Competition 
1999: 6 
Vietnam  Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 1999: 3 
Source: Fink, C., Mattoo, A. & Rathindran, R. (2001).  
 
 
The regulation in the mobile services was more relaxed, although the number of 
licenses, and thus the number of operators, was limited to a few, except for 
India, that registered 20 mobile operators in 1999. The mobile services were 
comparatively young and were not publicly owned in most countries. In the last 
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years, these services showed tremendous growth and in some Asian countries 
the number of mobile subscribers even passed the number of fixed-line 
subscribers (Fink et al., 2001). 
Australia and New Zealand also liberalized their telecommunications 
markets gradually. In Australia when competition was introduced, Telstra, the 
former state-owned monopolist, was under tight control concerning its prices, 
through price caps and tariff requirements. In New Zealand, the control on 
prices and interconnection was less stringent. Australia regulated the possibility 
of interconnection for Optus, and New Zealand simply encouraged Telecom, 
the former state-owned monopolist, to allow Clear on the local access network 
(Green & Teece, 1998). In both countries, the mobile telecommunications 
industry was less constrained with regulation. As a result, the mobile 
telecommunications industry showed an explosive growth in competition 
(Green & Teece, 1998).  
 
Telecommunications Industry and Technological Developments 
In recent years, the telecommunications industry has evolved from 
manufacturing and providing basic fixed line telephony to an industry that 
offers mobile telecommunications services, and integrates IT and media into its 
services (Bourreau & Doğan, 2001). In particular, mobile telecommunications 
innovation and digitalization have substantially changed the 
telecommunications landscape. The mobile telecommunications innovation has 
offered new forms of communications and services such as analog/digital 
cellular services, cordless telephony, trunking, and paging services (Krogt, 
1996)36. Particularly, the use of mobile services has dramatically grown in the 
last decade. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
(2002c), the total number of mobile subscribers in the world increased from 
approximately 145 million to 1405 million respectively over the period 1996 - 
200337. However, the total number of fixed line subscribers in the world 
increased only from 738 million to 1143 million over the same period. Hence, 
the total number of subscribers for mobile services exceeded the total number of 
subscribers for fixed services in 2002 (ITU, 2002b). Figure 1 presents the 
development of the number of subscribers in fixed line and mobile services. The  
                                                     
36 Cellular telephony takes up the largest part of mobile services. 
37 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is responsible for the development and 
standardization of telecommunication services in Western countries. Furthermore, it also 
stimulates and supports the construction of telecommunication networks and services in Less 
Developed Countries. The International Telegraph Union was established May 17th, 1865. When 
the telephone came into commercial use, the International Telegraph Union got involved into 
this part of communications as well. In 1903, the preliminary forms of radio communications 
became a part of the union as well. The mixture of these two fields was the underlying cause for 
the official name change in 1934 of the International Telegraph Union into the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU, 2002a). The ITU is an affiliation of the United Nations (UN) 
and 186 countries are member.  
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Source: ITU (2002c).  
 
Figure 1. Development of Total Number of Fixed Telephone Lines and 
Mobile Cellular Subscribers Worldwide, 1991-2003 
 
 
evidence shows the tremendous increase of mobile services starting at the end of 
the 1990s. 
The other main development that has had a significant impact on the 
landscape was the digitalization. Since the digital technological development, a 
convergence between the telecommunications industry and the information 
technology industry is observed. The digitalization of the telecommunications 
industry is the direct effect of the rapid expansion of Internet. The number of 
users globally rose from 20 million in 1996 to 400 million in 2000 (ITU, 
2002b). The convergence of industries or digitalization of the telecommuni-
cations industry is the interplay of four different areas: customer devices, 
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networks, network devices and content/software (Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, 
2001). Customer devices are the apparatus to receive and communicate, like 
telephones and PCs. Networks are links that transfer information. Network 
devices are the tools that control and accumulate the information. 
Content/software denotes the applications people employ (Thimm, 1992).  
An additional integration is observed between telecommunications, 
consumer electronics, and mass media. Nowadays, telecommunications services 
can generally be classified into two categories: basic services and enhanced 
services (McLarty, 1998). Basic telecommunication services consist of all voice 
and non-voice services transmitted without processing. Enhanced 
telecommunications services include specialized voice and non-voice services, 
requiring information processing, which adds value. The information 
transferred from one point to the other needs restructuring or a format change 
during this process. An example of enhanced services are the features on a 
mobile phone. Nowadays, mobile phones include the ability to make photos, 
tape a short video, or listen to the radio and mass media can deliver their 
content via satellite and telephony (Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, 2001). When 
integrating the four areas, telephone, mass media, consumer electronics and 
computing, a new industry has developed, called the multimedia information 
industry (Fransman, 1997; Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, 2001).  
Another recent development in the telecommunications industry is the 
emergence of the so-called value network. Aggressive competition by new 
entrants from different industries in the New Economy has forced incumbent 
telecommunications companies to reconfigure their strategy and business. In 
this context, a new development is the value network. In a value network, 
companies from different industries jointly offer products to customers (Li & 
Whalley, 2002). These value networks are made up of firms from the 
traditional economy but also from the New Economy. The value network is 
comprised of six areas: equipment and software, network, connectivity, 
navigation and middleware, applications and consumers (Li & Whalley, 2002).  
Related to the value network is the concept of one-stop-shopping. Within one-
stop-shopping, customers prefer only one incumbent to maintain all links 
leased through the network (Graack, 1996). Here, all services needed by the 
consumer should operate as if they belong to the same overarching network. 
Companies are, therefore, forced to engage in a search process for additional 
activities in an attempt to improve their ‘fit’ with these new business 
requirements. For this purpose various forms of collaborations between 
incumbents and innovative new firms in the field is being exploited (Li & 
Whalley, 2002). An example is the acquisition of Tymnet, a network systems 
company, by British Telecom in order to provide customers with one-stop-
shopping. Through this acquisition, BT is able to offer customers a portfolio of 
products in global data networks. 
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Strategic Behavior of Telecommunications Companies 
Due to deregulation, technological innovation and the convergence of 
industries the telecommunications landscape has changed into a turbulent 
environment. The telecommunications companies had to make adequate 
adaptations to these changes and responded quickly to improve or to sustain 
their competitive advantage (Jamison, 1998; Hamel & Prahalad, 1996; 
Chakravarthy, 1997). They have used several vehicles to adapt to the new 
requirements and to improve their long-term performance (Chakrabarti, 
Hauschildt & Sueverkruep, 1994; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1996; 
Williamson, 1996). The choice for a telecommunications company may range 
from a ‘simple’ non-equity agreement to a partial or even full equity transaction 
such as a joint venture, acquisition or merger. A non-equity agreement is any 
contractual agreement between two or more companies in which none of the 
companies have a degree of ownership. It is generally believed that this type of 
alliance has a relative short-term focus. An alliance with a more long-term focus 
is the joint venture. It is a joint effort to achieve interests through the formation 
of a new entity by two or more business partners. The new entity can have 
different ownership structures; however, in most cases the equity is distributed 
equally among the partners. Chan-Olmsted and Jamison (2001) researched the 
forms of alliances undertaken by telecommunication companies worldwide. 
They found that partnerships have frequently been used in the 
telecommunications industry, especially in the 1990s and they anticipated this 
trend to continue for the following reasons: globalization, economies of scale, 
competition, and, integrated product needs of the consumer. Technological 
advancement also is an important motive for the formation of alliances. Figure 
2 shows the development of the number of partnerships by the 
telecommunications companies in the world since 1985. The number of 
alliances has increased dramatically in the 1990s.  
However, a telecommunications company can not only use  partnerships, it 
can also choose to acquire the operating assets of another company in exchange 
for either, cash, securities, or a combination of both (Capron & Mitchell, 
1998). It can acquire a minority stake (acquisition of less than 50% equity) in 
another company or a majority stake (acquisition of more than 50% equity) in 
the company. The latter form provides the acquirer with an absolute controlling 
stake in the company. This means that the acquiring company will have a 
certain degree of authority over what happens in the telecommunications 
company. In an acquisition, the acquiring firm assumes the assets and liabilities 
of the acquired company (Gaughan, 1991). In the case of an acquisition the 
acquiring company continues to exist, whereas a merger is a combination of 
two or more firms in which a new firm is created. A merger joins resources of 
the separate entities in order to reach common goals. Figure 3 shows the 
development of the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the 
telecommunications industry from 1985 to 2000. The number of M&As also 
increased dramatically in the 1990s. 
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Given the globalization and the liberalization of telecommunications industry, 
many incumbents were forced to develop international strategies (Oh, 1996). 
Through international strategies, companies were able not only to enter foreign 
markets, but also to seek foreign assets (both of a tangible and an intangible 
nature) and to build R&D, supply and production facilities abroad. External 
strategic options such as an acquisition of or a partnership with a young local 
company from the traditional or New Economy provide an established market 
position, access to existing infrastructure, and contact with local expertise. For 
example, KPN acquired Pantel, a Polish fixed-lines telecommunications 
company, the Belgian mobile operator BASE, and has a majority stake in E-
Plus, a German mobile operator. Also, these strategic forms give companies 
access to a range of capabilities that they need to further develop both core 
activities and complementary activities. For example, BT acquired the U.S. 
network systems company Tymnet, the Spanish network services firm Banco 
Santander, and acquired several stakes in telecommunications companies in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Of course, firms could also enter foreign markets by setting 
up wholly owned subsidiaries. As foreign markets might be difficult to 
penetrate because of a lack of market presence and lack of information on 
customers’ needs, local operating conditions and government regulations, 
companies generally prefer partnerships and M&As. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
gradually increasing importance of telecommunications companies allying with 
international partners and to become involved in cross-border M&As. During 
the final years of the 1990s, the international focus increased exponentially. In 
general, the telecommunications industry has become more internationalized in 
the last decade.  
Furthermore, technological developments have also created new 
opportunities and threats for incumbents (Chacko & Mitchell, 1998; 
Kranenburg, Cloodt & Hagedoorn, 2001). Previously distinct industries have 
converged and new substitutes and complementary products and services have 
been introduced in the market. To maintain their competitive position, 
telecommunications companies gained access to new and complementary 
capabilities, resources and businesses. The companies allied with companies 
from other industries and acquired companies in expanding and potential 
markets because of possible increased production, stronger market presence, 
greater control over industry direction and decreasing competitive pressure 
(Jamison, 1998). Particularly, inter-firm partnerships can play an important 
role in an industry where learning and flexibility form the basis of competition 
(Dussauge & Garrette, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Duysters & Hagedoorn, 
1999). Partnerships in the telecommunications industry are particularly suited 
to monitor new opportunities and markets at relatively low cost. They are a 
more flexible and less expensive mode to set up. Consequently, partnering 
between established and younger firms from different industries is expected to 
have increased during the last decade. For example, Telefonica has a partnership 
with California Micro Devices,  an equity  stake in the provider of software and  
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Source: Thomson Security Data (2003) 
 
Figure 2. Development of Total Number of Alliances, Total Number of 
Domestic Alliances and Total number of Within the Industry Alliances in the 
Telecommunications Industry, 1985-2000 
 
 
and computer consulting services INFONET, a strategic alliance with IBM 
involved in information technology, and an equity stake in the producer of 
audiovisual content Patagonik Film group. Figure 2 presents the development 
of the number of alliances made by companies in the telecommunications 
industry. The minority of partnerships was focused on the telecommunications 
industry as such38. During the final years of the 1990s, the growth of this group 
                                                     
38 Based on the two digit SIC-code 48 a distinction was made between telecommunications 
activities and non telecommunications activities. 
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of partnerships was lower than the growth of alliances with partners from other 
industries. Figure 3 also shows the same pattern for M&As. For the 1990s the 
share of M&As of firms from outside the telecommunications industry was 
higher than the share of within the industry M&As. The second half of the 
1990s marked a sudden increase in the share of M&As of companies from other 
industries. 
 
 
 
Source: Thomson Security Data (2003) 
 
Figure 3. Development of Total Number of M&As, Total Number of Cross-
Border M&As and Total Number of Within the Industry M&As in the 
Telecommunications Industry, 1985-2000 
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Conclusions 
The telecommunications industry has been through some major developments 
in its lifetime. It started out with a mixture of privately owned and state-owned 
companies throughout the world. In the first half of the 20th century, the 
telecommunications industry turned into a relative stable industry, which was 
completely government-owned. During the last decades, due to the 
liberalization and the privatization wave in the world, the telecommunications 
industry has rapidly changed. This study showed that many countries 
experienced a gradual process of liberalization with the goal of full 
liberalization. When competition was allowed in the industry, the trend was to 
first allow one vertically-integrated competitor into the market to create a player 
of similar strength with comparable resources as the previous monopolist had. 
The succeeding phase was one of more open competition. However, 
liberalization and privatization not only turned around the outlook of the 
telecommunications market but also the speed and extent of technological 
developments. Due to innovations, the telecommunications industry, together 
with other industries, is rapidly transforming into a new industry, the so-called 
multimedia-information industry. The industry is the focal industry in the third 
generation of leading industries (Thimm, 1992).  
Deregulation, globalization and introduction of new technologies such as 
mobile phones and Internet have forced the telecommunications companies to 
reconsider their strategy and their product portfolio. In that context, companies 
have tried to develop and gain access to desired capabilities and resources and 
expanded across national boundaries to sustain their competitive advantages. 
Companies that lack some of the necessary new competencies used mergers, 
acquisitions, and partnerships with young innovative companies to acquire the 
essential technological knowledge and to penetrate new markets. During the 
1990s, the telecommunications companies were major acquirers of other 
companies and interesting partners for alliances, therefore sustaining the 
emergence of the New Economy. 
This study also presented a general overview of major trends in inter-firm 
partnerships and M&As in the telecommunications industry since 1985, 
examining both the general developments and the distribution according to 
internationalization and industries. The overall trends demonstrated an increase 
in importance of inter-firm partnerships and M&As. The number of domestic 
inter-firm partnerships and M&As as well as the international inter-firm 
partnerships and cross border M&As showed an increasing pattern. Another 
interesting pattern was the increase in importance of other industries. In relative 
terms, the growth of alliances with partners outside the telecommunications 
industry superseded the increase in the number of alliances within the industry. 
M&As demonstrated the same pattern as the inter-firm partnerships. An 
explanation for this specific pattern can be found in the companies’ need for 
new capabilities and resources emerging from the New Economy in order to 
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compete in an industry that is transforming into a multimedia information 
industry. 
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The Key of Success, the Cause of Failure: 
A Comparative Analysis of 
Two UK Digital Television Companies 
Giuseppe Pagani 
Benedetta Prario 
Fabiana Visentin 
Yvonne Zorzi 
  
The process of digitalization has transformed not only the way people watch 
television but also the way in which television industry works. The competitive 
dynamics that feature the digital television industry limit the likelihood for new 
entrants to survive when incumbent organizations have already settled their 
dominance in the industry. The UK digital television market can be regarded as 
a remarkable example of such competitive dynamics. In 1998, BSkyB entered 
the digital television market, after having strengthened its experience in the 
analogue television domain, becoming the dominant operator in only a few 
years. One month later, ONdigital decided to enter the same market. 
ONdigital, however, came across completely different outcomes. Indeed, in 
four years the company announced its failure. 
Our aim is to contribute to a better understanding of media firms’ reactions 
to the opportunities of the “New Economy” era. In particular, the comparison 
of BSkyB and ONdigital allows us to shed light on the factors that might 
potentially lead to the success or failure of companies in the digital television 
industry, a typical sector of the new economy wave. Such analysis will be 
conducted on the basis of two theoretical frameworks: Resource Based View 
and Institutional Theory. The Resource Based View revealed to be valuable in 
highlighting the gap between the set of resources, which the two companies 
could rely on. Resource availability was undeniably in favor of BSkyB, allowing 
the company to plan and implement a successful strategy. ONdigital (later ITV 
Digital) merely replicated BSkyB’s strategic moves, although the resources at its 
disposal were inadequate to attain the same returns: this led the company to its 
failure.  
In order to come to these conclusions, the research had to follow a 
qualitative research technique through the construction of two case studies 
which have been consequently compared. In-depth interviews with important 
representatives of the companies, the analysis of both corporate documentation 
(such as annual reports) and public information (such as press release features) 
have been the main tools for gathering fundamental information about the 
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competitive structure of the market and the strategic policy driving the two 
companies’ actions and decisions.  
In the discussion that resulted from such analysis, particular attention has 
been devoted to marketing and strategy issues which play a relevant role in the 
competitive dynamics occurring between the two companies.  
BSkyB and ITV Digital: Different Paths in the Digital Television 
Industry 
In October 1998, BSkyB—the UK largest digital television platform operator, 
whose main shareholder is Rupert Murdoch—launched its digital unit, Sky 
Digital. To promote its launch, BSkyB decided to offer free set-top boxes in 
exchange of an annual subscription of basic packages. 
One month later, after a £90m advertising campaign, ONdigital—the UK 
carrier of digital terrestrial television (DTT)—a joint venture between the UK 
operators Carlton and Granada, was launched, despite the numerous technical 
constraints confessed by the chief executive officer.  
By Christmas, a sizeable discrepancy already emerged between the two 
companies. On the one side, BSkyB marketing campaign allowed the 
attainment of a large number of subscriptions. On the other side, ONdigital 
missed out the sales, mainly because of set-top boxes supply problems. The 
availability of decoders was indeed poor and the decoding technology could be 
easily counterfeited. 
To regain ground over BSkyB, ONdigital chief executive, Stephen Grabiner, 
proposed an aggressive bid for movie and football rights. This was countered by 
Carlton and Granada—ONdigital’s main shareholders—who decided to 
withhold ONdigital service from BSkyB. In June 1999, because of these 
dissenting opinions, Stephen Grabiner resigned and announced a legal battle 
against ONdigital.  
A few months later, Murdoch decided to replicate and confirm the free 
supply of dishes and set-top boxes in exchange of annual subscription. In 
response, ONdigital’s new chief executive—Stuart Prebble—decided to do the 
same. Even in this case, the two companies experienced far different outcomes: 
BSkyB’s sales soared to five millions, mainly thanks to the important 
investment in customer service. On the other hand, ONdigital’s churn rate, i.e. 
the number of customers who decide to leave after the expiration of their 
subscription, settled to some 30%. 
ONdigital assault to BSkyB took up again the following year. ONdigital 
decided to invest heavily on football to challenge its competitor’s dominance in 
the digital television market. During the summer of 2000, BBC acquired from 
ONdigital the FA cup and the international matches for £400 million. At its 
turn, ONdigital signed a £1.3 billion contract with BSkyB for the Premiership, 
after obtaining the highlights rights. Moreover, ONdigital aimed at acquiring 
the Football League rights, too. Although BSkyB withdrew from its original 
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bid, ONdigital offered £315 million to obtain the rights for the Nationwide 
League and the Worthington Cup. Football bosses welcomed the deal and 
many clubs rushed headlong into the transfer market and offered expensive 
contracts. 
However, the number of subscribers still dropped and in April 2001 the 
company announced to re-brand ONdigital as ITV Digital The main purpose 
of this move was to increase control over the escalating costs. After a huge 
marketing campaign, ONdigital was finally re-branded as ITV Digital, in order 
to integrate it thoroughly into the ITV Network. The new subscription service 
was centered on ITV sport, which allowed the subscriber to follow the 
Champions League, the Football League and the League Cup. This service was 
welcomed as “the key driving force behind take-up of pay television”. During 
the first months after this launch, ITV Digital attracted a large number of new 
subscribers. However, because of the inability to exploit the technological 
support provided by BSkyB to UK families, in the last quarter of the year the 
number of subscribers sharply dropped. In autumn, after the unexpected 
downturn in the advertising market due to September 11, Carlton and Granada 
announced a reorganization of the platform. Finally, after having invested more 
than £800 million and with 1.2 million subscribers, in March 2002 the 
company announced the failure and put the platform in liquidation.  
A Resource Based View Analysis 
The investigation of BSkyB’s and ITV Digital’s ventures in the UK digital 
television market can be easily conducted with reference to the Resource Based 
View (Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1986, 1991). 
According to this theory, resources are considered the main source of 
sustainable competitive advantage for a firm. In particular, Barney (1991) 
underlines that a key resource must be: 
 
• valuable, in the sense that it exploits opportunities and/or neutralities in 
a firm environment; 
• rare among a firm’s current and potential competition; 
• imperfectly imitable (either through unique historical conditions, causal 
ambiguity or social complexity) and  
• without strategically equivalent substitutes. 
 
Collins and Montgomery (1995) distinguish material, immaterial resources and 
organization capabilities. The first are tangible and easily identifiable. 
Reputation, brands, culture, and knowledge represent immaterial resources. 
Organization capabilities mainly refer to the firm’s ability to combine such 
resources in planning and implementing its own strategy. In order to find a 
successful position in its market a firm has to elaborate an appropriate strategy 
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taking into serious account its strengths and weaknesses. This becomes 
particularly relevant when a company seeks to enter in open competition with 
the industry leader. A company first has to bear in mind that each competitive 
position results from a specific strategic time path. In other words, “strategic 
asset stocks are accumulated by choosing appropriate time paths of resource 
flows over a period of time” (Dierichx & Cool, 1989:1506). For example, 
R&D represents the stock of know-how at a particular moment in time. R&D 
spending represents the current increase in value of the available resources. “It 
follows that a key dimension of strategy formulation may be identified in the 
task of making appropriate choices about strategic expenditure with a view to 
accumulating required resources and skills” (Dierichx & Cool, 1990:1506).  
We can sum up saying that a simple passive imitation of the resources 
applied by another company, without taking into account the strategic 
implementation aspect of those resources, can not lead to the success of the 
imitating company. Fist of all, an organization should self-evaluate its resources 
and estimate the time needed to develop them. In a second step, by considering 
its potentialities, the firm can find its position in the market. If its resources are 
limited it has to choose a particular niche, to compete with the leader will be a 
waste of energy.   
This chapter compares the case of a successful and an ineffective company: 
BSkyB and ITV Digital. Thanks to a merger between Sky and British 
Broadcasting Television Satellite (BSB), BSkyB entered in the digital television 
sector in 1990 and nowadays it is a leading company in this sector. BSkyB 
could first enjoy a reliable set of monetary resources in order to develop new 
technologies: Murdoch believed in digital television and invested on it 
(Horsman, 1997). Customers needed to be stimulated to acquire the new 
technology. Monetary and technological resources allowed BSkyB to 
implement a sales promotion campaign by giving free set-top boxes in exchange 
of an annual subscription of basic packages. BSkyB entered the analogue 
television sector at the end of the 80’s. The experience and the know-how built 
in those years let the company diversify successfully in the digital television 
market. In particular, during those years BSkyB made appropriate choices about 
strategic expenditures (e.g. advertising spending, R&D) to accumulate an 
intangible key resource: brand loyalty. The company gained dealer loyalty and, 
on the other hand, customers’ trust. Today BSkyB knows that “as [it] is the case 
with physical plant and equipment, all asset stocks “decay” in the absence of 
adequate “maintenance” expenditure. R&D know-how depreciates over time 
because of technological obsolescence; brand awareness erodes because 
consumers forget” (Barney, 1991:508). For this reason, BSkyB heavily invests 
in R&D and in marketing activities in order to maintain and to increase its 
resources. 
As ITV Digital entered the digital television market, it immediately 
positioned itself as BSkyB’s direct competitor. ITV Digital did not enjoy 
previous experience in the television market. This did not allow the company to 
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feature the same brand loyalty BSkyB had and its know-how still needed to be 
built. As Barney (1991) stated “an MBA student may not accumulate the same 
stock of knowledge in a one-year program as in a two-year program, even if all 
inputs other than time are doubled”. Considering brand loyalty, for example, 
even if ITV Digital launched a massive advertising campaign, the company 
could not reach BSkyB customers’ base.    
Figure 1 illustrates, on one side, the resources that led BSkyB to attain its 
leading competitive position and, on the other, the lack of resources featuring 
ITV Digital that eventually led to its failure.  
BSkyB was the first company to enter the digital television market, ITV 
Digital followed but it showed that jumping into another firm’s strategic 
position might not be easy, and it failed because BSkyB protected its position 
(Haveman 1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Resources Availability for BSkyB and ITV Digital 
An Institutional Theory Analysis 
The Resource-Based View analysis allowed ascertaining the levers, which BSkyB 
could rely on in order to reinforce its strategic position. These factors were both 
firm-specific, such as initial firm market share, initial profitability and 
marketing expenditures, and resource-specific, such as a firm brand and 
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knowledge. On the other hand, ITV Digital merely assumed a strategic 
position, which, in Haveman’s terms (1993) could be labeled “following the 
leader strategy”. This proved to be an unsuccessful strategic move for ITV 
Digital. The reasons why it produced unconstructive outcomes could be 
assessed through the lenses of the Institutional Theory. This is a very broad 
theory, which aims at investigating instances of imitation among organizations. 
Among the many contributors Institutional Theory numbers, Powell and 
DiMaggio (1983) appear to be those, whose reflections best apply to the 
analysis of ITV Digital’s strategic failure. According to these authors, successful 
organizations are regarded as the benchmark, which other organizations are 
likely to imitate. Success is, however, a devious term. It can indeed refer to 
many organizational circumstances, such as high profitability, high 
productivity, high reputation, or centrality within the industry. Cognitive 
motives account to assess the relevance of such organizational aspects, since 
what appears to be salient in an industry may not hold in another (Haveman, 
1993). Organizations are induced to imitate successful organizations’ decisions 
and actions in the attempt to attain such success at their turn or, more 
generally, legitimacy.  
The process of imitation actually only refers to legitimacy motives. 
Organizations are driven by collective rather than individual rationality. They 
assume that the reproduction of successful organizations’ structures, practices, 
processes or strategies might ease the attainment of higher returns. Actual 
success, however, rests upon competitive, rather than legitimacy factors. The 
lack of a thorough assessment of the internal resources an organization might 
hinge on and of the environmental forces that shape competition in an industry 
might undermine the attainment of success. Imitating organizations feature, 
therefore, a higher probability of failure with respect to the organizations they 
imitate, right because of their strategic and organizational choices are not driven 
by rational and individual assessment of the resources they dispose and of the 
environmental conditions, which they are surrounded by.   
Institutional theory usually applies to industrial circumstances where a 
substantial number of organizations compete. This might downgrade its 
applicability to the instance presented in this chapter. It is however worthwhile 
highlighting that the digital television market prevents the occurrence of 
competition among a large number of firms. On the one side, this occurs 
because of the strict legal environment, which sets high barriers to entry, by 
defining codes of competition that few firms can thoroughly comply with. On 
the other, the digital television market itself does not allow a pure open 
competition, since consumers’ needs are substantially homogeneous. This 
prevents the differentiation of supply, hence avoiding the co-existence of many 
digital television firms within a given national system, since a single company 
can wholly fulfill demand. Furthermore, BSkyB and ITV Digital wholly 
embody the characteristics institutional theory ascribes to industry leader and 
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followers. The application of DiMaggio and Powell’s theory to the cases of 
BSkyB and ITV Digital can therefore be justified.  
ITV Digital’s venture in the UK digital television market can be mostly 
regarded as a replication of BSkyB’s strategic choices, still under its old brand, 
i.e. ONdigital. ONdigital’s launch can be judged as the first mimetic move the 
company undertook, in all probability to avoid the very likely loss of market 
share and of competitive advantage over BSkyB. However, technical 
limitations, problems related to distribution of set-top boxes and the poorer 
quality of the service ONdigital provided with respect to BSkyB’s did not grant 
the company the success it strove for. Mimetic moves continued with main 
concern to programming, with the heavy investment ONdigital made to 
acquire football rights. Even this choice revealed itself as unsuccessful because of 
internal dissents and because of the financial efforts undertaken by the company 
that eventually led it to bankruptcy. All this happened despite the ultimate 
marketing move of re-branding the company as ITV Digital. 
ONdigital/ITV Digital strategic moves in most cases replicated what BSkyB 
had previously undertaken. The Resource-Based View analysis already revealed 
that ITV Digital could not rely on the same set of assets BSkyB disposed of, 
either in concrete (e.g. financial resources) or soft terms (e.g. brand). The blind 
replication of industry leader’s moves often features followers’ strategy. In most 
cases, this choice is likely to lead followers to death (as in the case of ITV 
Digital) right because they cannot lever over the same resources leaders can rely 
on. Followers’ survival chances can increase only when they can perform their 
activities in specific niches within the industry, which prevent them to compete 
directly with more powerful companies. ITV Digital might have enhanced its 
probability of success if it had tailored its strategy on the specific domain, which 
it was rooted in, i.e. the terrestrial digital television market. This might have 
prevented ITV Digital to come into open competition with BSkyB, thus 
exploiting its poorer set of resources in a more efficient manner. Such resources 
could have actually been employed to enhance the technical efficiency of the 
telecommunication devices they provided or to provide higher-standard 
programs and services, rather than to follow and replicate BSkyB’s business 
strategy on a broader competitive environment that paradoxically could not be 
accessed by another company.   
BSkyB and ITV Digital: Successful Strategies and Managerial 
Mistakes 
Many factors can account to explain the failure of the UK terrestrial digital 
platform. In particular, the superiority in channel availability and the supply of 
interactive services, both favored by the free distribution of set-top boxes, forced 
ITV Digital to compete directly with the satellite competitor. This situation 
combined to the heavy investment in football contracts apparently led ITV 
Digital to its failure.  
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Nevertheless some critics argued that the reason of the failure was essentially 
a result of a sequence of managerial mistakes: 
 
1. Technology: the availability of decoders was initially poor and they could 
be easily counterfeited. Moreover the digital terrestrial signal proved 
patchy, failing to cover large parts of Britain. 
2. Branding: ONdigital spent £90 millions to promote itself. Two years 
later the expensive re-branding exercise forced the company to waste 
millions on brand advertising. 
3. Programming: instead of taking on the middle England market with 
quality drama and cultural programming, Carlton and Granada used 
ONdigital as a platform to push their own, sub-standard digital 
channels. As a consequence, regionality, commercial creativity and 
diversity, which were the usual standard for ITV, were sacrificed to fight 
head-to-head against BSkyB. The restricted channel portfolio offered a 
package similar to an analogue service for a digital price. A clear example 
is given by the acquisition of the First Division football rights. This 
misunderstanding towards the demand negatively influenced the 
consumer perception, expressed by the high number of churn (30%). 
 
Besides, other crisis factors can be advanced (Richeri, 2004): 
 
• the low penetration: only 60% of the population could access the ITV 
Digital services, with a high limitation of potential subscribers; 
• a restricted channels’ supply in comparison with the BSkyB supply: ITV 
Digital supplied to its subscribers only 30 channels, while BSkyB over 
300 channels; 
• a high debt limiting the opportunity to launch a diversified supply and 
promotion strategy: in fact, Carlton and Granada, the two ITV Digital 
holders, accumulated a debt of 800 millions of pounds and they did not 
have any more possibility of investment; 
• the dissimilar number of subscribers attracted by the two companies: by 
2001, BSkyB had already reached over 5 million subscribers, while ITV 
Digital could rely on a lower number of people and on a minor financial 
funds disposability. In addition, the average annual expenditure per 
subscriber of ITV Digital in 2001 was around £200, while BSkyB’s was 
around £300. 
 
BSkyB acts for a benchmark for multi-channel and multi-service television 
platform at European level. To understand its success, it is primarily useful to 
remember that BSkyB operates in the industry as channel provider, distributor 
of television services and direct-to-home (DTH) platform operator. It competes 
in the following television sectors: 
 
UK Digital Television Companies 
133 
1. satellite television; 
2. cable television; 
3. terrestrial television. 
 
The strategy of BSkyB is to create “added value by maintaining and extending 
[…] (its) position as Britain’s leading digital TV platform and multi-channel 
content provider” (Sky, 2001). BSkyB especially invests – as shown afterwards – 
in programming, considered very important to generate subscriptions and foster 
viewers’ loyalty. The aim of the company is to supply a reasonable, ever 
improving, broad range of programs, and BSkyB is indeed a multi-channel and 
multi-service television platform, whose supply is composed by various 
programs and services. In particular, interactive services can be 1) linked to the 
programming (enhanced TV), which allow the viewers to send e-mail, choose 
the different angles, televote, memorize the channel they prefer, and 2)  linked 
to t-commerce services, which allow to shop, play, bet and administrate one’s 
own finance.  
According to Jon Florsheim (2002), chief executive officer of Sky Interactive 
Limited39, BSkyB decided to bet more on enhanced TV than on transitive 
services, because it allows to: a) generate revenues, b) improve the supply, and 
c) retain customers within a specific channel or within the platform, reducing 
the churn.  
Normally interactive services represent an important source of funding for 
the company. The main revenues derive from:  
 
1. premium rate telephone charges in connection with viewers’ usage of its 
service; 
2. revenue sharing in t-commerce transactions completed on the platform; 
3. advertising;  
4. tenancy and technology fees charged to content providers that supply 
services on the platform.  
 
To make its products and services successful, BSkyB makes important 
investments in marketing. In BSkyB’s strategy, marketing is a crucial lever. The 
aim of this strategy is that the client guides the share price of the company. The 
brand ambition of BSkyB is “to make every day extraordinary40 for every one of 
the customers” (Sky, 2002). Using a marketing approach diversified on the 
basis of clients, the company tries to understand the desires and needs of 
different targets and to use different languages for the many channels (for 
                                                     
39 Sky Interactive Limited, a subsidiary of BSkyB, delivers digitally transmitted interactive services 
to viewers in the United Kingdom.  
40 To specify the concept “extraordinary day” Sky (2002) says: “just think: a generation ago, the 
business that we work in didn’t even exist. The technology we deploy didn’t exist. This is all 
brand—new staff, and we’re right at the front of it. So let’s continue to make every day 
extraordinary for every one of our customers”.  
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example it tries to speak to the sport channels’ subscribers with the language of 
sport etc.). Among its marketing activities BSkyB provides free digital satellite 
equipment to new customers, the installation of the digi-box and, most of all, 
qualified call centers. 
Nowadays customers do not only look for goods or services, they demand a 
much more holistic service supply, which range from information about the 
way a product can be best employed, to delivery, installation, updating, repair, 
maintenance and correction of the products they have bought. In a customer 
relationship that goes beyond a single transaction of goods and services, the 
product itself becomes just one element in the total ongoing service offered. 
BSkyB’s management was able to understand that what really counts is the 
ability of the firm, regardless of its position in the distribution channel, to 
manage the additional elements of the offering better than its competitors. This 
intuition was a key determinant for its success. 
Discussion 
The previous analysis leads to important reflections on the two cases considered 
in this chapter: BskyB operates as a channel provider and distributor of 
television services, defining its position as multi-channel and multi-service 
company. It accounts as a significant example of how it is possible to realize 
high profits even for companies providing an ongoing service offering and 
operating in a turbulent environment such as the high tech industry. On the 
other hand, ITV renounced to its regional character and commercial creativity 
in order to compete against BSkyB, a decision which led to a misunderstanding 
in the customers’ perception of the offering’s quality. 
Most strategic prescriptions merely redefine the ways companies build 
advantages over the competition. This has been the strategic objective of many 
firms, and nothing is wrong with this objective. A company needs advantages 
over the competition to sustain itself in the marketplace. However, despite 
tremendous efforts, companies often achieve no more than incremental 
improvements—imitation and not innovation (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997). 
This is the case of ITV Digital, which aimed at competing with the greatest UK 
digital service provider, facing in this way difficulties in particular due to 
numerous technical limitations. 
Within high tech firms, customer decisions about the use of a product or 
service play a fundamental, strategic role. In recent years the marketing 
discipline has regarded market driven activity (i.e. Jaworski & Kohli, 1993), 
customer-leading (i.e. Day, 1990) and pioneering (i.e. Golder & Tellis, 1993) 
as appropriate paradigms for achieving long and short terms success. 
Nevertheless these marketing approaches could not be considered sufficient to 
address the unique characteristics of high technology industries and markets. 
Marketing in these industries requires a broader and more proactive strategic 
approach, defined as market driving: this concerns the ability of a firm to lead 
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fundamental changes in the evolution of industry conditions by influencing the 
value creation process at product, market and industry level. Market driving 
organizations create value by engaging in innovative activities both within and 
outside the organization (Deshpande, 2000).  
In this prospective, BSkyB seriously invests in program acquisition, which 
represents some 57% of its whole operating expenses. Such investment aims at 
guaranteeing the subscribers exclusive and attractive programming, while trying 
to reduce the possible entry of new competitors in the same industry, 
negotiating as many agreements in exclusive rights as possible.  
The interactivity characteristic is stressed by the advent of the interactive 
service which can be linked to the programming. Pagani (2003) states that the 
gradual control of content, as well as the strengthening of the control over the 
final users’ access account as critical factors for achieving and holding a long-
lasting competitive position (Barney, 1991). Digital television players will 
though often need to decide whether to focus primarily on consumer ownership 
or content ownership. It is very difficult to maintain a strong position in both. 
The failure of ITV Digital is mainly due to a lack of focus both on content and 
consumer ownership. The company provided only a limited number of 
channels and could reach only a limited number of subscribers. 
In order to manage and guide subscribers’ choices, to consolidate customer 
retention to a program bouquet and to allow the personalization of program 
supply with reference to users’ needs BSkyB always bears in mind families’ main 
characteristics. Its supply takes two important issues into account: on the one 
hand, the expenditure for accessing services (e.g. satellite antenna, set-top box, 
…); on the other, the expenditure for using the services (e.g. subscription). 
Digital television strengthens the relationship between the supply and the 
demand of programs: users no more pay for watching a flow of programs; they 
rather watch and pay for specific and previously chosen programs. Therefore, a 
digital television company can successfully maximize its revenues only if its 
content and service supply thoroughly matches single consumers’ demand. 
In the light of the above-presented details, it is possible to argue that 
BSkyB’s success mainly springs from the following factors, enabled by a highly 
capable management: 
 
a.  offer of quality and diversification from the traditional free to air supply 
in the United Kingdom; 
b.  promotion and marketing ability; 
c.  availability of easy and convenient reception equipment; 
d. a capillary network of subscription, sale and reception equipment 
installation outlets; 
e. a broad and innovative supply of interactive services. 
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Conclusion 
Although illustrating an interesting comparison between two digital television 
companies, that are examples of the new media economy business, this chapter 
features some limitations. First, the considered time framework appears to be 
too limited to fruitfully seize the whole array of factors that might lead to the 
success or failure of a company in the digital television industry. Second, a lack 
of economic and financial data concerning ONdigital/ITV Digital’s venture 
make this analysis defective. Some records about BSkyB strategy actually had to 
be reduced in order to allow the thorough comparison of the two companies. 
For these reasons further research on this topic is suggested. 
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Growth in a Convergent World: 
The Bundle of TV and Telephone Services 
on the Fiber Optic Network  
Marco Gambaro  
 
In the last ten years, the telecommunication industry has been radically 
transformed by the deregulation processes in its sector, by the euphoria of the 
new economy which gave the illusion of obtaining success aside from solidity of 
the business model, and by the disillusion and crisis following the explosion of 
the speculative bubble which had brought upward all the high-tech stocks. 
Technological innovations and enhanced competition drove the prevailing 
falling trends in telecommunication prices and fuelled growth in consumption 
mostly in mobile services. In the fixed market the broadband connections 
emerged as the fastest developing area in conjunction with the internet 
diffusion. The broadband diffusion is now viewed as an important 
infrastructure for developments in communications exchanges and information 
consumption of digital contents that in turn can fuel the economic growth. 
The scientific literature embraces several issues related to broadband, 
ranging from the diffusion factors to the relationship between market structure 
and adoption, till the complementarity/substitutability with adjacent markets 
like cable TV, pay TV. Distaso, Lupi and Malenti (2005) emphasize the role of 
stronger competition across technologies as the main driver to stimulate 
broadband adoption with empirical evidence based on data for 14 European 
countries. Conversely, the enhanced competition within the ADSL technology 
does not seem to have played a similar role and in conclusion they find positive 
synergies to be exploited between policies directed to induce more inter 
platform competition and those directed towards local loop unbundling. 
Hoffler (2004) finds similar results, but points out that parallel 
infrastructures incorporate opposing welfare effects. The gain from accelerating 
the broadband penetration and the reduction of monopoly power might be 
outweighed by the inefficient duplication of an existing infrastructure. The last 
effect can be mitigated as the services offered from different networks evolve in 
different directions. 
Several American studies confirm these results (Hazlett, 2005; Grubesic & 
Murray, 2004; Savage & Wirth, 2005). Aron and Burnstein (2003) examine 
the influence of availability, competition, and demographics on the adoption of 
broadband technology in US. Their econometric results indicate that after 
controlling for the demand and cost influences on adoption, inter-modal 
competition drives increased penetration in a state. 
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Among European states there is a general consensus that infrastructure based 
competition is desirable in telecommunications and has an important role in 
delivering innovations such as broadband (Maldoom, et al., 2003). However, 
public statements from national regulation authorities about the benefits of 
infrastructure competition have not always been matched by coherent 
regulatory policy designed to facilitate such competition. If broadband 
deployment in Europe has been too slow, regulatory policy is a key area where 
one should look for an explanation. 
In a paper on determinants of digital divide the cross country analysis, 
Chinn and Fairlie (2004) show that computers and internet diffusion are 
positively linked with broadband adoption, a telecommunication (TLC) 
competition over the usual factors as income, literacy and infrastructure 
availability. 
While evolving toward broadband, fixed telecommunication infrastructure 
suffers from the mobile competition. Fixed to mobile line substitution is a 
reality today; market research suggests that 15% of households in Western 
Europe were mobile only at the end of 2003, an increase of three percentage 
points over the year (JPMorgan, 2004). This is driven by a general increase in 
usage and the falling price differential between the cost of a mobile and the 
equivalent fixed call. Line loss is currently running at 4% per annum in the US 
where there is little difference in the price of fixed long-distance and mobile 
calls for consumers. 
Rising broadband penetration could be seen as a mitigating factor giving 
consumers and businesses an alternative reason to maintain a fixed connection. 
However in Korea, the most developed broadband market in the world, high 
broadband penetration (nearly 80%) has deferred rather than halted fixed line 
loss.  
In this context, e.biscom constitutes a positive model because it found a 
good strategy which aimed at the construction of a large-band network, so 
becoming the second Italian phone operator, with its own network. This 
business model has different features: the main technological aspect is the 
realization of a fiber optic cable network with an IP architecture, consenting to 
bring phone data and TV signals, end to end along the network itself. It’s a 
network architecture experimented by other operators (the USA next generation 
telcos) for the long distance part, which e.biscom extended also to the last mile 
connection, up to the final users. This network constitutes the main power 
point of this company because it offers lower management and service 
configuration costs. 
After some initial hesitations, e.biscom concentrated on the joint offer of 
phone, TV and data services, sold in bundle, so obtaining an increase in average 
revenues per subscriber and a reduction in the investment pay back time. Basic 
broadband and premium broadband can in some view be considered separate 
market and therefore the price and availability of basic broadband for internet 
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access does not constrain the price that may be charged for the premium 
broadband that allow for interactive TV services (Kjetil, et al., 2004). 
There has been an evolution in the vertical integration: while at the 
beginning the company tried to control all the business aspects with 
investments in content production and the creation of a specialized purchasing 
net, in a second time a vertical specialization in the managing of the net services 
was selected, with agreements with external providers for TV content 
availability, but also for the laying of cables, in which e.biscom has not been 
involved since 2003. 
In spite of the crisis of its sector starting from 2001, e.biscom has rapidly 
grown, passing from 42 million € in 2000 to 529 million € in 2003 and over 
700 million € in 2004. In this fast growth there was an evolution both in the 
company structure and in the management organization: from a business 
management based on the ability of the founding partners to a more managerial 
organization with more structured processes and better activity control, adding 
to this a strong aiming at innovation and flexible organization. 
The idea of triple play spread through the Europe as technology evolved and 
enhanced the bandwidth capability of ADSL up to a full video delivery. In 
2004 both British Telecom in UK and Deutsche Telekom in Germany started 
some IP television operations to offer on their fixed network broadband 
internet access, multi-channel video services and the traditional telephony. In 
France the broadband market is particularly promising because satellite and 
cable have had difficulty penetrating city centers, where laws ban dishes on 
older buildings and apartment dwellers have to win approval to install cable or 
satellite. It is Free, a new entrant, that leads the triple play race. Free is an 
internet service provider grown with free internet access that offer ADSL 
services on shared access lines with the incumbent and use triple play to 
differentiate service offer. 
The Initial Strategy in the Italian Market 
Italy exhibits a mature telecommunication market with high fixed line 
penetration. From the deregulation process during the last decade a few main 
competitors emerged while the incumbent retains the main share of the market. 
Together with Finland, Italy is leader in mobile diffusion due to the strong 
initial competition and probably the lacks in the fixed telephone service. The 
fixed network topology with a high number of local exchanges keeps short the 
local loop length compared with other European countries and makes the 
ADSL deployment particularly feasible. The personal computers penetration 
rate is lower when compared to the European average since the prevailing of 
small enterprises slowed the early business adoption which has though 
accelerated in the last three years. 
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Within the television area satellite penetration is low and before Fastweb 
there was no cable operator. Pay television suffers in fact from the richness of 
free-TV offers both in sport and in film programming (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Features of the Italian Market in 2003 
 
INDICATORS 
Total Population (millions)    57.5 
Total Household (millions)     22.5 
Fixed telephony (millions)   
    -number of pstn lines    21.4 
    -lines/households 94.8% 
Mobile telephony   
    -number of users     56.4 
    -users/population 98.1% 
    -users/households      2.5 
Sat TV subscribers (millions)       2.5 
Broadband subscribers (millions)       2.5 
Pc households penetration rate 51% 
Internet users (millions)     22.6 
 
 
The e.Biscom business idea was to create a vertical integrated operator able to 
exploit the opportunities of the convergence process of Telecommunications, 
Information Technology and Media. E.Biscom is the only “triple player” on the 
Italian market, the only operator able to offer phone services, Internet 
broadband connection and video services using a single technological platform, 
and making the offer of value added services feasible. 
The core of e.Biscom’s differentiation strategy is the creation of its own 
telecommunication network, independent from the one of the incumbent 
Telecom Italia. The innovation of e.Biscom proposal was the creation of an IP 
based network, on which the services offered (TV, Internet, Phone) are 
conveyed through a single integrated technological platform. 
Bringing the fiber directly to the homes makes economic sense in the Italian 
market because of the high concentration of buildings and wealth. The average 
apartment block in Milan has 16 flats and most Italian cities are comprised of 
multi-dwelling units. To achieve a pay back period of two years the level of take 
up per building needs to be at least 18%. 
The opportunities coming from convergence and the uncertainty on the 
profitability of the different market segments pushed e.Biscom to fill all the 
stages of the value chain, internally providing for network management and 
implementation, customers’ research and care, service management, and 
content production. The dynamic environment constituted a further spur to 
pursue any business activity that showed potential synergies. E.Biscom revealed 
to be the first mover in many business segments thanks to its flexible framework 
and its entrepreneurial attitude. 
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At its start-up, the business of e.Biscom was supposed to have many 
potential synergies with the emerging third generation of mobile telephony. 
Shortly afterwards e.Biscom joined the Dix.it consortium in order to purchase 
an UMTS license. A few month before the licenses auction, a deeper analysis of 
UMTS business opportunities and the very long pay back period of the 
required investments forced e.Biscom to leave the consortium. 
During the early launch phase e.Biscom tried to rapidly increase its number 
of users in order to reach the critical mass of users needed to sustain the high 
fixed costs of the fiber network and to engender positive direct externalities 
among vas (value added services) users. To reach this goal the sales force was 
broken down in salesmen, telesales, web-sales and licensed shops. Besides these 
sales channels e.Biscom opened eVoci, a chain of consumer electronics shops 
focused on fixed and mobile telephony and on high tech devices. EVoci was 
supposed to be the last stage of e.Biscom’s integrated value chain: the services 
and devices commercialization. 100 shops were planned to be opened within 
2003. 
The offering followed the usual distinction between residential customers 
and business customers. The residential offer included three kinds of services: a 
voice over IP service, a broadband Internet access service and video (free or on 
demand) services. In the starting phase the Voip service arose several technical 
problems, anyway its quality is by now in line with traditional phone services. 
The Vod service, launched in 2001, included contents created by e.Biscom 
through the controlled company e.Bismedia. 
The business offer was split in three customer categories: large companies, 
small medium companies (SME) and SOHO (small office/ home office). 
Among a number of services e.Biscom provided phone services, broadband 
Internet services, virtual private network and video-surveillance. 
The strategy of service differentiation made e.Biscom focus on high spender 
customers, strongly oriented to technology innovation and Vas services. 
According to this vision, the early stages of service providing privileged cities 
with higher average income per person. E.Biscom tried to widen its range of 
services by promoting all inclusive flat subscriptions. This strategy differentiated 
from the effort of other competitors to increase the number of users by using 
aggressive price policies and pay-per-use policies, useful to attract occasional 
Internet users, who are reluctant to pay a flat rate. 
The extensive financial funds required to pursue this wide range strategy 
were provided by the March 2002 IPO at the Milan stock exchange, when the 
financial bubble on technology stocks was still to blow up. 
The key successful factor of e.Biscom’s project lied on the innovation of an 
integrated offer of services formerly perceived as completely separated by the 
consumer. Moreover, basing this innovative approach on an independent 
network gave e.Biscom full autonomy in the choice of its price and supply 
policies, in order to address directly the final customer. This bottom-up 
approach let e.Biscom develop its own “cost plus pricing” price policy, so as to 
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avoid incumbent’s retail-minus policy, which often leads to margin erosion in 
the long run. Also, the scope for directly billing the final user reduced the churn 
rate and increased customers’ fidelity. Furthermore, the conspicuous 
investments undertaken to implement the network, the rank of customers 
reached in the main cities, and the first mover advantage have built high 
barriers to the entrance of competitors with a “follow the leader” strategy. 
E.Biscom has been the first player to understand that the convergence of 
services required a convergent approach toward the whole network 
infrastructure, and that the integration instrument could be an open protocol 
such as the IP. Using a single vehicle to convey audio, video and data can 
reduce management and maintenance costs, and make the creation of Vas 
easier. Moreover, using a single platform reduces the testing period and so 
shortens the time to market of e.Biscom’s services in comparisons to the 
incumbent’s and to other non-integrated operators. 
In order to rapidly reach the scale economies needed to support the high 
fixed costs of building an alternative telecommunication network e.Biscom 
made a joint venture with AEM, the service carrier of the municipality of Milan 
which was already endowed with a 600 Km dark fiber network in Milan. The 
fiber-to-the-home strategy was also assisted by the planning framework of many 
Italian cities, which are densely populated and where many persons can be 
reached with few works on the building. 
Evolution in Strategies 
This wide-range strategy was financed through the placing of e.Biscom 
securities in the New Market at Milan Stock Exchange in March 2000, 
bringing in 1.6 billion €. The blowing-out of the speculative bubble on high-
tech stocks caused difficulties in finding further resources in order to finance 
the high investments required by the development of the network in Italy and 
abroad. Moreover, the synergies deriving from a complete integration resulted 
lower than expected.  
So the company had to operate in heterogeneous markets where competitive 
dynamics are not uniform, rules are evolving and operators work with different 
costs and business models and have consolidated abilities and operative 
routines. 
In this situation, the company chose to focus its resources on its own core 
business, as to say the supply of phone services, TV and access to the Internet in 
Italy. In 2003 the company was re-organized and some non-strategic activities 
were abandoned. 
The cease of the activity of content production was realized thanks to the 
agreements with RAI, Sky Italia and many movie majors, who bought it. The 
agreement with RAI includes the creation in joint-venture of Raiclick, a 
company that offers 3500 contents available through a subscription fee. The 
availability of the Sky content pack through the e.biscom platform derives from 
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the antitrust regulation, regarding the fusion of Tele+ and Stream, obliging the 
pay TV operator to put its Premium contents at disposal of the digital operators 
on non-satellite platform, as to say TV service suppliers through broadband 
telecom network and digital terrestrial television. 
The change of the setting has brought to a change of the strategy of offering 
access to its own service platform through optic fiber to all its users. Starting 
from 2001, the xDSL technology developments allowed this system to reach the 
band width of 4mb/s, necessary to supply phone-TV contents. The focus on 
xDSL technology is due to its installation and managing low costs. 
In fiber optic connection the cost per client is around 1200 € including a 
variable component due mainly to set-top-box and installation and a fixed 
component due to a component of international bandwidth, the catalyst 
(router) necessary to connect the building to the network infrastructure. Each 
catalyst can support 24 client connections and cost around 3000 €. 
Considering a subscription rate of 18-20% per catalyst, the incidence per client 
is around 500 €. With an ARPU (average revenue per user) of 900 € and a 
gross margin of 650 € per year the pay back period of the specific fixed cost is 
limited to two years. 
In ADSL connection the cost per client is remarkably lower. With the last 
mile unbundling e.Biscom must install in incumbent local exchange an ADSL 
equipment with 500 slots. Moreover each new subscriber requires modem and 
set-top-box (180 €), installation cost and the 8,3 € monthly rent of unbundled 
local line from the incumbent. The total investment costs per client are around 
450 euro and the gross margins are slightly lower than in fiber optic 
environment due to the monthly fee.  
Since there is no product and price differentiation between the two 
technologies, the ADSL ARPU is the same than fiber optic and the pay back is 
shorter with ADSL. 
In this framework the proportion of ADSL subscribers rose from 22% in 
2001 to 57% in 2004 and is expected to grow further following the 
geographical expansion in regions not covered with fiber optic network. 
 
Table 2. Italian Broadband Market  
 
Broadband Access 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Telecom Italia retail 247 49.8% 630 58.1% 1504 61.0% 2584 61.5%
Telecom Italia wholesale 143 28.8% 175 16.1% 562 22.8% 797 19.0%
e.Biscom 63 12.7% 220 20.3% 331 13.4% 501 11.9%
Wind unbundling 38 7.7% 54 5.0% 58 2.4% 260 6.2%
Others 5 1.0% 5 0.5% 9 0.4% 57 1.4%
Totals 496 100.0% 1084 100.0% 2464 100.0% 4199 100.0%
 
 
During the years e.Biscom grew with the market maintaining its market share. 
Other players reselling ADSL from Telecom Italia wholesale offer lost market 
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share over the years. After initial hesitations the incumbent drew the broadband 
diffusion and gained market share with its direct offer (See Table 2).  
In 2003 the business represented 15% of e.Biscom customers and 65% of total 
revenues. However, with video services the residential market is now growing 
faster. In the last years most part of e.Biscom clients have been families and 
30% of them buys video services and shows higher average revenues.  
Corporate Structure Evolution and Organizational Development  
E.biscom was founded as a partnership of entrepreneurs and managers coming 
from media and telecommunication sectors and a joint venture with Milan 
utility AEM which, through its controlled company Metroweb, manages a 600 
km dark fiber optic network in Milan metropolitan area (See Figure 1).   
Figure 1. The Joint Venture between e.Biscom and AEM 
 
Moreover, since AEM often digs for the maintenance of gas and electrical 
network, the excavation cost to lay underground the fiber can be significantly 
reduced due to scope economies. In the e.Biscom group, Metroweb and 
Fastweb were committed to network building and service management, while 
Videoportal (later transformed in Ebismedia) was devoted to content 
acquisition production and aggregation. Inside Ebismedia there was the first 
Italian on line journal “Il Nuovo”, the news agency ApBiscom, the online 
videogame platform “GameOn”. The framework was completed with eVoci, a 
store chain that planned to open hundreds of outlets to sell all e.Biscom 
product and services with the complements of other technological devices and 
customer support services. 
E.Biscom planned also to build a large range of specific services for business 
clients through the subsidiary B2Business. Eventually, e.Biscom aimed at 
expanding its business model in other European markets and in September 
2000 it acquired 80% of Hansenet, a TLC local carrier in Hamburg 
(Germany), offering mainly narrowband services but with a 1800 km network 
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infrastructure. After two years though, the growth was too slow to support such 
an ambitious strategy and the changing in stock exchange climate made difficult 
to find new capital to sustain the investment plan. The strategy was than 
narrowed to get a stronger position in the Italian market, focusing more closely 
on the core activities of network and services management. Therefore, several 
non strategic activities were divested. Hansanet and ApBiscom were transferred 
to Telecom Italia, and il Nuovo was sold to HDC (a market research group). 
The content production was abandoned following agreements with majors for 
right acquisition and a joint venture with Italian public television Rai to exploit 
its huge archive. In March 2003 e.Biscom terminated the joint venture with 
AEM and the share in Metroweb was divested in exchange for the AEM 
shareholding in e.Biscom. However, the co-operation for the use of fiber 
infrastructure continued with a commercial agreement.   
Finally, to complete the simplification of the group structure and to enhance 
the management flexibility, in April 2004 the fusion of e.Biscom and Fasweb 
was approved bringing together all the activities relating to the core business. 
The integration simplified the coordination process, reduced some costs 
eliminating duplications in staff structures and brought some fiscal advantages.  
The content distribution remains in eBismedia. Since November 2001, 
when the commercial offer with 450 video titles was started, there has been a 
continuous growth in content availability and in June 2004 the video on 
demand offer through the brand OnTV arrived at 1200 among films and 
documentaries. 
The e.Biscom video supply, like any standard cable TV, includes 8 free to 
the air TV channels, a slim basic package included in the subscription, some 
option thematic channels and the block of premium film and sport channels 
obtained from Sky Italia at a retail minus intermediate price.   
Starting in July 2001 e.Biscom controls a 40% share in Raiclick, a joint 
venture with Rai that sells video contents taken from the huge archive of the 
Italian public television. The 3500 videos were first sold on a pay per use basis 
now transformed in an “all you can eat” formula with a monthly subscription 
fee and include films, series, classical music, ballets, and entertainment for the 
99.000 subscribers as to June 2004. 
E.Voci, fully owned by the group, was intended to develop in a large store 
chain selling consumer electronics, mobile and fixed telephone devices, hi-tech 
products, and computers. But the slowdown of hi-tech industries, the e.Biscom 
exit from 3rd generation mobile phone consortium and the narrowing of the 
strategy on core business activities drove to the downsizing of the retail presence 
and now there is a mere 7 stores and 10 affiliates with limited growth prospects. 
The shifting in strategy and particularly the reduction in vertical integration 
degree pushed the reshaping of the organization structure (See Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The Corporate Structure of e.Biscom as to June 2004 
 
In the first stage of development e.Biscom was a typical start up company 
moving in a changing and innovative environment. The founding partners 
impressed an entrepreneurial approach to the activity within an informal 
structure where discretionary power was prevailing. The goal was to get a 
flexible organization capable to react quickly to external input in a changing 
environment.  
In the second stage, following changes in strategy and group reorganization, 
e.Biscom moved to a more structured organization in which the managerial 
component prevailed over the entrepreneurial one. This time the goal was to 
have a more global and long range vision able to support a continuous and 
organic growth leaving aside an approach based on specific project assembled 
together. The human resource department implemented a more formal process, 
an internal audit department was set up and the cost control was improved 
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through a more designed budgetting process. At the same time several inter-
functional groups were created to maintain good lateral integration. 
Essentially e.Biscom moved from a top-down leadership where the actions 
of the partners originated the whole activity to a bottom-up leadership with a 
better definition of the roles and tasks of middle management. The aim was to 
achieve a more structured organization without loosing the speed and the 
flexibility which were among the critical success factors of the start up phase. 
E.biscom moved from a focus on network and technology to a focus on the 
customer requirements. Before the whole firm process was seen in a value chain 
mode, while now a value network model prevails where the client is put in the 
centre of the network. Following this vision, the firm internalized the customer 
care department revising deeply roles and organizational configuration. The 
whole reorganization process was centered particularly on soft components like 
corporate culture, integration devices, values and priorities, while the hard 
structure remained substantially the original one with five core departments: 
commercial for the whole selling process, network design and management, 
technology with IT and operations and finally staff that includes finance, 
communication, human resources and regulation affairs. 
Performances and Regulatory Issues  
At the end of 2004 revenues were grown at 710 million Euros but the Ebit 
remained negative for the high level of capital expenditure and the consequent 
amortization (See Table 3). Revenues had been growing at 50% per year and 
from 2003 the revenue per employees grew at a level compatible with a stable 
telecommunication business; however, the ratio fixed asset to subscriber while 
declining from 20k euros to 4k euros remains high. Fixed assets absorb huge 
capital and to complete the picture you have to add the assets of Metroweb 
(around 300 millions euros) the firm controlled by Milan utilities that owns the 
dark fiber posed in Milan. 
 
Table 3. E.Biscom Financial Data 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004
Revenues (mn euro) 155.5 321.2 529.1 710.8
Ebit (mn euro) -233.3 -269.1 -205 -78
Ebitda (mn euro) -109.8 -35.2 111 220
Fixed Assets (mn eur) 991.6 1428 1457 nd
ROE  -9.3% -15.2% -27.8% -6.9%
Capex (mn euro) 601 683.5 458 397
Employees  1230 1793 1470 nd
Subscribers 48900 176100 330600 417500
Fixed Assets/subscribers 0.02 0.008 0.004 nd
Revenues /Employees 0.126 0.179 0.36 nd
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One of the most important indices in cable and telecommunication 
profitability is the relation between home passed and subscribers because the 
first relates to the total fixed cost of network deployment and the second 
indicates the potential annual revenues (See Table 4). 
 
Table 4. E.Biscom Performance Index 
 
2003 subscribers/home passed 2003 arpu 
NTL (uk cable) 0.34 402 
Telewest (UK cable) 0.26 752 
Comcast (US cable) 0.54  
Cox (US cable) 0.64  
UU cable (total) 0.68  
BSkyB  530 
E.biscom 0.10 871 
Telecom Italia Adsl  360 
Telecom Italia Voice  300 
 
 
When we compare e.Biscom with other companies operating in similar 
business, we find a significant lower penetration index but also lower overall 
costs and a slightly higher Arpu. Us cable operators usually have a penetration 
rate above 50% that is considered a survival rate in the cable industry. 
However, European companies often perform worse as the UK cable operators 
that work with a penetration rate between 25% and 35% so explaining their 
poor performances. 
So far the e.Biscom penetration rate has been quite low but also the costs are 
low because in the target towns there are mainly apartments and consequently a 
high population density that reduces excavation costs. Moreover the adoption 
of the ADSL strategy to penetrate areas outside fiber coverage lowers the capital 
required to build the network as part of the fixed costs is borne by the 
incumbent telecom operator (Telecom Italia) and are thus converted into 
annual variable costs. 
Finally, e.Biscom shows a greater Arpu compared both with cable operator 
and with traditional ADSL operations reflecting the differentiation strategy and 
the triple play approach, a service bundle able to multiply the revenues and to 
enjoy scale economies in customer relationship and management.  
In the development of e.Biscom some regulatory issues have emerged as 
specific opportunities that the firm could capture to fasten its growth. In 2000 
Telecom Italia acquired from Cecchi Gori Group two television stations, La7 
and MTV. To give clearance the antitrust authority imposed to offer at 
interested competitors for a nominal right of passage the cable infrastructure 
that Telecom Italia has built in the late eighties within the Socrates Project with 
the aim to carry cable TV to the main Italian cities. E.Biscom was practically 
the only operator to catch this opportunity. It could therefore pass its optic 
fiber in the existing conduct, substantially reducing time and investments 
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required to expand its area of operation beyond the original Milan focus to the 
major Italian metropolitan area. In this way the customer base grew faster and 
e.Biscom could achieve critical mass to exploit scale economies.  
In 2001, following the European directive on last mile liberalization, 
Telecom Italia was forced to unbundle the local loop for ADSL lines. 
Moreover, in 2003 the Communication Authority imposed a 10% reduction in 
wholesale prices and in the same ordinance extended number portability to 
fixed telephony, removing a significant barrier to entry in this market. In this 
way e.Biscom could extend the geographical coverage to the areas where its fiber 
optic network does not arrive with a broadband offer via ADSL without 
significant fixed investment.                  
When Sky Italia sold the two Italian pay TV operators Stream and Telepiù, 
in order to accept the monopoly in this market the European Commission 
imposed some conditions to make easier eventual entries. Among the others, 
there was the requirement to sell the premium channels to competitors’ 
platforms at a retail minus pricing. The amount of the minus is the object of a 
controversy in front of the Authority with e.Biscom asking for a 50% discount 
and Sky offering a lower 30%. With this measure e.Biscom could offer the same 
premium content of pay TV at the same price improving the attractiveness of 
the video component of its triple play offer. 
Conclusion 
The e.Biscom story is a good case study to analyze the features of a rapid 
growth in TLC business. The process exhibits learning capabilities, fast strategy, 
and adjustments to the changing market conditions. 
Around the central idea to deploy a fiber optic network with IP architecture 
that allows integrated transport of voice data and video, e.Biscom enlarged the 
offer with ADSL links and changed the vertical integration degree to a situation 
where the company operates directly only the network and the services 
management. 
In the evolution process, the organizational structure has changed rapidly 
taking a more stable shape and adapting operational procedures at the market 
environment and at the evolving strategic orientation. The conjunction of a 
stable core orientation and a deep strategic and operational flexibility is an 
important feature of e.Biscom experience and is one of the most influential key 
success factors up to the point. 
E.biscom enjoyed a first mover advantage in video-telephony and large scale 
video on demand and, together with a throughout advertising strategy, 
contributed to form a strong and innovative brand with a good perception 
among the Italian consumers. The direct control over an IP network generates 
potential cost advantages both in network management and in service provision 
where there could be scope economies. 
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The low penetration rate appears to be the main weakness as it can stress the 
financial structure requiring more capital per subscriber. E.Biscom responded to 
this weakness with the strategic shifting to ADSL through the local loop 
unbundling. 
Considering the pace of innovation in telecommunication and IP 
technology, a compact vertical integrated IP network can generate some 
technological lock-in especially if any real breakthrough in access technology 
would appear.  
As happened to other telecommunication operators, the shift from a 
prevailing technological orientation to a more customer orientation focus, is a 
crucial stage that requires a broad rethinking of all internal processes, key 
competencies and in general the transformation of the whole corporate culture. 
The fiber optic strategy contributed to enhance the competition in Italian 
broadband market and could play a role in quickening broadband adoption 
bypassing weakness factors as low personal computer diffusion. 
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The Impact of Digital Convergence on 
Broadcasting Management in Korea: 
Telecommunications Firms’ Entry into 
Broadcasting Industry  
Daeho Kim 
 
Ever since the beginning of the 1990’s the telecommunication industry and the 
broadcasting industry have been bracing themselves for the convergence 
between the two fields. Towards the end of the 1990’s this “convergence 
between broadcasting and telecommunications” became a reality. The 
development of the communication and digital technologies enabled the overall 
digitalization of the broadcasting and brought about broadband 
telecommunication networks. These developments have led to a huge change in 
the broadcasting and telecommunication industries. In other words, the 
emergence of various new technologies brought down the barrier between 
telecommunication and broadcasting.  
In Korea, digital broadcasting started in 2001 beginning with terrestrial 
broadcasting and it gradually proceeded to include satellite TV and then cable 
TV. Korea is one of the first countries to start digital broadcasting and our 
prowess in telecommunications network is even more impressive. As of August 
2004, 76% of all Korean households are subscribed to the broadband Internet 
and such penetration rate is indeed the highest in the world. The Korean 
Internet users utilize this advanced Internet infrastructure to gain access to the 
sea of contents over the web and they have well earned reputation of being the 
most Internet savvy people in the world (Ministry of Information and 
Communication, 2004a). Broadcasting network such as cable TV network 
offers broadband Internet access. Meanwhile, telecommunication network such 
as ADSL provide broadcasting services. People use the video on demand 
(VOD) service over the high speed Internet. 
Convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting is a 
phenomenon where what used to be two separate areas—broadcasting and 
telecommunications—becomes one through the development of supporting 
technologies and the sophistication of demand. Such convergence eliminates 
the distinction between network and service thereby initiating an overall 
convergence in the industrial structure as well as in the institutions. (Korea 
Information Strategy Development Institute, 1997). What’s more, convergence 
reduces the difference which had so far separated broadcasting from 
telecommunication and has inevitably introduced great changes all around us.  
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Currently, convergence between broadcasting and telecommunication can 
be witnessed everywhere. There are two factors that had been conducive to this 
phenomenon. One is the ‘hardware factor’ such as the wide penetration of 
broadband Internet and the development of the broadband network. The other 
is the ‘software factor’ that includes the digitalization of the contents through 
the emergence of High-Definition TV, cable TV and satellite broadcasting. 
However, the most conspicuous result of the convergence between broadcasting 
and telecommunication has been the transformation of the whole media 
industry. The convergence trend not only rewrites the industrial system but also 
further more transforms the market structure and fuels competition. As this 
trend of convergence continues, the broadcasting companies and the 
telecommunication service providers alike are displaying signs of change which 
was only to be expected. The two industries, the broadcasting industry and the 
telecommunication industry are now vying for the same objective, to take a 
large share of the lucrative multimedia business, and therefore, the barrier 
between the two has disappeared leaving them in a direct competition with one 
another. 
Particularly in the case of the telecom service providers, they have expanded 
their businesses from voice telecommunication and are now providing various 
image data services including broadcasting. This affects the business of the 
broadcasting companies and shifts the overall structure of the broadcasting 
industry. Nonetheless, the telecommunication service providers are aggressively 
pursuing to take part in the broadcasting business.  
Of course, it is unlikely that the broadcasting companies would welcome 
such a challenge. The terrestrial broadcasting companies in Korea are highly 
influential. The three terrestrial broadcasting companies, KBS, MBC and SBS 
account for 70% of the total Korean broadcasting market (Korean Broadcasting 
Commission, 2004). These three companies are strongly opposed to allowing 
the telecommunication service providers to take share of the broadcasting 
business. This is because they fear they will lose their market dominance. 
However despite their concerns, the telecommunication service providers 
continue to gain a foothold in the broadcasting market starting with satellite 
broadcasting. 
This study aims to address the effects and implications of this convergence 
trend. The study will focus on analyzing the impact of telecommunication 
service providers’ entry into the broadcasting industry.  
Change of Industry Structure  
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, convergence of broadcasting and 
telecommunications has been anticipated and highly discussed (OECD, 1999). 
Graham Murdock (2000) has explained the concept of convergence by 
distinguishing the following three types of convergence. The convergence of the 
media is a phenomenon that took place even before we became familiar with 
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the concept of ‘Multimedia’ in the beginning of 1990’s. This first type of 
convergence is characterized by the fusion of the main forms or ingredients of 
the media (music, text, image, graphic etc.) into one. CD-ROM and Internet 
websites are some of the examples of media convergence.  
The second type is the convergence of telecommunication and media 
technology. During the 1980’s and 1990’s there was an expansion of such 
technologies. From the beginning of 1980’s to the first half of 1990’s there was 
a great surge of new media and telecommunication technologies. People gained 
command over numerous channels of access such as VCR, cable TV, and 
satellite broadcasting. Since then, the emergence of personal computer (PC) has 
paved the way for even more new technologies as computer games and CD-
ROMs gained popularity. With the digitalization of information and 
communication technologies, the PC became linked to networks and ultimately 
to digital TV. Digitalization provided the necessary foundation for the 
integration of information and entertainment. 
The third convergence type is business ownership. This means the removal 
of the barriers that used to separate media companies, telecommunication 
service providers and computer makers. With the introduction of digital TV 
and with the expansion of the Internet, new players such as telecommunication 
service providers were able to enter the broadcasting business. The opportunity 
was given not only to the service providers but also to the household appliance 
makers and PC manufacturers. The convergence between the businesses took 
many shapes and forms including strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions 
and equity partnerships.  
Both Murdock and Peter Golding pointed out that convergence should be 
regarded as an economic phenomenon that takes place due to changing business 
strategies and structure (Murdock, 2000; Golding, 2000). In other words, the 
convergence between broadcasting and telecommunication has taken place 
because of business needs. And the current convergence trend is actually 
broadcasting companies and telecommunication service providers crossing over 
each other’s boundaries. 
Korea is also witnessing an active integration among telecommunications 
and broadcasting companies. And this integration brings down the wall 
between different areas of business. Cable TV operators step over their 
boundary by providing Internet access via cable. Likewise, the telecom service 
providers trespass on the broadcasting industry by providing audiovisual 
streaming service. Finally, some businesses diversify and conduct M&A. 
Just to name a few examples, Korea Telecom (KT) is the majority 
shareholder of SkyLife, the only digital satellite broadcasting company. And SK 
Telecom recently launched their satellite DMB business41. Such business 
                                                     
41 DMB is a Digital Multimedia Broadcasting which is developed from the DAB (Digital Audio 
Broadcasting). The latter is to provide audio service only, while the former provides video service 
as well. 
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diversification, alliance and acquisition strategies among telecom and 
broadcasting companies are all means of survival in the new media era. 
More and more telecom operators are launching a broadcasting business 
because of the change in the industrial structure due to convergence trend. In 
1997 the European Commission (EC) predicted that the media industry would 
undergo a significant structural change. According to the EC, the media 
industry would move away from its current vertical structure toward a more 
horizontal structure in the value chain. In short, up to now, industries have 
been divided into telecommunication industry, broadcasting industry, 
newspaper industry, film industry and so on according to the form of 
information format, but from now on the industries will be defined as 
information network industry, information service industry, contents industry 
etc., according to the kind of value they create.  
With this in mind, the European Union (EU) has come up with a new 
categorization of the information industry. In March 2002, the EU divided the 
information industry into two categories: electronic communication network 
and electronic communication service (European Union, 2002). Accordingly, 
they adopted the proposed recommendation to apply a single regulatory system 
for both electronic communication network business and electronic 
communication service business. This recommendation aims at striking a 
balance between network and media, applying separate regulations for 
transmission and contents and most of all to uphold public interest. By 
achieving these objectives they plan to simplify and integrate the network 
related laws and regulation. The purpose of this plan is to change the structure 
of the regulation system from vertical to horizontal. Under the existing vertical 
regulation system, regulations differ depending on the type of business i.e., 
broadcasting or telecommunication. With the horizontal regulatory framework, 
different regulations will apply for different layers of the business i.e., network, 
service, contents etc. (OECD, 2004).  
Telecom Service Providers’ Entry into the Broadcasting Industry 
The 2000 Broadcasting Act is an integrated law that brought together all the 
broadcasting related laws into one. Under this new law, the responsibility of 
regulating the broadcasting industry was handed over from the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism to an independent administrative and consultative body 
called the Korean Broadcasting Commission that possesses the authority to 
enforce the regulations. Also for the first time there was an inclusion of an 
article on satellite broadcasting. This article made it possible to launch SkyLife, 
the Korean satellite broadcasting company. At the same time, the 
telecommunications operator KT could enter the broadcasting industry and 
became the majority shareholder of SkyLife. Since then, more 
telecommunication providers began to take part in the broadcasting business. 
In the following sections we will describe some examples. 
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KT  
KT is Korea’s largest network operator. After acquiring a majority stake in 
Skylife, which has 1.27 million subscribers and generates revenue of 17 million 
US dollars (March 2004), KT is planning to become a major player in the 
broadcasting industry through the launch of IP-TV. IP-TV is a network based 
broadcasting service. KT will provide multicasting service to the households by 
utilizing their ADSL subscriber network42. Their service will include real-time 
broadcasting and VOD service. This service will become commercially available 
in 2005 (KT, 2004).  
KT also considers home network service to be their core service. Home 
network can be established by linking all the information devices in a 
household. Home network can become a reality with the help of computers, 
but the digitalization of broadcasting and telecommunication is what made it 
ultimately possible. When the home network develops, contents can flow in 
both directions and more video images can be made available. Particularly with 
the wide penetration of DVD and digital broadcasting, quality of sound and 
video has enhanced greatly. As such, Home network service seems to be a 
highly desirable business opportunity for KT because it will allow them to 
obtain a smooth access to the broadcasting and video industry. KT has branded 
its home network service as HomeN. HomeN is a broadband based home 
networking service. KT has used its ADSL high-speed internet access, 
Megapass, and connected it to the home gateway to allow home automation 
that controls broadband Internet, HDTV and other home appliances. On top 
of that, this home networking service supports a wide range of 
telecommunication and broadcasting service including interactive TV. Also, KT 
provides several other services such as TV-VOD service that allows the viewers 
to do their own programming, home viewer service that enables the subscriber 
to check his/her home from outside and an SMS service between TV and 
mobile phone.  
 
SK Telecom 
SK Telecom is the largest mobile operator in Korea. It accounts for more than 
53% of the total mobile telecommunication market (Ministry of Information 
and Communication, 2004b). 
SK Telecom is not only providing voice data service but recently it has 
launched a 3G technology based multimedia service called June. This 
multimedia mobile service provides movie, music, animation game and other 
entertainment contents as well as TV programs. June is especially significant 
because it offers the users the choice of eight TV channels including four 
terrestrial TV channels and four other major cable channels. And the viewers 
can watch these programs real-time over their mobile handsets. The service 
                                                     
42 KT has 6 million subscribers of ADSL, which shows 40% of total high speed internet. 
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started in November 2002 and as of March 2004, the number of subscribers to 
this service exceeded 2 million. This is because the Korean mobile users find 
this video streaming service extremely convenient and enjoyable. 
Furthermore, SK Telecom is preparing to launch a full mobile DMB service. 
This satellite DMB service will provide 11 to 13 TV channels and 25 audio 
channels. The mobile broadcasting service will be available to the users for a set 
fee (SK Telecom, 2004).  
Satellite DMB is categorized as a broadcasting service under the new law of 
2004 and SK Telecom is in the process of obtaining a license for the provision 
of this service. The application for the license will be submitted in November 
2004 and license will be granted in December. Therefore service will become 
available in 2005. Once the service begins SK Telecom will have launched its 
first broadcasting business (Kim, D., & Kim. Y., 2004).  
 
Hanaro Telecom  
Hanaro Telecom is the second largest local telephone company and also the 
second largest broadband Internet service provider. Hanaro serves 8% of all 
households subscribing to the local telecom service and 25% of all broadband 
connected households (Ministry of Information and Communication, 2004b). 
Hanaro Telecom has a vision to become a multimedia service provider that 
provides broadcasting and telecommunication service together. To this end, 
Hanaro Telecom plans to use its broadband network and subscriber base to 
provide VOIP and IP based broadcasting service. From June 2004, Hanaro 
Telecom has started their broadcasting bundled service in cooperation with 
satellite and cable TV operators. Up to 2006, they will continue to provide a 
bundled service of broadband Internet and VOD and afterwards, from 2006, 
they will add IP based broadcasting service (Hanaro Telecom, 2004).  
 
Dacom  
Dacom is the second largest international telecom operator. It was established 
in 1991 as the first company to challenge the monopoly of KT and it became 
KT’s major competitor. Dacom also owns Powercom, an information network 
company. Through Powercom, Dacom operates a cable TV network as well as a 
broadband Internet network. Using these networks, Dacom plans to provide an 
HFC based broadcasting and telecommunication service (Ministry of 
Information and Communication, 2004b).  
Dacom is also focusing on Digital cable service. Powercom will offer HFC 
network and Dacom will provide the service under its own brand name.  
Dacom aims to provide PC-Vision service. PC-Vision service is an 
interactive service made possible by installing a DCR (Digital Contents 
Receiver) on the subscribers PC to allow free flow of contents. Dacom hopes to 
transform itself as a convergence service provider through TPS (Triple Play 
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Service) which will include VoIP, Digital TV, and broadband Internet service 
(Dacom, 2004).  
Broadcasting Companies’ Entry into the Telecommunications 
Iindustry  
The broadcasting companies show a great interest in the telecommunication 
business. The cable TV operators are the most aggressive in their pursuit. Most 
of the cable operators in Korea are already providing value added 
telecommunication services, such as high-speed Internet access, using their own 
network or other telecommunication companies’ networks. As of July 2004, 
800,000 subscribers gain broadband Internet access via cable and this number 
represents 6.7% of the total of 11.7 million broadband subscribers. Recently 
the cable operator’s market share in this business is surely increasing (Ministry 
of Information and Communication, 2004a). Until now the government did 
not apply stringent regulations on the telecommunication services provided by 
the cable TV companies and because of this lack of regulation, most cable 
companies have been selling their cable TV service bundled together with their 
broadband Internet service. In some cases they even add a voice data service 
using VoIP and their service ultimately becomes a ‘Triple Play Service’.  
The essential prerequisite for providing such convergence service is the 
digitalization of cable. As such, many cable TV companies are in the process of 
building a digital cable center in preparation for the convergence. In fact, more 
recently, Kuryx, C&M, and BSI have either started or made plans for it (Lee, et 
al., 2004).  
At the same time, cable TV operators are already in the home networking 
business. Cable TV operators find this business attractive because cable TV Set-
top-Box can also serve as a home network server. What’s more, the cable TV 
operators believe their HFC network is more suitable for home networking 
service then the xDSL network used by the telecom operators. 
As for the terrestrial broadcasting companies and satellite broadcasting 
companies, they are more interested in interactive data broadcasting. The 
terrestrial broadcasting companies have completed testing this service and the 
satellite broadcasting companies have began DVB-MHP based data 
broadcasting. SkyLife has already joined hands with a telecom service provider 
for the provision of broadcasting and telecommunication integrated service. 
All in all, the cable companies’ goal is to provide all around multimedia 
service by converging broadcasting and telecommunication. They are 
aggressively seeking to achieve this goal by starting their convergent services. On 
the other hand, the terrestrial and satellite broadcasting companies prefer to stay 
with their original broadcasting service rather then enter directly into the 
telecommunication service market. However, they do plan to provide limited 
interactive service and other convergent services as a part of their additional 
services.  
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Implications of Telecom Operators’ Entry into the Broadcasting 
Industry  
Methods of Entry  
Korea’s telecommunication operators are highly motivated when it comes to 
launching broadcasting and convergent services. They are threatened by many 
factors such as telecom market saturation, integration between fixed line and 
wireless and increasing competition. Because of this adversely changing market 
environment, the operators are concerned about securing future revenue source 
and that is why they are diversifying into multimedia service business which 
they expect will become highly profitable as the convergent trend accelerates. 
However, telecom service providers are entering the information service 
industry using their existing networks. So they start with vertical integration. As 
such, they are more focused on information service business and less on 
information contents business. This indicates that the service providers, based 
on their long-term prediction that the broadcasting companies will have a 
competitive advantage in the era of convergence, has decided to secure service 
provision capabilities so that they will have more leverage in future negotiations 
with the broadcasting companies. Most telecom companies gain a foothold in 
the convergent service area by launching broadcasting services. KT launched the 
nation’s first satellite broadcasting company, SK Telecom started a satellite 
DMB business, Hanaro Telecom is about to launch IP-TV service and Dacom 
has a digital cable TV business underway. 
The fact remains that the broadcasting companies and the telecommun-
ication service operators alike are crossing one another’s boundary and such 
convergence leads to a significant change in the existing industrial structure. 
Neither the broadcasting companies nor the telecom operators can stay safe 
within their own boundaries. There will emerge a new industrial structure 
where these two industries have to engage in direct a competition to secure a 
share of the home entertainment network.  
 
Skylife  
SkyLife is the first satellite TV service which is a consortium of KT and the 
terrestrial broadcasting companies. The consortium was formed in March 2000 
and license was granted in December. It started its broadcasting service in 
March 2002 and currently has 1.5 million subscribers.  
KT is the majority shareholder of Skylife and it also has the management 
right. SkyLife’s shareholder distribution is as follows. KT: 27.43%, KTF: 
2.38%, KBS: 10.7%, MBC 6.42%, SBS 1.07% etc. KT and its affiliates hold 
over 29.81% of SkyLife’s shares and next to KT, the three terrestrial 
broadcasting companies have 18% of the shares. In short, SkyLife is run by an 
alliance of KT and the terrestrial broadcasting companies. The influential 
terrestrial broadcasting companies seem to have been included to facilitate KT’s 
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entry into the broadcasting business. As such, the management is also shared by 
KT and terrestrial broadcasters. The president of SkyLife is from KBS, and the 
vice-president from KT. The management team for broadcasting department is 
also an equal mix of KT and KBS. Surprisingly, there has been no report of 
management disputes as of yet. Besides the management, the junior employees 
were also recruited from various areas of broadcasting and telecommunications.  
 
TU Media  
TU media is a subsidiary of SK Telecom established in December 2003 to 
handle the satellite DMB service. SK Telecom has 30% of its shares and 
MBCo(Toshiba) of Japan has about 10%.  
Interestingly, TU media’s management group is also an amalgam of 
broadcasting experts and telecommunication experts. The president comes from 
SK Telecom and the vice–president from KBS. Inclusion of some terrestrial 
broadcasting companies is a strategic move that will help the company to 
become accepted in the broadcasting industry. However, unlike SkyLife, most 
employees of TU media are from SK Telecom. 
 
Impact on Broadcasting Management 
As seen, telecom operators’ entry into the broadcasting industry brings 
inevitable and significant changes to the whole industry. Such entry is contrived 
through vertical integration. The main rational behind this vertical integration 
is maximization of financial gains. Due to the inherent nature of network, 
economy of scale is imperative, the larger the scale the more efficient and 
profitable a business will be and thus, vertical integrations have been the best 
option so far. 
It is said that efficient management is the main benefit of a vertical 
integration. By diversifying the use of network, companies can generate more 
revenue and seek new growth opportunities. The other benefit is stronger 
presence in the market. The vertical integration enables the companies to 
achieve economy of scale and create synergy effect which leads to larger market 
share  
Because of the competition presented by the telecom service providers the 
broadcasting companies are beginning to feel the importance of maintaining a 
certain level of profitability. However, the broadcasters still tend to be more 
focused on preserving the public interest than enhancing profitability. 
With regard to the broadcasting industry’s entry regulations, the level of 
foreign ownership has increased in the broadcasting business. According to the 
2004 Broadcasting Act, the ceiling for foreign ownership was lifted to 49%. 
The regulation on foreign ownership in the broadcasting business became less 
stringent as the telecom operators began to enter the broadcasting industry.  
However, we have yet to witness any positive results of telecom operator’s 
participation in the broadcasting industry because so far none of them has been 
Jönköping International Business School 
 164
able to display substantial gains in profit or market share. SkyLife, led by KT 
has been in the business for the last 2 years and they are still suffering a loss. SK 
Telecom has so far invested a total of 270 million US dollars in its satellite 
DMB business without seeing much return 
 
Dispute between Broadcasters and Telecom Operators  
The broadcasting companies are strongly against allowing the telecommun-
ication service providers to take part in their business. Amidst the convergence, 
it turned out that while the telecom operators are actively taking the initiative 
in the broadcasting business, the broadcasting companies were somewhat 
passive in their approach to the telecommunication industry. As such, the 
broadcasting companies are resentful and concerned. 
First, since the telecommunication industry is already much larger in size, 
the broadcasting companies are concerned that their industry will shrink even 
further. The telecommunication service providers have an advantage over the 
broadcasting companies in terms of technological capability (Network), finance 
(Telecommunication industry is estimated at 400 billion US dollars while the 
broadcasting industry generates only around 55 billion US dollars), and 
marketing.  
Second, broadcasting services in future will mostly be convergent service 
that incorporates telecommunication element as well as broadcasting element. 
Digital revolution will produce more fusion and integration among various 
media or services. Internet newspaper and satellite DMB are all forms of hybrid 
media where more than two forms of media come together to create a new 
service. This kind of hybrid media are not pre-planned and developed by a 
regulatory body, they are developed as a result of an understanding between the 
businesses and consumers. However, when it comes to hybrid media the 
broadcasting companies are faced with limitations in their development 
capability due to their lack of technology. But the telecommunication service 
providers, who already have the broadband network and money to invest, find 
it much easier to develop new services. 
Third, it’s relatively more difficult for the broadcasting companies to enter 
the telecommunication industry than vice versa. Telecommunication service 
providers are launching broadcasting services such as satellite and satellite 
DMB. On the other hand, the broadcasting companies cannot as easily enter 
the telecommunication business whether it is fixed line or mobile. Therefore, 
apparently in a convergence situation, the telecommunication service providers 
seems to have more advantage and this perception is what makes the 
broadcasters take a negative stance. 
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Conclusion  
After 2000, in Korea, convergence between broadcasting and telecommun-
ication has accelerated. Convergent services have been introduced and 
telecommunication service providers and broadcasting companies alike are 
responding more seriously to this trend. Bundling services that incorporate TV, 
broadband Internet and telephone have emerged through the integration of 
networks. And the functions of cable TV and telecommunication network have 
grown more similar so as to put them in direct competition with one another. 
For instance, the digitalization of cable TV enabled the operators to provide 
broadband and interactive services. Meanwhile, the telecommunication service 
providers have continued to increase their bandwidth and thus are now able to 
add video streaming to their list of services. Inevitably the two areas begin to 
overlap and this leads to competition which will motivate them to develop 
further. 
The telecommunication service providers have been more active with their 
broadcasting business however this effort is yet to bear fruit. They are 
continuing to make huge investments but the positive effects of this vertical 
integration have not been obvious as of yet.  
Particularly, the opposition from the existing broadcasting companies 
remains a problem. When SkyLife wanted to retransmit the terrestrial 
broadcasting channels, the regional broadcasting companies fiercely objected 
and this plan was put on hold for two years. 
As can be seen, the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunication is 
not a smooth process. Mainly because the two areas are competing one another 
over who will take the initiative in the convergent service market. Therefore, 
even though there are some telecommunications operators already operating 
broadcasting businesses, the convergence trend is not likely to quicken its pace 
because of strong opposition from the broadcasting industry. Nevertheless, 
despite everything, we can expect to see significant changes in the Korean 
broadcasting management in the near future.  
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 Will Peer-to-Peer Technologies 
Create New Business? 
Franz Lehner 
 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) can be seen as a new technology or a new paradigm within 
electronic communication and are driven by research, development, and market 
activities of companies and government (See Figure 1). There are some clear 
indicators for the business relevance of P2P technologies. Nevertheless, the 
economic aspects of peer-to-peer systems have received little attention so far. 
Due to the success and popularity of applications such as Napster, KaZaa and 
others, a lot of ideas were created about how to use P2P networks within an 
organization as well as a general instrument for electronic business. Both areas 
can lead to new market opportunities and also to the creation of new firms. On 
the one hand the opportunities of P2P technologies can serve as basis for new 
business models; on the other hand they can lead to substitution of existing 
applications or just be used for improving current work processes.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Driving Forces of Business Opportunities through New Technologies  
 
In order to understand what is generally happening when new technologies are 
emerging, it makes sense to briefly look at an example which is taken from the 
world of mobile business. In the world of mobile applications, services, 
networks etc. meanwhile most things happen in a commercial or business 
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context. We may not forget that this was quite different in the early days of 
mobile solutions. But exactly this is a good reason why business aspects should 
be taken into consideration from the very beginning when planning new 
applications or at least looking for market opportunities in combination with 
new technologies. Transferring the experience from the world of mobile (which 
is close to P2P also in a technological sense) we should try to consider economic 
aspects of P2P from the very beginning. 
A structured and systematic discussion of unsolved problems therefore 
should consider technological and business aspects in a balanced manner. A first 
step would be the development of a common view identifying the key areas to 
be considered for discussion. In a first approach four levels of discussion can be 
distinguished, namely: 
 
1. market level (including legal and regulative issues) 
2.  enterprise level (business models etc) 
3.  user level (single/group, private/workplace etc.) 
4. technical level and global infrastructure(s), including legal environ-
ment(s), cultural and other aspects) 
 
Figure 2.  Market Forces in the Mobile Market 
 
Based on this framework a business oriented view of applications and 
technology use can be developed.  It is also possible to go into the details of the 
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market (which is close to and overlapping with the IT market) and identify the 
key players, dependencies between players and market participants, influences, 
driving forces etc. and discuss possible scenarios. Figure 2 demonstrates this for 
the mobile market. In the market for mobile technologies and services the 
network operators and the service provider are playing a dominant role at the 
moment (and there are no changes in sight for the next years). The end user has 
(at least indirectly) some influence on the market development but she/he is not 
really the driving force. The acceptance of new products and services within a 
market environment is dependent from many factors (among them price, social 
value, trust, security etc.). The approach presented above and the model shown 
in Figure 2 can easily be adopted to analyze the activities and market 
opportunities in a related field. 
Survey and Classification of P2P Applications  
There are several reasons why (mobile) P2P is worth being investigated. At this 
point we will not discuss the different definitions of P2P. We base on the 
following two interpretations: a) Sharing of computer resources and services by 
direct exchange between systems; b) P2P is a class of applications that takes 
advantage of resources—storage, cycles, content, human presence—available at 
the edges of the Internet. We will also not discuss the characteristics of P2P 
networks in detail; we assume them to be the following: network of equal 
nodes, shared infrastructure, no central authority, added values through shared 
resources leading to network effects. Beside ubiquitous access to existing services 
new opportunities like ad-hoc networking or vehicle networks are seen. The 
difficulties in exploring the field rely on the fact that several layers of abstraction 
(technical, logical or conceptual, social, business) can be distinguished and they 
are all contributing to the offered features. Figure 3 depicts the complex 
environment and infrastructure in which P2P applications are embedded. 
Figure 3. Complex Environment of P2P Applications  
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Meanwhile there are many applications in the market which are based on peer-
to-peer networks. Nevertheless several applications have been referred during 
the last years as “peer-to-peer” which, according to the definitions above, are no 
peer-to-peer applications. For example, the large amount of tools for distributed 
computing does not count to the domain of peer-to-peer applications according 
to the common understanding. The reason is that no direct communication is 
intended between the peers there. The exchange of data or files only takes place 
between a central instance and the individual peers. So the term P2P represents 
sometimes rather a marketing tool than a new technology. In addition to that 
the term became a “buzz” concept around 2000 and was applied to nearly 
anything that had to do with connecting or sharing. A result of the popularity 
and the wide perception was little knowledge about the underlying technical 
concepts. 
Some of the existing applications, which are actually based on the peer-to-
peer technology, will now be presented. An exhaustive survey of the 
applications is nearly impossible due to the market dynamics. 
The group of the different Instant Messenger Tools forms a majority of 
the existing peer-to-peer applications. To be precise, this group includes e.g., 
the AOL Instant Messenger and ICQ, which both support a real-time and 
direct communication between two participants in the network (peers) by the 
use of direct message exchanging. The simultaneous message exchange between 
several persons is also possible via the use of a chat function. 
Further Instant Messenger Tools, which support the communication 
between persons by the use of a peer-to-peer network, are e.g., the MSN 
Messenger from Microsoft, the Yahoo! Messenger, Zim-Pro and also the 
VyPress Messenger from VyPress. The last two offer the possibility to form 
private sub-networks and thus limit the communication to a closed, authorized 
user group.  
Another class of applications supports the user in purchasing and selling of 
goods. An example is PinPost7. With PinPost7, it is possible to create own sale 
offers and search for goods which one intends to buy.  It is also possible to limit 
the search for specific objects on sale to the close vicinity of the person 
interested in buying the object. An application which intends to realize an 
electronic market place on the basis of peer-to-peer nets is still in prototype 
status (Benger & Schulz 2003). This procurement-network is intended to 
support the participants in the network especially during the transaction phase. 
However, a solution which is ready for the market has not yet been 
implemented.  
An IP-telephony application based on peer-to-peer technology is Skype. 
With the use of Skype it is possible for everyone to talk via internet with any 
other person being online and having installed the same application.  
The application Groove is an example for a groupware solution based on 
peer-to-peer technology. The participating peers can use communication 
features and also form work groups, which collectively share a field of activity. 
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Besides synchronous communication Groove offers in these working groups 
also the possibility of asynchronous communication as well as the possibility of 
exchanging data, contact management features, a scratch-board and a group 
calendar. Also, a collective browsing in the internet is possible with this 
application. Similar functions can be found in the applications Hive, Colloquia  
iKnow  or Onobee, which all belong to the class of peer-to-peer groupware.  
The exchange or swapping of files—widely called ”file sharing”—can be 
seen as the area of application which led to the boom of peer-to-peer 
applications and started the broad discussion a few years ago. These applications 
combine stable and mature search algorithms with the possibility of locating 
distributed files on different nodes in the net and download it partially. Objects 
exchanged or downloaded from the internet by the use of these applications are 
music files and more and more movies.  
We can distinguish between open networks, whose protocol architecture is 
publicly available, interoperable networks, which exchange data with other 
networks and whose protocols can be licensed, and proprietary networks, whose 
underlying protocols and available clients were designed proprietarily and are 
not public available. Proprietary nets are, e.g., the Edonkey2000-Net and its 
successor Overnet, which offer for the use of their services clients like eMule or 
eDonkey. Another proprietary net is the OpenFT-Net with its clients giFTcure, 
giFT-fe and KCeasy. An example for an interoperable network is the Fasttrack-
Net with its client-applications KaZaa, KaZaa Lite K++ and Grokster. A 
completely open network would by the Gnutella-Net with the clients 
Morpheus, BearShare or LimeWire. 
A very special kind of application concerns open discussion forums because 
they support the original idea of the internet. Seen from the distance Freenet is 
just another network for sharing data. However, the exchange of music- and 
movie-files is not the intention here. Freenet was designed as a totally 
decentralized system for the exchange of statements and opinions. This 
application makes it possible for everyone to publish texts without personally 
being identified. Another application in this field is the project Freehaven, 
which follows the same philosophy as Freenet but goes a step further 
concerning anonymity because also the reader of an article is anonymous.  
A similar application with a different objective is Science-to-Science (S2S). 
S2S is the first search engine in Europe designed for the search and exchange of 
scientific information. By the clearance of certain files scientist can offer their 
documents to an interested community.  
After this short overview of existing P2P applications a more systematic 
attempt is made to classify existing application. For that purpose in a first step 
typical activities supported by P2P applications are identified and briefly 
discussed. Of course, the classification and description is not exhaustive but 
gives an insight in business opportunities of this emerging field. 
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Communication and Collaboration 
Communication is primarily supported by instant messaging tools like the AOL 
Instant Messenger. The original and primary target group of these open peer-
to-peer networks was private persons. However, these tools seem to be useful 
for companies as well. Companies and particular work groups in companies 
respectively can be considered as the main target group of the applications Zim-
Pro and VyPress Messenger. As it is possible to limit the use of the tool to a 
certain group of persons, it becomes possible for companies to selectively 
exclude or include persons and eliminate the risk that due to the use of an open 
network information could fall in the wrong hands or problems with spam-
messages come up. 
Collaboration, which also includes the support of cooperation between 
persons, is supported by groupware and collaboration-tools like Groove. In the 
domain of collaboration the largest number of peer-to-peer applications can be 
found. Most of these tools primarily focus on business or company related use. 
This happens because the implementation causes costs or requires license fees, 
and utilization by private persons is unlikely because many instant messenger 
tools offer at least a subset of the functions found in groupware solutions and 
are usually free of charge. 
 
Sharing 
The activity of sharing, according to the definition, is supported by numerous 
file-sharing tools like KaZaa or eMule. The target group of these applications is 
private persons. The commercial use is discussed. Mainly music- and 
multimedia-files are being exchanged so far. It is of no relevance from whom 
these files originate. A special application that can be counted to this category of  
applications is PinPost. The users of this tool do not offer multimedia contents 
but tangible objects like used computer hardware. In return they receive money. 
For the buyer and the seller it is of no relevance who the opposite party of a 
transaction is. However, it is crucial that the purchased article matches the 
given specifications and that the price which was agreed upon is paid. PinPost is 
designed predominantly for the private use. 
 
Publishing 
The application Freenet can be mentioned as the main application in the 
domain of publishing. Although the real identity of the publisher is not 
revealed, every document is clearly assigned to an author, even though 
anonymous, by the use of a special algorithm (Möller, 2001). The reader can 
thus recognize the author of a certain article and can draw conclusions 
concerning the credibility of the publication. Freenet is used primarily for 
private purposes. 
For scientific material Science-to-Science is used. A main difference to the 
philosophy of Freenet is that, in a scientific context, it is of high relevance for 
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the recipient to know, who the author or publisher of an article is. This means 
that the business context can be seen as a possible future target group for this 
application. 
The original idea of this kind of applications was that the sender has to be 
relevant for the recipient. Both Freenet and S2S are applications that match this 
characteristic. In contrast to this Freehaven goes a step further with its 
anonymisation of the author. Here, the originator of an article is no longer 
apparent.  
 
Storing 
Storing in a very conventional sense is obviously the basis of every peer-to-peer 
application as the decentralized use of storage is a fundamental concept of all 
peer-to-peer networks. With this special applications the question where the 
data is stored physically is of no relevance for the sender and he cannot 
influence this respectively. Distributed and shared network resources are used in 
order to store files and efficiently use existing resources. The technologies 
aligned are discussed and investigated under the term grid computing (which 
includes some additional facilities beyond storage). 
Further activities supported by P2P networks, which are not discussed in 
detail here, are selling and reselling goods (e.g., Lightshare, PinPost), gaming 
(e.g., DOOM, DaliWorld, Star Craft), and distributed computing (e. g. 
Seti@home, Folding@home). 
In Table 1 an attempt is made to summarize the results. It can be observed 
that most of the tools support communication and collaboration activities. This 
may be caused by several reasons. Obviously the main reason is the structural 
similarity of a peer-to-peer network with the real communication situation. If 
one thinks of the cooperation between persons, this is characterized most 
notably by the direct exchange between all parties involved. Sharing is 
supported by a tool in the private as well as in a business environment, although 
the electronic market place is still under development. A similar situation exists 
in the area of publishing based upon peer-to-peer nets. In the domain of storing 
no applications are known so far, which are available; the field is developed in 
combination with research attempts on grid computing (which also includes 
sharing of  processing capacities). Generally speaking, it can be observed that at 
the moment there are only very few applications, which were designed for the 
use in an enterprise or for business purposes. Communication and collaboration 
seem to be the most promising field for the near future.  
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Table 1. Classification Schema for Peer-to-Peer Applications 
 
 Communication and 
collaboration Sharing Publishing Storing 
Private 
misc. Instant 
Messenger 
Skype 
misc. File-Sharing Tools 
PinPost 
Free Network 
Freehaven 
 
Business-
related 
div. Instant Messenger
Skype 
VyPress 
Zim-Pro 
Groove 
Hive 
Colloquia 
Onobee 
Electronic market place Science-to-
Science 
Grid-
computing
Advantages and Disadvantages of the P2P technology 
Due to the early stage of development it is not easy to fully understand the 
benefits of the emerging P2P technology. Sometimes P2P technology is 
contrasted with the client server technology because at the first glance all 
functions of an application can be realized with this widely adopted technology 
as well (most web applications are based on a client server architecture). In 
other words, for a non expert user, it often can not be seen whether an 
application is P2P based or not. Anyway, to reduce a comparison to 
architectural characteristics would not really allow deeper insights into the real 
potentials of P2P solutions. Therefore an attempt is made to assess the 
advantages and disadvantages in the following chapters in order to get a better 
understanding of what might motivate people and also companies to use that 
new kind of applications. 
 
Advantages of the P2P technology 
Cost reduction There is no need for a central server in a P2P network which as a 
consequence reduces the costs for operating and maintaining this equipment. 
This means that not only the costs for hardware are touched but also the costs 
for administration and management of these servers can be saved (Moore & 
Hebeler, 2002). These advantages can only be achieved if a decentralized or at 
least a hybrid architecture approach is used for the implementation. Of course, 
some administrative overhead is still remaining, e.g., for maintaining and 
exchanging meta-information.  
 
Scalability A peer-to-peer net in its pure form is principally unlimited. This 
means that any number of nodes or users can be incorporated because no 
bottlenecks like a central server in the client-server-architecture servers exist. As 
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every node can use services from any other participant but also allocates new 
services, a maximum efficiency is hard to achieve. This of course only applies to 
the case of a fully decentralized net architecture. Although more nodes can be 
served by a meta-server in the hybrid-approach than in a Client-/Server-
architecture, the net cannot become infinitely large as the meta-server can only 
support a certain number of requests.   
 
Content selection and rating Files usually are rated by many net participants 
whether they are worth seeing, hearing etc, and the result influences the 
distribution in the net. The download rate of a file that is high rated is usually 
high. In the case that the application supports the simultaneous download from 
several sources, the process of distribution can be accelerated as the content is 
available several times in the net. If a file is only interesting to a small number 
of net participants, it can happen that the content disappears completely from 
the net. This can be seen as a natural selection or filtering process.  
 
Distributed responsibilities By the use of an application based on peer-to-peer 
technology the responsibilities are shifted to the individual participants. The 
individual is no longer controlled in his actions by a central entity, but is 
responsible for his own actions. He no longer has to wait for the execution of 
his inquiry in a central queue.  
 
Anonymity Depending on the implementation an individual net participant can 
under certain circumstances act completely anonymous. It cannot be uncovered 
who e.g., published or just read an article including content that is suspicious or 
illegal. This anonymity cannot be realized in a centralized system. There the 
centralized instance, the server in most cases, has to know about the enquirer 
for sending the result to the correct recipient. In a peer-to-peer net this can be 
achieved much easier. The interaction between the peers is guaranteed by a 
number of applications and techniques which differ however in their degree of 
supporting anonymity for the participants. 
 
Avoidance of a single point of failure Through the lack of a central server a 
potential source of errors and a potential target for attacks on the net 
respectively is eliminated. Thus attacks can no longer cause a breakdown of a 
whole application. In the worst case—if the net is based on a hybrid 
architecture—only a part of the net can be disturbed. If a fully decentralized 
architecture is used, only individual participants will be disconnected which 
does not endanger the continuity of the net itself. In the hybrid approach, this 
advantage can obviously not be realized. When a central access point is 
disconnected, an individual net participant cannot locate the required files in 
affected sub-networks even if the point only contains meta-information about 
the available files. 
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Support of ad-hoc co-operation Usually in a P2P network no central instance will 
be available. This means that mechanisms have to be implemented that are 
capable of coping with the dynamic loss and addition of nodes. The 
mechanisms for self-administration and dynamic re-configuration can be used 
for the spontaneous co-operation. In the same situation in a client/server-
application a manual intervention by the administrator would be required, who 
has to allocate rights according to the security policy. A peer-to-peer network 
therefore is the ideal solution for spontaneous co-operation or communication 
needs. 
 
Disadvantages of the Technology  
Besides the already mentioned advantages which result from immanent 
characteristics of the peer-to-peer architecture, there are also possible 
disadvantages which have to be obtained as well. 
 
No guaranteed resource supply or availability Through the characteristic of a peer-
to-peer network is quite normal and not an exception that particular resources 
are temporarily unavailable in the net. Though the possibility of redundant 
storing on different peer systems can be used, which reduces the problem a little 
bit, it cannot be entirely assured that a required resource (e.g., files) is available.  
 
Misinformation A peer-to-peer net makes it much easier to distribute false or 
misleading information, as no central control mechanisms or supervision 
instances exist. This does not only apply to misinformation. Also illegal 
contents or content relevant to national security can be distributed and under 
certain circumstances be associated with the wrong person only because such a 
file is made available on a computer, although the owner did not know about 
its existence.  
 
Missing technology standards At the moment standards are missing for 
guaranteeing the cooperation of different (public) nets. If we for instance look 
at applications for exchanging data files, we can find that there are no 
technology standards in effect, which could guarantee the co-operation between 
different networks. The consequence is that it is very difficult to establish a new 
peer-to-peer net especially in the field of public data sharing. The use of a peer-
to-peer net as we know it from e.g., music files implies a certain critical mass so 
that the user gains an advantage from the participation in the net (creating net-
effects). As new participants tend to take part in a net that already offers a 
certain amount of data, it is very difficult to reach this critical mass nowadays. 
An attempt to implement a technology standard is made by SUN with their 
JXTA Framework (Dornfest, 2001). 
 
Freeriding The terms freerider or freeloader in general refer to a group of users 
who participate in a sharing process, but only by obtaining data from other 
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users and not adding data to the net (Adar & Hubermann, 2000). The 
freeriding problem originates from the economic game theory and is a classical 
example for a social dilemma. The underlying theory in its most general form 
assumes that individuals are rational players who choose the one action 
alternative out of their perceived action alternatives that provides the highest 
personally anticipated benefit (Haug & Weber, 2003). 
This behavior can also be observed in peer-to-peer networks (e.g., KaZaa). 
In general one can expect that the collective interest of the users of KaZaa is 
that as many participants as possible share their music with other users. The 
interest of a single person lies in the fact that all relevant resources are made 
available to him so that as little money as possible must be spent for purchasing 
CDs. There is no incentive for the individual user to buy disks or CDs and 
make music files accessible in a network as long as there are enough users who 
provide their resources without a consideration. Anyway, economic aspects are 
not the only ones who are of relevance in this context.  
 
Reputation and trust Another problem is represented by the difficulty of creating 
reputation and trust (Dustdar, et al., 2003). In a P2P-net one is always 
connected with new, partly unknown people and it is nearly impossible to assess 
the reputation of the other peer, in other words if the source is usually 
providing trustworthy data or not. The consequence is that depending of  the 
area of application special mechanisms have to be implemented which can work 
as substitute for trust and reputation as we know it from social networks. 
Business and Revenue Models for P2P  
In any case P2P technology is a good example to learn about interactions and 
links between technology and business interests (which do not always overlap). 
This can be seen when we watch the strategic investments of the technology 
company Intel which were done by Intel Capital. Comparable to the early 
investments in a lot of internet start-up companies in the last decade (it was 
reported that the portfolio finally consisted of approximately 250 investments) 
,Intel meanwhile added P2P-start-ups to the portfolio. According to Leuf 
between 2000 and 2001 the company invested 13 Mio USD in Groove 
Networks, 8 Mio USD in the P2P search company Enfish, 22.5 Mio USD in 
Engenia Software and 15 Mio USD in Data Synapse, to name just a few of 
them. Similar activities were started from Microsoft and can be interpreted as 
clear indicators of business relevance.  
Within the field of strategic relevant information technologies (e.g., Internet 
technologies, mobile technologies) P2P-technologies obviously are becoming 
more and more attractive as a new paradigm within electronic communication. 
Due to the success and popularity of applications like Napster, KaZaa and 
others a lot of ideas were created how to systematically use P2P networks within 
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an organization as well as an instrument for creating new businesses. Both areas 
can lead to new market opportunities and also to the foundation of new firms.  
Anyhow, searching for suitable business models brings up more questions 
than answers. Is there a market for P2P applications at all? Is P2P commercially 
interesting? Is there a need for a business model and what could be its role? 
Who should make the first step and demonstrate practicable solutions 
(companies, research units)?  
The motivations for initiating P2P networks or applications are quite 
different and cannot be not discussed here in detail. A closer look at the field 
shows a mixture of commercial and non-commercial motivations—both 
leading to innovation, some leading to investments. Commercial arguments 
focus on generating business with the P2P technology but also on internal use, 
e.g., for improving work efficiency. The interests and benefits expected differ 
for different players, e.g.,   
 
• hardware manufacturer, e.g., Intel 
• service provider, e.g., media companies Bertelsmann, Napster , Skype, 
eBay 
• virtual network operators (VNO), e.g., AOL (ICQ) 
• profiling, data mining, e.g., MoneyBee 
 
If P2P is a marketable technology one of the interesting questions is whether 
net effects can be foreseen or even “generated”. This leads to non commercial 
issues which are relevant also in a business context. Usually one or more of the 
following topics plays a role: 
 
• reputation / reciprocity, e.g., file sharing, reciprocal support 
• “open source” incentives 
• elimination of (dominating) market players, e.g., KaZaa, eMule 
 
The ways to make money with P2P leads to business and revenue models. On a 
general level two types of models can be distinguished, namely consumer 
oriented revenue models and business oriented revenue models. The first model 
derives revenues from services and/or applications offered to consumers and end 
users, the second one focuses on business-to-business relations and companies. 
The consumer driven revenue models have something in common with the 
internet business – with the difference that generating revenue by advertising or 
transaction-based will be much harder. The following types of revenue models 
describe basic ideas of how to make money with the end-user: 
 
• Advertising (e.g., inserting banner ads as it is done at the top of the 
Yahoo! Messenger window, TopText of eZula).  
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• Selling Software (similar to advertising it is not very likely that anybody 
other than big players could make much money in the end-user market). 
• Transaction fees 
• Subscription fees (is used by the new Napster network, subscription costs 
a few Dollars per month and this is the way revenue is generated. The 
threat would be a similar service which is for free or costs much less). 
• E-commerce fees (this is a special type of transaction for the case that the 
user purchases something. The role shifts to a mediator, trust or sales 
commission representing a tried-and-true revenue model). 
• Resource selling (distributed computing services could gather unused 
computing and storage resources and offer it on the market for money; if 
we look at applications like Seti@home we can see that users already 
allow the use of unused resources). 
• Supporting hardware sales (this is for instance the case with Intel, Dell 
etc. The growing activities in the P2P business will lead to the need for 
new computers and therefore generating revenues). 
 
The business-to-business revenue models are a bit different and as enterprise 
applications probably more successful. Here we can distinguish between 
 
• Selling and licensing P2P software for the company wide use 
• Hardware sales (for instance companies using the Jabber instant 
messaging service will need to buy the appropriate hardware to operate 
the system; in addition to that the same arguments apply as for the 
consumer models) 
• After-sale-service (using the P2P network for customer support, CRM 
etc) 
• Resource reselling (could be the resources that have been collected form 
the consumer side)  
• Application development (as it looks now the market for P2P 
development tools is likely to grow over the next years. 
Barriers, Inhibitors and Lessons Learned so Far 
P2P is definitively a technology that has the potential of creating new business 
on different levels. Anyhow, what can be seen so far is the tension between 
regulation attempts and legal issues on the on side and fostering a free 
economy, disintermediation and some more effects on the other side. Some of 
the problems which can be seen with existing P2P applications are  
 
• Third-party infrastructures are required 
• Very costly maintenance protocols 
Jönköping International Business School 
 182
• Maintenance protocols may compromise structural properties (e.g., load-
balancing) 
• Previous knowledge is lost (e.g., reputation of the peer, QoS, etc.) 
• No current approach addresses security (Denial-of-Service, replay, man-
in-the-middle attacks, etc. are not addressed) 
• Only the owner should be allowed to update the mapping 
 
Discussing the field from a business or market point of view usually leads to the 
question what can be learned from the market experiences in similar 
environment so far. In the meanwhile we do have a lot of new technologies 
(2.5/3G networks, WLAN, Bluetooth, NFC, RFID, VOIP and many more). 
The following aspects can help to understand key issues and challenges: 
 
Where is the content? 
• Limited market access 
• Europe’s MNOs decide who can enter the market 
• revenue sharing is unfair for content providers in Europe (iMode NTT 
DoCoMO takes 9 % of the revenues for official content providers, but 
takes all of the airtime revenues; this is the main revenue source) 
• roaming works only for voice and SMS, not for applications/services 
(contractual issues) 
 
Security Issues 
• users feel insecure  
• privacy legislation might help to reduce the insecurity, but might also 
cause additional costs to providers  
• payment issues: People trust their bank but not unknown provider or 
MNOs 
 
Cost Aspects 
• variable costs are high (transfer costs), fixed costs low 
• the cost models are too complicated for users in Europe 
• Charging of data transfer is per kilobyte 
 
Quality of Service   
• Quality of Service is not predictable, but also quality of data 
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Standards 
• sometimes not detailed enough or not followed strictly by terminal 
manufacturers or their subcontractors (microbrowser), walled garden 
policy! 
• heterogeneity of terminals, heterogeneity of standards by diverse 
MNO/Service providers 
 
Although there are many opportunities in the emerging field of P2P 
applications the market still seems to be in a very early phase of development. 
There are not only opportunities but also dangers, i.e. there will be winners and 
looser. Potential winners are of course the big players like Microsoft, Sun, Intel, 
AOL and others who already invested in that new technology. Especially Sun 
Microsystems stands for the growth of the P2P market and with JXTA and Sun 
ONE projects moves into the direction of P2P development tools (which will 
be needed as a consequence of increased demand for applications). But there is 
a chance also for small or smaller companies especially when targeting the 
corporate market with enterprise wide P2P applications. And this is a market 
where real money can be earned (without being in direct competition to 
Microsoft etc). Of course, there will be a push for technology firms who help to 
develop protocols, standards etc which are used by other companies for their 
products. 
The potential losers probably will be content companies. And we should not 
forget at this point that it were the content and media companies that had the 
biggest problem with Napster and Co. These companies were used to have 
nearly full control over the distribution process and are not willing to share that 
control—and exactly that happens because P2P gives control to some extent to 
the consumers. The discussion about intellectual property rights is led very hard 
and can be contrasted by control vs. freedom as two extreme positions. In 
addition to that there might be some threats for traditional client-/server 
companies as they are closely related to current internet business. Due to their 
technology experience they probably will be able to offer also these new kind of 
applications as soon as there is a demand—and as it seems at the moment the 
mass of ordinary internet users around the world will create such a demand.  
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The Successful Model of Overseas Investment 
in Chinese New Media Companies 
Yingzi Xu  
 
In many countries, the new economy has become the new engine of national 
economy and promoted by national government. Investors usually believe that 
Internet represents the new economy. China has the largest Internet user 
population among all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The new economy is 
therefore becoming more and more important within the Chinese national 
economy and is highly valued by the Chinese government. Chinese new media 
companies have played the leading roles within the new economy wave.  
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, the average profit rate of the media 
industry is much higher than the one of other industries (Outlook 2004-2008). 
In China, the media has becomes the fourth biggest industry reaching more 
than RMB 200 billion in market value. The Chinese media market has in fact 
attracted a lot of venture capitalists and established Internet companies such as 
Softbank, IDG, Amazon and Disney. Since February 2004 a number of 
Chinese internet companies have been listed on overseas stock markets 
including NASDAQ, Hong Kong and Singapore. The total assets of the three 
biggest Chinese Internet portals—Sina.com, Sohu.com and Netease.com—have 
reached USD 2.6 billion. However, China’s policy, environment and culture 
are very different from those of the developed countries. Just like looking at 
flowers in a fog, some overseas investors came to China and left soon after with 
many questions in their minds. Meanwhile, some investors are very successful 
in the Chinese market. This paper tries to study some successful investment 
cases in Chinese new media business. By discussing success factors and models 
related to investments in new media, the paper aims at increasing the 
understanding of theorists and practitioners on Internet investment in China.  
Review on the Chinese Media Market 
Topics such as financing of Chinese media companies, feasibility of foreign 
media investment in China, interpretation of Chinese media law, and return of 
venture capital have lately caught the attention of many media and economics 
scholars. In particular, the question whether Chinese media should be 
commercialized raised a hot debate among Chinese scholars, media 
professionals and government policy markers. 
However, the issues of Chinese media investment and Chinese media 
financing can not be discussed without first clarifying ownership structure and 
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nature of Chinese media. For a long time, Chinese media has been regarded as 
tongue of the Chinese Communist Party and Government. Chinese media 
companies could hardly be listed on the Chinese stock market. So far, only ten 
media companies have been listed on China’s stock market (Zhao, Zhou & 
Wei, 2004). In 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission finally 
announced that the “communication and media industry” is one of the thirteen 
basic industries up for listing. The ownership and commercialization of Chinese 
media have been developing since then. At present, advertising agencies, 
distribution and publishing companies are opened to overseas investors and 
Chinese investors who have not been in the media industry before. Although 
content production within news and publishing companies is still tightly 
controlled, overseas investors are allowed to involve into the film and television 
production industry and have no more than 49% ownership in a joint 
company.  
The new media is the most opened field among all media industries and has 
attracted most overseas investors so far. The main Chinese law regulating the 
new media field is the “Internet Information Service Regulation”, which uses 
licenses to control the commercial Internet information service. Foreign 
companies can invest in any places in China without geographical limitations 
apart from the 49% maximum ownership in a joint venture (Zhao, Zhou & 
Wei, 2004). In general, non-professional investors and industry investors are 
very active in the overall media market, while professional investors are not. 
Past experience shows that the risk of failure for laymen investors is very high 
which means that media investors in China are not very successful Non-
governmental domestic investors are the leading players while international 
investors represent only a minority (Meitiandu, 2004). However, in the arena 
of new media investment, overseas and local investment organizations showed 
different figures in 2004: local players have slowed down and overseas investors 
have gained comparative advantage in this field. Mr. Dan, CEO of China 
Science Start-up Investment Company, argued that “whether venture capital 
firms can operate well does not rely on their capital, but relies on their 
operation model and corporate governance” (Sun, 2005). 
There are basically two models to invest in the media field: the direct 
investment model and the indirect investment model (pure financial 
investment). Since China has just started to promote the commercialization of 
the media industry and its capital market is far from mature, most overseas 
investors chose to invest directly in Chinese media companies. According to 
Zhao, Zhou & Wei (2004), the non-financial investment model includes Sino-
foreign joint ventures, general cooperation, joint investments, copyright 
transfer, advertising agent and single project cooperation. The financial 
investment model has hardly existed until now, since there are only few Chinese 
media companies listed on the stock market. In recent years, more and more 
overseas investors preferred to step into joint investments or set up mutual 
funds in the Chinese new media area (Chen, 2003). 
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A specific problem that overseas investors have to face is that China does not 
provide any official and practical ways to withdraw their venture capital. Many 
scholars (Wang, 2003; Liu, 2003) mentioned that this problem has largely 
restricted overseas investment in Chinese media industry. In developed 
countries, venture capitalists usually exit their investments by selling the 
investee company, opening an IPO or transferring their stockholder's rights. 
Until now, China has not set up its own NASDAQ and foreign currencies are 
restricted to flow out. All these restrictions have made the IPO in overseas 
market as the best choice for most venture capitalists in China.  
Method 
The main research method for this paper is documentary analysis. Multiple 
sources include relevant journal articles, magazine and newspaper articles, 
annual reports of most famous Chinese new media companies and investment 
companies. For the purpose of the research topic, the research period has been 
limited between January 1999 and October 2004. In 2001, China has been 
granted access to the World Trade Organization as official member. Overseas 
Internet investment is legally allowed since then. During this period, China’s 
new media companies experienced a cold winter together with the rest of the 
world and China has became a hot investment target again within the world 
stock market since 2003. Looking into the English literature, the author 
searched a journal database at the library of the University of St. Gallen. Key 
words for search include a number of relevant topics such as “overseas 
investment in China”, “foreign investment in China” and “China Internet”. 
Online databases include Electronic Journals from the University Library in 
Regensburg, ScienceDirect, JSTOR, and EBSCOhost. As for the Chinese 
literature, the author used same key words and searched relevant articles within 
the China Academic Journal Database CNKI. The finding of this research is 
summarized in the following sections and used as basis for a discussion of the 
research topic at the end of the paper.  
Findings 
For policy restriction and other reasons, the overall amount of overseas 
investment in the Chinese media market has no beent that relevant so far. 
However, overseas companies have played leading roles within the new media 
market. In 2004, newly-added investment from overseas venture capital 
counted for more than 55% of the total value of venture capital in China (Sun, 
2005). A survey (Sun, 2005) shows that in 2004 China had RMB 524,540 
newly-added venture capital which grew 41.67% compared to 2003. Many 
famous Chinese new media companies accepted investment from abroad (see 
table 1). The most active and famous  foreign investors  in  China  include  
IDG VC,  Doll Capital  
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Table 1. Main New Media Companies and Main Overseas Investors 
 
Main Chinese New 
Media Companies 
Main Overseas Investors 
Sohu.com IDG, Dow Jones, Intel etc. 
Sina.com Dell, Softbank, Goldman Sachs, Creative Technology of 
Singapore etc. 
Netease Softbank 
Ebay.com.cn (Yiqu) Ebay 
Shanda Softbank 
Joyo Amazon 
3721 Yahoo! 
Baidu Google 
Ctrip IDG, Carlyle, SOFTBANK 
 
Management, Intel Capital, Goldman Sachs, Softbank Asia Infrastructure Fund 
(SAIF), Walden International Investment Group and Warburgpincus. 
These investment companies often adopt the direct investment model in 
China. Before 2003, many of them invested in start-up or early stage companies 
and kept some shares in these companies. However, fewer and fewer foreign 
investors would bet on seed companies at present. Lot of these investors 
changed their investment strategy and now prefer to put their capital on a few 
promising big projects (Chen, 2004). According to Mr. Huang (SAIF), “We do 
not pursue a 10 times return, but the successful rate of our projects has to be 
higher than 70%, which is very different compared to international standards. 
This strategy is decided by the domestic marketing environment.” SAIF 
invested 40 million on Shanda last year.  
United investment and cooperative funds are very common investment 
methods in China. As the financing of new media companies usually requires 
high amounts of capital, cooperative funds provide many advantages for such 
projects. The purpose to set up cooperative funds is to allow foreign investors to 
involve into Chinese currency projects. Chinese partners can gain not only 
management experience from their overseas partners but also have access to 
capital from overseas markets. Successful examples of these funds include the 
cooperation between Shenzhen Capital Group and Softbank. Both sides 
invested USD 1 million to register a new company to manage their mutual 
fund. Shenzhen Capital Group financed RMB 100 million in China and 
Softbank provided the same amount of money in foreign currency abroad. The 
profits of their investment are then shared between the two companies (Chen, 
2003). 
In recent years, more and more mergers and acquisitions took place in 
China. For example, eBay acquired the Chinese leading online business 
company Yiqu. Yahoo! acquired 3721 for USD 120 million. Reed Elsevier 
group acquired the financial information provider PRCInvestment.com. 
According to experts, the Chinese ICT market has been quickly developing 
with an annual growth rate of 30% to 50%. Other countries have been 
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developing at a 10% annual growth rate. It therefore seems that China will 
become the biggest technology market in 2030 (Lei, 2003). The prospect of the 
biggest market has attracted many investors from all over the world to test the 
Chinese market. They are now waiting the change of Chinese policy and the 
development of the Chinese capital market. Meanwhile, their competitors come 
from the Chinese local governments. Statistics show that the total amount of 
venture capital in China is less than USD 300 million. It is estimated that 
China itself reserved RMB 40 billion to be destinated to venture capital 
investment. Most local Chinese venture capital and venture funds are owned 
and managed by local governments via credit guarantee. Compared to the 
Chinese venture capital funds, overseas investors have more experience in the 
marketplace and because of that achieved more success in China so far.  
However, failure examples are not uncommon. Pearloriental Internet 
Technology invested in eight Internet companies—including Mingrenmingxing 
and Zhongguoxiansheng—within a short time and the whole capital 
investments simply disappeared in a year. Another example is eSamsung which 
was set up by Samsung group to be responsible for its global investment 
business. One year after its foundation, eSamsung decided not to invest in new 
projects anymore and not to be a venture capital firm anymore (see Three 
Generation of Chinese Venture Capital). Analysts argued (Liu, 2003) that “due to 
the difficulty to reach high rates of return and flow of capital, venture capital 
firms lost their motivation to do business”. According to international custom, 
VC usually do not involve into the daily operations of their invested companies. 
However, such investment model faces a high risk in China as a lot of start-up 
companies often do not obey to the game rules (see Chen, Y., 2004).  
Now the question is whether there is a successful model of overseas 
investment in Chinese new media companies and if yes, how it looks like. Yes, 
IDG is a good example. IDG Technology Venture Investment (IDGVC) is the 
most famous and successful venture capital company in China. As early as 
1980, IDG and the Ministry of Information Industry established the first 
publishing joint venture in China—China Computer World Publishing 
Company—and launched the Computer World weekly magazine. IDG holds a 
49% share in this joint venture. So far, IDG published 12 IT-related 
newspapers and magazines in cooperation or joint venture with other Chinese 
partners. It ranks as the first IT media group in China and has nearly USD 100 
million in annual revenue. IDG business covers publications, research, venture 
capital, events and exhibitions, film and television production as well as 
training. IDGVC was one of the first American venture funds to enter the 
Chinese market. It focused on new media and high-tech industries such as the 
Internet, information services, software, telecommunications and networking 
technology. Many leading Chinese new media companies received funds from 
IDGVC such as Baidu.com, Eachnet.com, Sohu.com, 8848/Intellgent, Emay, 
Yesky. To date, IDGVC has invested more than USD 100 million in China 
and planned to invest a lot more in the coming years. According to Mr. 
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McGovern, chairman of IDG, the company reached an average investment 
return rate of 45% out of 30 Chinese projects from which the company already 
withdrew. This investment return rate is higher than any other rate coming 
from other businesses in which IDGVC is involved.  
Having found promising companies, IDGVC is still willing to provide 
venture capital to start-up companies in their first round of financing. The 
investment size in individual companies usually falls within the range of USD 
500,000 to USD 5 million. IDGVC often acts as main investor and usually 
provides contacts to other venture capitalists, which could be interested in the 
target companies. It usually does not involve into daily operations and 
management of the companies but involves into their board of directors. It 
often plays a leading role to help the companies attract more funding. As 
already mentioned, due to foreign currency restrictions and other policy 
reasons, it is not easy to withdraw the invested capital from the invested 
companies. A listing on the stock market is one way and the investment in new 
projects is often used, too. Relying on IDG’s IT publication and research 
network, IDGVC is able to offer a full-range of services to the companies in 
which it invests: this includes finance, law, government relations and training. 
Summing up, IDG developed a unique investment model in China (see Figure 
1). Its business has been centered on the IT paper publishing business, though 
it spread into related business too. All its business is characterized by a common 
IT and new media information platform which allows to interactively share 
information within the entrepreneurial network of investors and investees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
                                                                     
 
 
 
                                        
  
                                
 
                             
 
                     
Figure 1. IDGVC Investment Model  
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Discussion 
At this point a question arises: why have some companies been successful and 
some other companies failed their investments in the Chinese new media 
market? We can see that the amount of capital invested is not that important, 
on the contrary other comparative advantages linked to the resources play an 
important role. Based on the analysis of the IDG case, the main comparative 
advantages needed to invest in the Chinese new media market can be 
summarized in six points: 1) human resource advantage, 2) technology 
advantage 3) brand advantage, 4) promotion and information advantage, 5) 
government relations advantage, and 6) capital advantage. IDG owns a 
comparative advantage in all six areas. 
With regard to human resources, to step into the Chinese market IDG 
employed managers like Mr. Xiong who had work experience in both China 
and America. These senior staffs are very familiar with operation processes both 
in IDG home country and China, which is a very unique environment. This 
human resource strategy has been very helpful for IDG to develop its business 
in China. In terms of technology, IDG has years of experience in cross-national 
business and technology resources in IT media content. As to the brand factor, 
IDG is very powerful. In the U.S. where the new economy started, IDG has 
been famous since the 1960s. Based on its famous brand in the home country, 
IDG could easily earn credibility among Chinese partners and clients. With 
regard to promotion and information resources, IDG has dozens of influential 
IT media papers. While introducing the latest IT development to China, IDG 
could also promote its good image within the Chinese IT and new media 
community and therefore earn reputation. Each year, IDG organized a number 
of IT industry exhibitions which set up a wide network. All potential clients 
know IDG. In this case, promotion and information resources are related with 
and complement one another. IDG can count on very strong relationships with 
the Chinese government. It is the first foreign enterprise that set up a joint 
venture with China to publish magazines legally. When the company got the 
passport to forbidden areas, IDG gained a monopoly market position as foreign 
investor. In terms of capital resources, IDG does not have more obvious 
advantages compared to other competitors. However, owning most of 
comparative advantages needed to invest in the Chinese market, it is clear that 
IDG takes much less risk than other investors and therefore can win the 
competition battle.  
Apart from the regular data which investors and researchers need to pay 
attention to, such as the investment market situation, investment policy and 
relations, the following points are also of particular importance.  
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Investment timing 
Timing is always important, in every place and for every project. However, 
timing is one of the most important factors for success in Chinese new media or 
media market today. The Chinese media industry is just starting to be 
commercialized. Catching the right time and enter the market earlier than 
competitors can be determinant for the success or failure of an investor to a 
large degree.  
 
Investment partner 
This is also related to the characteristics of the Chinese media industry. At 
present, most media are still owned by the Chinese government, while the 
commercialization process is developing step by step. In order to have a leading 
role in the Chinese marketplace, a breakthrough of the government policy has 
being decided in support of government departments or key government-
owned media. To gain investment partners like the Chinese Ministry of 
Information Industry is a very clever strategy.  
Conclusions 
According to the most recent breaking news (February 2005) Shanda acquired 
19.5% of the ordinary shares of Sina.com, one of the biggest Chinese Internet 
Content Providers. This event shows that Chinese domestic companies started 
to play a substantial role within the new media market. The new media 
investment market is becoming more and more mature and competitive. Along 
with the opening of Chinese media market after China’s entry into the WTO, 
expanding their market share becomes an essential survival task for most media 
companies. It is predicted that a new wave of mergers and acquisitions will take 
place between this and next year.  
Still, the Chinese capital market is very controlled. Media law and regulation 
have not been developed very efficiently. Regulations about technology share 
and intangible assets share are not favorable for venture capitalists to withdraw 
their investment. There are also many restrictions for overseas investment in the 
telecom value-added area. However, the development of the Chinese media and 
overall domestic capital market will be an ongoing process. It is expected that 
overseas investors will use more and more stock investment models and direct 
investment models. Current share-holding investment models will occur less 
and less. At this stage a perfect and widely-recommended investment model is 
hard to define in an ever-changing market like China. Successful examples such 
as IDG can not be copied without considering the dynamism of the Chinese 
market environment. This paper has collected some observation and thoughts 
related to the current investment situation in the Chinese new media market. 
However, Chinese investment models and theory building within the media 
investment field need further in-depth studies and research.  
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Censorship, Government, and  
the Computer Game Industry 
Robert C. Burns 
T. Y. Lau 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the computer game industry reactions to the 
threat of government censorship. The industry reactions will be described 
within a conceptual framework that details the roles and relationships among all 
players. This framework will provide a backdrop for discussing the enduring 
issues for profitable computer game content relative to the applicable delivery 
technologies, cultural ideologies and industry market structure. Chapter 
findings will be supported by relevant literature citations and interview data 
collected from representatives of United States computer game development 
and publishing companies. The chapter will conclude with future research 
questions suggested by this work. 
Computer game industry gross revenues are estimated to be $28 billion 
dollars worldwide by 2005 (Lowenstein, 2003). Computer games are financially 
successful in part because they allow their creators to offer an interactive 
experience involving audio, video, text and animation to create a desired 
outcome (otherwise known as a win condition) that can alter or reinforce a 
user’s belief system. This was explicitly acknowledged by the New Zealand 
OFLC (Manhunt, 2005) in their written explanation for banning a computer 
game called Manhunt: 
 
The impact of the console game medium is high. PlayStation 2 is a state of the 
art gaming format that provides high quality images and sound. Unlike more 
passive media—such as film and video recordings—the console game medium 
allows the player to interact with the images on screen directly and to control the 
actions of a character, in effect translating viewer actions and choices into 
onscreen action. This is particularly relevant to Manhunt which does not offer 
the player a choice as to whether or not to kill, but instead only offers a choice as 
to how brutal the kill is to be.  
 
This means that the creative thinking going through the concept and software 
development process can threaten some socio-political status quos resulting in 
censorship of game content. Specifically, games involving violence, sex 
(Lowenstein, 2003) or contrary ideologies (Kreimeier, 1999) are at risk of being 
banned: 
 
Jönköping International Business School 
 196
German legislation… strives to prevent exposure of minors to content that might 
be “ethnically disorienting.”  
 
While the threat of lost revenue from censorship exists, the computer game 
industry seems more concerned with restrictions on content creator expression, 
according to the current president of the U.S. Entertainment Software 
Association (ESA) (2004): 
 
… as long as critics and regulators see interactive entertainment as just a game, 
they will tend to be dismissive, less respectful, and more willing to censor content 
in ways they would never censor a film or a book. (Lowenstein, 2003) 
 
To-date, besides governmental lobbying to avoid or overturn censorship 
legislation, this industry has three responses to existing or potential censorship 
of its content: doing nothing, localization and self-regulation. This chapter will 
examine each response and discuss its consequences for impacting freedom of 
expression for computer game makers and freedom of experience for computer 
game users. Cases from the United States, European Union, Australia and New 
Zealand will be used to address the following questions: 
 
1. What are the forms of computer game censorship?  
2. Where do film censorship criteria apply to games? 
3. How does the computer game industry react to these forms of 
censorship? 
 
Answers to these questions may shed light on the models of censorship used, 
and the potential impact on the freedom of expression of game creators and 
users’ freedom of experience. This study may also permit industry participants 
to see the dynamics behind censorship that limit their effective response to it. 
The Study’s Conceptual Framework 
This study is primarily focused on censorship of content created by service 
providers (mostly software developers). If censorship suppresses the work of the 
service provider then consumer experience is correspondingly limited and no 
economic value from that suppressed content can occur. 
Figure 1 depicts triangular relationships within and between the players 
(government, service providers and consumers) involved with censoring 
computer games. It is these players and their relationships that comprise the 
conceptual framework for this study.  
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Figure 1. Computer Game Censorship Conceptual Framework 
 
The middle triangle in Figure 1 illustrates the content and technology 
impacted by censorship (the computer game) as well as three enduring forces 
that need to be balanced which are artistic expression, consumer experience and 
economic value: 
 
• Artistic expression in computer games is embodied in all the visual, 
audio, textual and interactive content generated to represent one or 
more espoused viewpoints 
• Consumer experience in computer games comes from being exposed 
to their content as well as any added by other consumers of the same 
game (i.e., during multi-user games) 
• Economic value comes from a computer game when a consumer yields 
some form of legal tender in exchange for the gaming experience 
 
The top triangle in Figure 1 shows the governmental forces responsible for 
implementing censorship: the Legislator defines what is to be censored; the 
Judge approves the use of legislated censorship and the Appointed Censor 
applies the legislation to content creation (artistic expression) and content 
consumption (consumer experience). In those jurisdictions that use self-
regulation, the Appointed Censor is usually a group of computer game 
industry representatives. 
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The left triangle in Figure 1 illustrates the main service industry participants 
that bring computer games to market: the Developer creates the game; the 
Publisher packages it for consumption and the Distributor/Retailer makes it 
available to consumers. It is possible for these participants to be divisions within 
the same or different companies. 
 
Judge Legislator
Appointed Censor
Distributor/Retailer
PublisherDeveloper
Parent Child
Other Adult
Constrains
Empowers
Regulates
Supplies
Sells
Represents
 
Figure 2. Relationships between Conceptual Framework Players 
 
The right triangle in Figure 1 explains the relationships between all the types of 
computer game consumers: the Parent buys games; the Child experiences games 
and the Other Adult can do both. It is possible for a Child to also purchase 
games but it is assumed that funds for this purpose come from Parents. The 
Other Adult also represents any citizen that chooses not to experience a 
computer game. 
Figure 2 shows how each of the players in the conceptual framework relate 
to each other. The box in this figure surrounds the players that are not directly 
addressed by this study (i.e., the consumers) but are the recipients of 
government and service provider activities involving computer game censorship. 
As indicated in Figure 2, censorship is mostly about constraining freedom of 
artistic expression but in some jurisdictions the consumer experience is also 
regulated. The government in Germany will definitely prosecute a consumer 
knowingly in possession of banned computer games (Kreimeier, 1999). 
Australia (Australian OFLC, 2005) and New Zealand  (New Zealand OFLC, 
2005) have similar laws that have been used against consumers exchanging 
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“objectionable” content on the Internet (New Zealand Department of Internal 
Affairs, 2004) that could be used against computer games banned there.  
Because censorship indirectly impacts economic value, freedom of 
expression (content creation) and experience (content consumption) are the 
perspectives that must be balanced. Yet, it is not the expression or experience of 
all ideas that are threatened. Repeatedly, games involving violence, sex or 
contrary ideologies (e.g., Nazism in Germany) (Kreimeier, 1999) are universally 
at risk of being banned by one or more local governments. Usually, protecting 
children from harmful exposure to these concepts is cited as the justification for 
being concerned about computer game content (European Union Commission, 
2002) but in some jurisdictions protecting adults from the same thoughts is 
given equal weight (Ang, 2004).  
Control of artistic expression is generally deemed by governments easier 
than control of consumer experience because it is generally easier to identify 
and locate computer game companies than all of the consumers of their 
products within any jurisdiction. In the next section we will describe the 
different forms of censorship that are commonly used. 
Forms of Censorship 
Censorship can be in three forms:  
 
1. pre-censorship, content subject to approval before circulation based on 
published rules and regulations;  
2. post-censorship, based on complaints filed and the government takes 
action;  
3. self-censorship, based on the creators’ fear of punishment or perception 
of anticipated rejection by government regulations and intention to 
preserve the industry reputation in order to prevent government 
regulation intervention. Self-censorship can be found in industry 
standards (where it is generally known as “self-regulation”) or in-house 
manuals. 
 
Pre- and post-censorship can be seen in Australia  (Australian OFLC, 2004) 
and New Zealand  (New Zealand OFLC, 2004) where the standards for film 
censorship are also applied to computer games. While neither jurisdiction 
explicitly declares why the censorship criteria for film is applied to games, 
Australia does acknowledge that the interactive nature of computer games yields 
opportunities for receiving video and audio “rewards” (Australian OFLC, 2004) 
that are applicable to existing censorship criteria. 
Self-censorship exists in the United States (ESRB, 2004) (ICRA, 2004) 
(RSCA, 2004) and the European Union (European Union Commission, 2004) 
(PEGI, 2004) where the rating systems are similar to those used in their film 
industries. The Interactive Software Federation of Europe (ISFE) created PEGI 
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in a similar fashion to how ESA (2004) created ESRB (2004). However, the 
ISFE explicitly used existing film rating criteria for PEGI where ESA seems to 
have implicitly done the same with ESRB. 
Sometimes, a Publisher will impose self-censorship upon computer games 
created by their Developers through enforcement of an in-house manual. This 
is done when the Publisher recognizes the need for censorship in a target 
market before either an industry standard or governmental decision has evolved 
there. An example of this happened in the late 1980s when Nintendo realized 
that the Japanese versions of their games might cause controversy if realized 
unaltered in the United States. Interestingly, once the ESRB became established 
in the United States, Nintendo made their games conform to it and ceased to 
enforce use of their in-house manual which was actually more restrictive than 
the ESRB rating system (http://www.filibustercartoons.com/Nintendo.php). 
Computer Technology Impact on Censorship 
Besides providing a powerful medium for expression, computer technology also 
defines how a game may be delivered and experienced. This means that the 
forms of censorship are impacted by how computer technology is employed in 
games. A computer game company makes decisions about which technology to 
use based upon their own analysis of the game’s target market(s). Figure 1 
shows this by relating computer game economics, expression and experience. 
If a game is economically viable when delivered via the Internet, then it is 
more difficult to effectively apply any form of censorship because either the 
game server or browser may not reside in a jurisdiction employing censorship 
(Akdeniz, 2000). Internet delivery of games also increases the probability of 
multi-user experiences since the Internet readily supports collaboration 
technology (this is the primary driver behind the selection of Internet delivery 
being economically viable). Allowing users to interact with each other via the 
medium of a game really makes it difficult to censor content that is only 
enabled by the game environment but originates with its users. 
Conversely, when delivery of a game cannot be economically done via the 
Internet (e.g., it is delivered on a CD-ROM or DVD-ROM) then it becomes 
more likely to be a single-user experience (because collaboration technology 
requires some form of network like the Internet) and also more easy to censor 
since the game resides on a physical medium that can be intercepted by an 
Appointed Censor. 
Study Data and Validation Method 
This study includes analysis of the laws and regulations stipulated by the United 
States, European Union, Australia and New Zealand governments, including 
their respective perspectives on how and what to do regarding the various forms 
of censorship. 
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The United States (U.S.) of America’s Constitution guarantees the right to 
the freedom of expression in its First Amendment (http://www.house.gov/ 
Constitution/Amend.html) which has consistently forestalled all prior and 
ongoing attempts by state and municipal governments from implementing pre- 
and/or post-censorship laws and regulations. However, the U.S. computer 
gaming industry has decided to implement self-censorship in order to help the 
U.S. government maintain this constitutional position (ESRB, 2004): 
 
According to the Federal Trade Commission, the ESRB is "the most 
comprehensive of the three industry systems" and "there is much in the game 
industry's rating disclosure requirements that merits duplication by others."  
 
The U.S. community of Developers supports the ESA position on self-
regulation through the International Game Developers Association (IGDA). As 
part of that support, the IGDA has a set of online forums 
(http://www.igda.org/Forums) where Developers can discuss issues pertinent to 
the industry. Although the forums are available to anyone on the Internet to 
read, only registered users may post content. Hundreds of posts have been made 
in these forums since it began in June 2001 by the people most directly 
involved with the creation of computer game content.  
The data used to validate this study’s U.S. findings comes from a sample of 
postings in the IGDA’s Business and Legal Issues forum that were a direct result 
of a discussion thread led by one of the study authors between October 2 and 6, 
2004 concerning the focus of this study: 
 
I'm interested in conscious business strategies or tactics used in the computer 
game industry to proactively deal with censorship. (Burns, 2005, p. 1) 
 
For example, when asked how Developers tended to address censorship using 
localization techniques, Tom Sloper (a Developer and U.S. industry consultant) 
said: 
 
Make the game according to the mores and tastes of the largest target market 
territory (the U.S.). Then localize as needed (and insofar as you are able) for the 
secondary and tertiary market territories. (Burns, 2005, p. 1) 
 
When asked how to substantiate this claim, Tom Sloper said: 
 
…telephone each company and ask to speak to the localization manager (not 
that that would get you anywhere—at many companies, producers manage their 
own localizations—thus there may not be a ‘localization manager’ per se) 
(Burns, 2005, p. 1) 
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The European Union (EU) acts similarly to the U.S. in regards to computer 
game censorship (i.e., provides no laws in support of pre- or post-censorship) 
but allows its Member States (like Germany) a lot of latitude to impose laws 
banning specific computer games (European Union Commission, 2002). In 
response, a large subset of EU Member States has adopted support for the Pan 
European Games Information (PEGI) rating system as a means of self-
censorship by the computer gaming industry in those countries. PEGI is 
explicitly based on film censorship criteria per the explicit intention of the 
ISFE: 
 
ISFE has entered into a contract with the Netherlands Institute for the 
Classification of Audio-visual Media (NICAM) for the administration of the 
PEGI scheme…In the UK, the Video Standards Council (VSC) will act as the 
agent of NICAM. In all instances, the voluntary PEGI system is subordinate to 
the pre-existing, wider framework set up, run and enforced by governments to 
ensure the protection of minors. As a consequence, the PEGI system is 
subordinate to all existing and future laws and regulations in this area. (PEGI, 
2004): 
 
Where PEGI has not been adopted in the EU, pre- and post-censorship is 
allowed to reign as long as it does not interfere with EU e-commerce law 
(Verbiest, 2003). 
Australian law supports pre- and post-censorship (Australian OFLC, 2004) 
requiring expense on the part of computer game service providers in order to 
advertise or sell games in Australia. Under Australian national law, its OFLC 
provides countrywide classification of content and the law enforcement agencies 
of the various states and territories of Australia prosecute violations.  So any 
criminal charge against a person in relation to material that has been refused 
classification by the Australian OFLC is conducted under the relevant state or 
territory law. 
For example, the NT Act (2004) appears to make it an offence to sell, or to 
“demonstrate in a public place”, or to “demonstrate” any refused classification 
(RC) game in the presence of a minor, but does not specifically make it an 
offence for an adult to possess or play a RC game in private.  It is also an 
offence to “use a computer service” (i.e., download) to obtain a game that 
contains “objectionable material” (i.e., a RC game), but it is a defense to such 
charge to show that the game has “recognized artistic, scientific or literary 
merit” and that obtaining the game was “for the public good” (i.e., it is not 
sufficient merely to show that the game had artistic merit). 
New Zealand censorship law (New Zealand OFLC, 2004) is similar to 
Australian national law where pre- and post-censorship of computer game 
content is concerned except New Zealand censorship law enforcement is 
applied uniformly across that country: 
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The Department of Internal Affairs investigates and sometimes prosecutes people 
who deliberately collect objectionable material and find ways to distribute it to 
other people via the Internet. (New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, 
2004) 
Findings 
Research Question 1: What are the forms of computer game censorship? 
This study has shown that pre-, post- and self-censorship exists in the computer 
game industry within the U.S., EU, Australia and New Zealand. Where pre-
censorship exists, the Appointed Censor makes the censorship decisions but the 
Legislator has the biggest influence on how policy is made. Post-censorship is 
generally implemented in a manner where a Parent or Other Adult makes a 
complaint (becoming the decision maker) then local law enforcement acts 
under the influence of the Appointed Censor only where banned games are 
concerned. Self-censorship results in the computer game industry making 
censorship decisions under the influence of Legislators and Judges. 
Table 1 summarizes the impact of censorship upon computer games and 
illustrates that only consumer experience is impacted in jurisdictions that favor 
self-censorship. 
 
Table 1. Study Findings Relative to How Censorship is applied in the United 
States, European Union, Australia, and New Zealand 
 
 USA Impact EU Impact Aust. Impact N.Z. Impact 
Pre-
censorship No None Varies Artistic 
Expression 
Yes Artistic 
Expression
Yes Artistic 
Expression 
Post-
censorship No None Varies 
Economic 
Value Yes 
Economic 
Value Yes 
Economic 
Value 
Self-
censorship Yes 
Consumer 
Experience Yes 
Consumer 
Experience No None No None 
 
 
Research Question 2: Where do film censorship criteria apply to games? 
This study has shown that film criteria apply to games in all jurisdictions, 
irregardless of the form of censorship employed. While Table 1 implies that 
consumer experience is impacted by use of film criteria in self-rating systems, 
use of similar criteria in pre- and post-censorship jurisdictions results in similar 
impact to the consumer experience. 
The New Zealand OFLC (2004) recognizes that new criteria may need to 
be applied to computer games but must await new legislation before acting: 
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While the Government has been considering amending the legislation to take 
account of technology such as this, the Office is required to operate under the 
existing law.  
 
Research Question 3: How does the computer game industry react to 
these forms of censorship? 
 
To-date, besides governmental lobbying to avoid or overturn censorship 
legislation, the computer gaming industry has three responses to existing or 
potential censorship of its content: 
 
• Doing nothing which allows full freedom of artistic expression in the 
complete ignorance of the censorship criteria of any jurisdiction 
• Localization which alters computer game content to make it acceptable 
to a specific jurisdiction’s censorship criteria 
• Self-regulation which is the application of a rating system to games as a 
form of self-censorship 
 
The authors of this chapter will now examine each response and discuss its 
impact on freedom of expression for computer game makers and freedom of 
experience for computer game users. 
 
Doing Nothing: The Developer’s Preferred Choice 
When Internet delivery is economically viable, doing nothing about censorship 
is a rational business strategy and is much preferred by the Developer since it 
eliminates a whole class of requirements that can not only impact their artistic 
freedom of expression but also make the game more expensive to produce 
(which in turn may reduce funding available for artistic alternatives). 
Unfortunately, too often game developers choose this option simply to avoid 
the issue instead of dealing with it as a legitimate content creation business 
issue. This inappropriate use of the “doing nothing” response has prompted the 
computer industry to help educate its developers about the entire censorship 
issue (IGDA, 2004). The inappropriate use of “doing nothing” also threatens to 
keep its audience from experiencing computer games, so all service provider 
players have a vested interest in making sure Developers care about censorship. 
Following is a Business and Legal Issues forum posting by Jason Della 
Rocca, the IGDA Program Director (essentially the organization’s chief 
operations officer) that illustrates dominance of the “doing nothing” tactic in 
this industry: 
 
It should be noted that for the vast majority of games, this is a non-issue.  To 
start with, only about 10% of games are rated M and potentially contain 
content that would trip censors. And, of those 10% very few are censored. It has 
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happened a few times in Australia (eg. GTA, Manhunt), and a few more times 
in Germany (with their "index" of banned games). Obviously, there are more 
cases, but they only represent a tiny fraction of game industry output...Tom is 
right in that most publishers pick their target market and make the game for 
them. Then, they look at further markets where the game can sell. In most cases 
this does require some investment to localize to the region, but this is much more 
to do with spoken/written text, and usability issues, and much less about 
censorship concerns...In terms of the USA, publishers usual decide in advance 
what rating they want and ensure the content/game that the developers produce 
will fall within the ESRB guidelines to hit the desired rating. Going for an M-
rating is usually a conscious marketing/business decision on the part of the 
publisher (Burns 2005, p. 1) 
 
Localization: An Expensive Option 
If government censorship of computer game content already exists and the 
marketing strategy for a game calls for it to be sold at a local retail outlet then 
customizing a game to fit the needs of a particular jurisdiction is an option and 
is known as localization which should not be confused with globalization. The 
latter approach to software development tries to eliminate any cultural 
references from the product so it will be equally acceptable everywhere (Stathis, 
1998). Globalization in computer game development is not used to address 
censorship issues concerning violence, sex or contrary ideologies so it will not be 
further discussed in this chapter. 
The decision to localize a computer game is complex which is one of the 
reasons that it is an expensive option. Like film, computer game development is 
expensive because it takes a long time and involves many people. Unlike film, 
most computer games have a very short usable life due to the factor of 
computing obsolescence (all software depends on an underlying computing 
platform and consumer computing platforms change rapidly) as well as a 
marketplace that treats old software badly (new platforms bring new capabilities 
to software so old games look old faster than old movies look old). This means 
that very few computer games can be sold more than two years after they are 
released and is the principle reason that computer game publishers cannot 
maintain a backlist of titles that continue to produce revenue over a prolonged 
period without incurring continual software upgrade costs. 
For a Developer, there is real pressure to complete a game before its 
underlying technology is gone. For a Publisher, there is little interest in 
maintaining something that requires continuous software upgrades in order to 
support it in the marketplace. For the Distributor/Retailer, fighting for shelf 
space places an emphasis on having something new. Anything that slows down 
the rate of introduction of new content is not favored by anyone in the 
computer game industry. 
So, the only way localization works for computer games is when it is 
introduced at the beginning of a product’s life cycle – before there is anything 
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built. This is the only chance a product can be built on-time and within budget 
while still maintaining an acceptable level of quality. However, localization still 
will add significant cost to the project and needs to be factored into the return-
on-investment analysis of each game (Collins, 2002) which was validated by 
Chris Burke, another Developer posting in the IGDA Business and Legal Issues 
forum: 
 
Some game companies (Raven Software) have a "policy" or standard operating 
procedure of including a software-adjustable violence setting in their violent 
games. This setting generally turns off gore, blood, mutilations, and sometimes 
even changes which cutscene plays. When the game is to be released in a country 
or jurisdiction with strict censorship, the game is modified to force the violence 
setting to its lowest level and to remove the violent assets from the game code. 
Example of a title using this strategy: Raven's Heretic 2.  (Burns, 2005, p. 1) 
 
If localization is deemed a cost effective technique for a computer game project 
then it constitutes a form of self-censorship on the part of the game developer 
because every design decision must be filtered through the localization criteria 
which are documented via in-house manuals. In some cases, this might preclude 
an entire game from being built at all (e.g., there are a significant number of 
computer games that require expressions of violence) (Anders, 1999) if its 
central premise needs to be removed in order to comply with cultural standards 
in multiple markets. 
Assuming that the central theme of a computer game is not the casualty of 
localization criteria then altering a game component introduced to elicit an 
emotional effect is likely to be. As Chris Burke explains, if a local cultural 
standard eschews visual depiction of human death then a game about combat 
could simply have robots instead of people: 
 
Another common strategy (Valve) is to use alternative storylines and color 
schemes to switch between violence and non-violence. The version of the game to 
be shipped to a strict jurisdiction is shipped with the alternative color scheme and 
story line. For example, a game that involves killing lots of people, and that has 
lots of blood, morphs into a game that involves destroying lots of robots, with lots 
of oil splatters: red assets become black. Example of a title using this strategy: 
Valve's Half-Life (German version).  (Burns, 2005, p. 1) 
 
However, this alternative definitely constrains the Developer’s ability to express 
the nature of combat and certainly alters the experience of the human player to 
the point of not being encouraged to feel anything about the risk of death from 
warfare. 
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Self-Regulation: Is It Effective? 
In jurisdictions that favor freedom of speech, self-regulation (also called self-
rating) is the preferred method of controlling game content by the computer 
gaming industry ESA (2004), ISFE (2004) and government (McGuire, 1999). 
The only issue with self-regulation is whether or not it is effective. This is the 
concern mostly of parents of children that play computer games because the 
parents generally do not wish to learn enough about each game in order to 
make their own determination whether or not it is suitable for their children. 
Unfortunately, even when a rating system exists, many parents do not use it 
(Singer, 2001). An ineffective system that does not appease those who favor 
censorship of computer games will increase the likelihood of state-sponsored 
censorship replacing it. So, poor self-regulation actually can result in even less 
freedom of expression and experience than the “doing nothing” strategy. 
It appears that the poor acceptance of the RSAC system RSAC (2004), 
ICRA (2004) caused the computer gaming industry to more aggressively adopt 
its competitor, ESRB  (Lowenstein, 2003), which has become such a success 
that the European Union has adopted a similar system called PEGI (2004). 
While it is too early to tell if PEGI will be as accepted in Europe as ESRB is in 
America, early indications point that way (Asbjørnsen, 2004).  
From the viewpoint of governments and the computer gaming industry, 
acceptance means the problem is solved as long as the parents of game-playing 
children trust that this industry can objectively govern its self-rating system to 
their satisfaction. Since the industry replaces the impartiality of the 
government, there is the concern that individual violations of the system will 
not be properly adjudicated or corrected (Campbell, 1999). This is why state-
sponsored censorship continues to be discussed in jurisdictions that currently 
employ self-rating of computer games (Thorsen, 2004). Unfortunately, even a 
well-designed self-rating system can fall prey to market forces (Thorsen, 2004). 
Consider how the complete avoidance of the “X” rating in the United States 
motion picture business means that only films considered as pornographic by 
many Americans can use it. 
From the viewpoint of someone interested in freedom of expression or 
experience, self-rating is better than state-sponsored censorship but more 
constraining than no censorship at all. This may be the reason that so many 
computer game developers choose to avoid the issue at all cost. It is mostly the 
larger corporations in the computer gaming industry that see that self-
regulation is worth supporting as a necessary condition of doing business across 
the planet. 
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Summary of Findings 
As Table 1 indicates, in the U.S. “doing nothing” is favored with localization 
considered only if there is an economic advantage to pursing pre- and post-
censorship markets. All U.S. and EU computer game providers seem to support 
their local self-rating schemes when they are not expecting to distribute their 
products exclusively via the Internet. Any computer game company wishing to 
do business in Australia, New Zealand or EU countries like Germany must 
consider localization in order to due business. 
Government policy positions relative to censorship in computer gaming 
have more to do with the individual national majority citizen culture then 
anything else. If violence is a cultural norm then it won’t be a censorship issue. 
If sexual-orientation and expression is considered a non-moral issue then it also 
won’t be a censorship issue. If freedom of expression is a cultural norm, then 
alternative ideological positions won’t be a censorship issue. Any nation not 
described in the preceding three sentences will be very interested in state-
sponsored censorship resulting in the elimination of self-regulation as an option 
for the computer industry there (Australian OFLC, 2004) (New Zealand 
OFLC, 2004). Elsewhere, self-regulation will remain the expected practice 
when violent or sexual content is to be expressed in a computer game. 
Future Study Questions 
These findings suggest a few questions that could be the subject of future 
studies: 
 
• Who is responsible for the multi-user experience in Internet games? 
• Is game localization worth the cost to be able to compete in foreign 
markets? 
• Is it possible to effectively censor games without resorting to film criteria? 
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Managing Growth in Young Firms: 
A Matter of Theory or a Question of Practice?  
Cinzia dal Zotto  
 
In terms of “liability of newness” new ventures face a greater mortality risk 
compared to established firms (Stinchcombe 1965, Hannan/Freeman 1984, 
Fichman/Levinthal 1991). Central to the “liability of newness” hypothesis is the 
concept of initial assets, or organizational capital. Levinthal (1991) observed 
that firms fail when they can no longer meet their financial obligations. 
Consequently, failure can be avoided if the firm has either strong current 
performance or substantial asset stocks. In this context, assets include not only 
financial assets, but also market position, distribution systems, manufacturing 
infrastructure, and technological capabilities. Levinthal refers to this 
conglomeration of financial and non-financial assets as "organizational capital." 
We can thus describe young firms as being prone to shortages of real capital 
assets and/or human capital assets. A lack of these assets when firms are nascent 
may have fatal consequences (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon & Woo, 1994; Gaskill 
et al. 1993, Venkataraman, Van de Ven, Buckeye & Hudson, 1990; Larson & 
Clute, 1979; McKinlay, 1979). In order to overcome constraints, managers can 
first try to reduce the degree of novelty associated with a new venture applying 
risk reduction strategies. As a second step growth strategies should be addressed, 
as the probability of survival increases with firm growth (Mata & Portugal,  
2002).  
Different risk reduction and growth strategies have been often analyzed 
separately in the literature. However, we argue with some other authors (Scholz, 
1987; Baird & Meshoulam, 1988; Hamel & Prahalad, 1993; Weir, Kochhar, 
LeBeau & Edgeley, 2000) that young firms should follow different strategies of 
risk reduction as well as growth simultaneously. In order to increase their 
probability of survival new ventures should foster growth introducing growth 
strategies. In this way young firms can overcome the risks connected with their 
novelty. Of course, new risks connected with growth must be taken into 
account and consequently risk reduction strategies are still needed, even if 
applied for new types of risks. By choosing such a multi-strategy approach 
young firms have to face the problem of strategy fit. Unfortunately we have to 
complain a complete lack of theory and models on this field. Therefore the 
design of some first theoretical fundaments has to be approached in this paper. 
The still dominant view in the American as well as European literature is 
that firms, and especially new firms, should pursue only one consistent strategy 
(Porter 1980, 1998). The discussions regarding strategic fit have only 
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considered the alignment of business strategies with organizational mechanisms 
and external environment (Venkatraman & Camillus, 1984; Venkatraman, 
1989; Bogaert, Martens & van Cauwenbergh, 1994). In order to make further 
progress in explaining new firms’ growth on a micro-level perspective, a 
theoretical framework is required to explore the compatibility of the different 
risk reduction and growth strategies. Indeed, until now, the compatibility of 
different strategies pursued simultaneously by one firm—it might be old or new 
—has not been discussed (Hambrick & Fredrickson 2001). By discussing this 
overlooked problem this essay aims at showing that, composing a bundle of well 
coordinated and harmonized strategies, young firms can exploit opportunities 
better, reduce market and financial risks and therefore foster long-term growth. 
First of all the paper will introduce the concept of strategy and describe 
possible strategy compatibility factors. Then risk reduction as well as growth 
strategies and their compatibility will be discussed. Two brief case studies will 
be introduced to give examples. Finally, the compatibility between risk 
reduction and growth strategies will be debated trying to develop a first attempt 
of framework for the strategy compatibility analysis. A final discussion and 
indications for future research will close the paper.  
The Concept of Strategy 
Although the first principles of strategy developed in China and are 
summarized in Sun Tzu’s classic treatise written at about 360 B.C. (Sun Tzu, 
2001), explicit interest in business strategy emerged in the United States during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s in response to problems of managing large, 
complex corporations. The post-war period was one of unprecedented stability 
and growth. As large companies sought efficiency and control of risk through 
scale-efficient production, mass marketing, vertical integration and large long-
term investments in technology, long-term corporate planning based upon 
medium-term economic and market forecasts became popular. Its key element 
was the planning and management of growth. By the mid-1970s, however, 
circumstances had changed. The increased macroeconomic instability 
discredited elaborated planning systems and firms were forced to adopt more 
flexible approaches to strategic management. As not only firms’ stability but 
also survival was threatened, interest shifted from issues of diversification and 
planning toward the need for competitiveness. 
As a consequence, over time also the definition given to strategy developed 
and changed. If in the 1960s Chandler (1962) described strategy as “the 
determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and 
the adoption of courses of action and allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals”, in the late 1970s Hofer and Schendel (1978) viewed 
strategy as “a fundamental pattern of present and planned resource deployments 
and environmental interactions that indicates how the organization will achieve 
its objectives”. Nowadays, Grant (1995) still interprets strategy as a plan for 
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deploying resources, which is though aimed at establishing a favorable position 
in the market. Mintzberg (1998) goes further and claims that strategy needs a 
number of definitions. He argues that strategy is one of those words that we 
inevitably define in one way, yet often use in another. As a consequence it turns 
out that strategy can be seen as a plan, i.e. a direction or course of action into 
the future, or more “softly” as a pattern, that is as consistency of behavior over 
time. To some people strategy is a position (Porter, 1996), to others strategy is a 
perspective, associated with image and sense of direction, namely a vision.  
Simply put, a strategy is an integrated set of decisions and actions made in order 
to meet the business objectives and this is how strategy is intended in this paper. 
The company mission and objectives guide, but stand apart from, strategy 
(Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986; Hambrick & Cannella, 1989; Nickols, 2002). 
Our hypothesis is that if a young firm final objective is to grow, then all 
strategies adopted by the firm must “serve” the same mission complementing 
each other and not competing with each other. 
If we accept that the fundamental goal of the firm is to earn a return on its 
capital that exceeds the cost of its capital—that is, to grow, then the firm has 
two alternatives to reach this goal. First, the firm may locate in an industry 
where favorable industry conditions result in the industry earning a rate of 
return above the competitive level. Second, the firm may attain a position of 
advantage compared to the competitors within an industry that allows it to earn 
a return that exceeds the one of the industry average. These two sources of 
advantage define the two basic levels of strategy within an enterprise: corporate 
strategy and business strategy. The first one defines the scope of the firm in 
terms of industries and markets in which it competes. These decisions include 
investment in diversification, vertical integration, acquisitions, and the 
allocation of resources between the different businesses of the firm. Business 
strategy is concerned with how the firm competes within a particular industry 
or market (Grant, 1995) in order to achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage. The detailed deployment of resources at the operational level is the 
concern of functional strategies. They include policies toward production, 
R&D, marketing, personnel and finance at the industry or product level. In a 
large firm these three levels of strategies are located within the typical 
organizational structure and traditionally form a hierarchy implying a top-down 
approach to strategy formulation (Weir, Kochhar, LeBeau & Edgeley, 2000). 
However, in reality, the three levels overlap and influence one another. 
Therefore, in order to optimize coordination and deployment of the available 
resources within a firm—and to assure the existence and success of the firm—
the chosen strategies must be compatible with one another and consistent with 
each other within each level. 
In the entrepreneurial firm, which constitutes the unit of analysis in this 
paper, it is unlikely to find any organizational separation of business and 
functional strategies or, in other words, of strategic and operating decisions 
(Grant 1995). According to a life-cycle perspective we have therefore 
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categorized strategies in risk reduction—or survival—strategies and growth 
strategies. Our aim is first to analyze the problem of compatibility between 
strategies within each category. Then we will consider the consistency between 
risk reduction strategies and growth strategies. In order to do this in the next 
section we will introduce some criteria for the measurement of compatibility.  
The Compatibility Problem as a Multi-Objective Decision 
Introduction 
In order to test if two or more strategies are compatible with one another a 
measurement tool for compatibility is required. One measure of compatibility is 
the increased company value. In this case firms should choose the combination 
of strategies which maximizes the company value. Two or more strategies 
would be considered compatible if their simultaneous application increases the 
net income of a company. Should the net income on the other hand decrease, 
the chosen strategies would be seen as incompatible. This simple approach 
requires that the impact of a strategy on the firm’s net income can be identified. 
Unfortunately an exact measure of the impact of a strategy application on net 
income is very difficult if not impossible to determine. Moreover it makes more 
sense to raise the compatibility test from the strategy application to the strategy 
choice level. Anticipating possible incompatibilities between strategies may 
facilitate the implementation of the chosen strategies. In this paper we therefore 
try to work out a second best solution evaluating compatibility between two or 
more potential strategies indirectly, according to qualitative compatibility 
factors.  
 
Strategy Compatibility Factors 
The implementation of different strategies requires the long-term commitment 
of material, human and financial resources. The resource demands of one 
strategy must be consistent with the resource availability of the firm, and 
therefore with the resource demands of the other strategies, in terms of the 
amount and the types of resources and capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993; Grant, 1995). The effective assignment of available 
resources to the different strategies causes a substantial coordination problem. 
Low coordination efforts become therefore a strategy compatibility factor. The 
coordination efforts decrease if managers do not have to compete on scarce 
or insufficient resources or if they can draw on the same bundle of resources 
simultaneously, exploiting natural synergies (Grant, 1995, Scholz, 1997). 
Following product innovation and acquisition strategies simultaneously may on 
one hand increase the flexibility of a young firm towards environmental 
changes, on the other hand it can lead to a lack of focus which threatens the 
firm’s success or even its survival. If the available resources are insufficient either 
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the implementation of one strategy prevails while the other is aborted or both 
strategies fail.  
Competition between strategic objectives represents a clear factor of 
strategy incompatibility and can bring a young firm to lose focus in pursuing its 
general mission/vision. Competing objectives may further cause a dispersion of 
financial—but not only financial—resources and therefore increase the 
mortality risk of the firm. As young firms are resource constrained, they should 
try to increase the resource productivity. One way to leverage resources consists 
in concentrating them more effectively on key strategic goals (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1993). Education and training as internal investment in capabilities 
and recruitment of experienced employees from outside are an example of 
competing strategic objectives for a firm in its early stage. As financial resources 
are not abounding at that stage, focusing on the second objective allows the 
firm to build human capital and acquire the necessary know-how more quickly. 
In this way the mortality risk of the firm is minimized, too. At a later stage, 
when its financial resources have increased and additional specific know how is 
not immediately needed anymore, the firm can invest in internal personnel 
development (Scholz, 1987).  
Keeping its organizational structure small, a young firm can centralize 
strategic decisions and facilitate the alignment of different strategies to the same 
final goal. This automatically reduces the risk of competition between strategic 
objectives. To maintain a small organizational structure a young company may 
have to outsource certain activities: this would at the same time reduce 
competition between managers, responsible for implementing the chosen 
strategies, for scarce or insufficient resources. 
Knowledge is a critical firm-specific intangible resource. Because they are 
socially complex and more difficult to understand and imitate, intangible 
resources are more likely to lead to a competitive advantage, and therefore to 
growth, than are tangible resources (Barney, 1991). Much of a firm’s 
knowledge resides in its human capital and is generated through individual as 
well as organizational learning (Fahra, Hitt & Ireland, 2000). The problem is 
that generating knowledge through learning requires time and high investments 
in education and training while young firms neither have time nor abundant 
financial resources. In order to make organizational learning compatible with 
the other strategies, it is therefore critical for young companies to be able to 
extract knowledge from their daily experience more efficiently than their 
competitors. Because experience comes at a cost, what differentiates firms over 
time may be less the quality or depth of their stockpile of experiences than their 
capacity to draw from and leverage that stockpile (Hamel & Prahalad, 1993).  
Time to market is generally essential for young firms that are not well 
known yet and are trying to build up their own reputation or are marketing a 
new product (Grant, 1995; Porter, 1999). Therefore strategy development 
and implementation time becomes crucial for a young firm’s success. The 
longer the development and implementation time of a strategy, the longer the 
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applied resources are not available for the development of another strategy and 
vice versa. Because of their emerging nature, in young firms strategy is to be 
considered as a dynamic assembly of short-term objectives which mostly have 
long-term effects (Bogaert, Martens & van Cauwenbergh, 1994). The 
commitment of resources at more or less short notice, following short-term 
objectives according to the situation, allows young firms to be quicker and 
doesn’t prevent them to perceive long-term objectives.  
It is very important for a new venture to minimize the know how required 
for developing and implementing its strategies: young firms do not have a large 
know how basis and competence development would contrast first of all with 
financial restrictions but also with the pressure of time to market. For the same 
reasons also the duration of strategy development and implementation should 
be minimized through the setting of flexible short-term objectives. 
Two or more strategies are compatible if their simultaneous implementation 
does not negatively affect firm performance. Compatibility cannot be measured 
on a cardinal scale, but in a nominal or ordinal scale indeed (Scholz, 1987). We 
can therefore say that compatibility between two or more strategies increases if 
their combined implementation has a positive impact on firm performance. 
Strategy combinations can develop positive synergy effects and consequently 
increase firm performance. A typical example of such effects is recognizable in 
the strategic orientation of Escada AG: this company’s clothes are successfully 
sold, its accessories singularly are not; both items together are even more 
successfully sold then the clothes alone. The accessories production itself would 
be a failure for Escada, but added to the clothes production is ends up 
improving the company’s performance. 
Summing up, strategy compatibility increases when synergies between the 
different strategies chosen by a young firm are maximized. This means that 
strategies are following compatible objectives and can share resources reducing 
in this way coordination efforts, required know-how and duration of their 
development and implementation. The choice of a strategy combination 
becomes then a multi-objective decision lead by the existence of synergies 
between the considered strategies. In the next section we will start the 
compatibility discussion by analyzing some examples of possible risk reduction 
strategies that young firms could choose in order to survive and prepare a base 
for their growth.  
Risk Reduction as Short Term Survival “Strategy” for New 
Ventures 
Mortality Risk and Managerial skills 
In the context of new ventures mortality risk can be defined as the probability 
that a firm will become insolvent and be unable to recover from that insolvency 
before being bankrupted and ceasing operations (Shepherd, Douglas & 
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Shanley, 2000). Business mortality occurs when an unexpected fall in revenues 
or an unexpected rise in expenses or both is of such magnitude that the firm 
becomes insolvent, is unable to attract new debt or equity funding and thus 
cannot continue to operate. New organizations begin life with a basic 
expectation that they will survive. Thus they are continually subject to the risk 
that an unanticipated event or combination of events will force them out of 
business (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Singh, et al., 1986). 
Minimizing risks is therefore a dominant first objective for young firms. Using 
chances for growth and profit is the second, competing objective.  
In order to explain why more young firms failed than did established firms, 
Stinchcombe introduced the concept of “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 
1965). It can be argued that the liability of newness is largely dependent on the 
degree of novelty associated with a new venture. Mortality risk increases with 
the degree of novelty in three basic dimensions of the business development 
process: market, technology of production and management. Novelty to the 
market concerns the customers’ uncertainty about the new venture (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; Sheperd & Shanley, 1998). Novelty in production means the extent 
to which the production technology used by the new venture differs from the 
technologies in which the production team has experience and knowledge 
(Hatch & Mowery, 1998). Novelty to management concerns the 
entrepreneurial team’s lack of business skills, industry specific information and 
start-up experience (Cooper, et al., 1994). Mortality risk increases also with the 
number of dimensions in which the young firm is novel. On the other hand 
information search and dissemination processes can erode the firm’s novelty in 
each dimension and therefore its mortality risk (Shepherd, Douglas & Shanley, 
2000). At the same time new ventures are initially very vulnerable to 
environmental pressures. Threats to the performance of similar but established 
firms may threaten the existence of new ventures. New ventures differ in their 
capabilities for meeting environmental threats and lower their mortality risk. 
This difference may be explained by the existence of information asymmetry, 
different managerial capabilities or the lack of them. This will be discussed later 
in the paper. 
Some evolutionary scholars argue that the acquisition of information and 
knowledge may improve a new organization’s chances of adaptation and 
survival (Parkhe, 1991). Positive results in this direction should stem from 
passive learning derived from natural interactions among organizations. 
Organizations do learn from other organizations facing similar circumstances 
(Davis, 1991; Miner & Haunschild, 1995). This collective learning across 
organizations constitutes a population-level learning (Miner & Haunschild, 
1995) which of course requires time. Mortality risk is therefore very high 
initially when the young firm has not had the time yet to reduce its degree of 
novelty in any dimension (Shepherd, Douglas & Shanley, 2000).  
Entrepreneurs are continuously making decisions about highly uncertain 
environments and the young firm’s internal structures that in turn modify its 
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performance outcomes. According to Shepherd, Douglas & Shanley (2000) a 
new venture manager’s decision can impact the liability of newness. If new 
venture managers learn from past choices about how to perform better in the 
future, adaptation to changed environmental conditions is indeed facilitated 
and therefore a new venture's chance of survival improved (Mintzberg, 1990; 
Hamel & Prahalad, 1993). Overall management skill for young firms 
constitutes the principal means by which managers can reduce uncertainty 
around them and establish their enterprises. Essential to the venture survival 
and growth is although how managers use their skills in the specific situation 
they face. They show their skills applying risk reduction and growth strategies. 
Risk reduction strategies reduce the variability of potential cost and revenue 
outcomes and perhaps also increase the expected net present value of profits. 
On the other hand, the cost of risk reduction strategies can reduce the firm’s 
margins. This is not a serious problem if growth strategies are simultaneously 
applied. Applying different strategies simultaneously would require a 
compatibility proof. Potential risk reduction and growth strategies as well as 
their compatibility test based on the previously analyzed factors will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
Risk Reduction Strategies 
For a new venture attempting to break into a market represents a corporate 
strategy which confers a higher degree of mortality risk as compared to an 
established firm broadening its product line (Lambkin & Day, 1989). First of 
all potential markets have to be identified and then analyzed. According to the 
market structures and their segments informative advertising must be 
undertaken to disseminate information and overcome the reluctance of 
potential customers to bear quality risk or switching costs. What makes this 
activity strategic is when it involves substantial investments of human and 
financial capital to lay the ground for the success of the venture. An alternative 
risk reduction strategy may be to seek a marketing agreement with an existing 
firm which would market the product or service either under the established 
firm’s brand name or allow the new venture to operate under the established 
firm’s corporate umbrella more generally (Keller & Aaker, 1994; Dacin & 
Brown, 1997). This would allow the new venture to reduce its novelty in the 
market dimension (see previous point) and avoid high marketing costs. On the 
other hand this would shift a portion of the rights to revenues to the established 
firm. Also the venture loses the opportunity to build its own brand and 
reputation capital and, finally, it becomes dependent from the established firm. 
To reduce dependence the new venture should seek a joint venture 
relationship where for instance an established firm presents a gap in its product 
line and would therefore be willing to jointly package and market the product. 
This would give the new venture some reputation without threatening its 
growth independence. Thus, when applying a risk reduction strategy, not only 
the effects on the market but also the impact on the other two dimensions must 
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be taken into account. Entering a joint venture relationship with an established 
firm may in fact reduce consumer ignorance but could also increase production 
and management novelty in terms of quality assurance and management of the 
joint venture relationship (Lechner, 2001).  
The set up of a production process for a new venture may need to be made 
“up front”. This can increase the risk of financial failure if expenditures and 
revenues are incorrectly planned. Licensing production rights or outsourcing 
the manufacture to an established firm usually helps to reduce production 
novelty and to avoid the major expenses which could lead to financial problems. 
The problems deriving from this strategy are two: first of all the acquisition of 
manufacturing skills and experience by the new venture are delayed. Second, 
increased transaction costs incurred in contracting with or monitoring the 
licensee may offset the venture’s gains in reduced capital outlays (Shane, 1994). 
If this is the case an alternative strategy consists in building up production 
knowledge through education and training programs as well as personnel 
hiring policies. This strategy is also applicable to reduce management 
ignorance. Introducing management information and control systems helps 
reduce management novelty too. However this risk reduction strategy usually 
turns the company’s focus internally towards preparing reports and attending 
efficiency meetings and turn attention away from monitoring, responding to 
and educating the market, therefore increasing novelty in the market and 
production dimensions of mortality risk (see previous section).  
In general we can say that a risk reduction strategy may have a different 
effect on each of the novelty dimensions. Some strategies reduce mortality risk 
by reducing more than one dimension of novelty (see previous section). For 
example allowing another firm to manufacture and market under license 
obviates the need for production knowledge, to build customer awareness of the 
new venture and to manage the production and marketing functions. Also a 
good entrepreneurial basic education complemented by entrepreneurial 
experience would directly reduce ignorance by managers and have an indirect 
impact on the learning rate—lowering mortality risk—in each of the other 
dimensions. In this way education acts as a catalyst to the learning process. On 
the other hand a risk reduction strategy applied on one dimension tends to have 
an undesirable effect on ignorance in one or both of the other dimensions of 
novelty and therefore mortality risk. It is therefore important to pay attention 
to the different impacts of risk reduction strategies on all novelty dimensions in 
order to be flexible and shift strategy if the negative effects overcome the 
positive ones.  
It is important here to stress that learning processes are likely to lower the 
mortality risk of a new venture. If mortality risk, even if lower, persists also 
when the firm establishes, then it is desirable that learning processes continue to 
be enhanced in organizations. This can be fostered introducing a system of 
incentives for learning (Drumm 2000).  
Compatibility of risk reduction strategies 
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In order to reduce all three dimensions of novelty and therefore mortality risk, 
different risk reduction strategies should be applied at the same time. We will 
here consider only the strategies that mostly contribute to reduce the three 
novelty dimensions. (1) Informative advertising or marketing agreements 
reduce consumer ignorance and therefore market novelty. These two strategies 
may cause problems in assuring production quality as the new venture doesn’t 
directly control marketing activities. In this case (2) outsourcing or licensing-
agreements could reduce production novelty and therefore state production 
quality. However such agreements make sense only if production is not specific, 
otherwise the transaction costs of controlling the partner firm would be too 
high. Another consequence of outsourcing and licensing agreements is that the 
acquisition of experience and skills is delayed. The introduction of (3) 
education and training instruments together with management information 
and control systems—which foster learning processes—may decline 
management novelty. Relaying only on these instruments in order to reduce 
newness increases the risk of delaying the new venture response to the market, 
as learning processes develop with time. But this is not a problem as long as 
marketing and/or outsourcing agreements with an established firm are made 
(See Figure 1).  
Risk Reduction
Strategy
Dimension of 
Novelty
Information advertisement/
Marketing agreements
Outsourcing/
Licensing
Management
Information Systems
Market
Production
Management
Reduction of
consumer ignorance
Risks in quality
assurance
Management 
problems
Production novelty
reduced
Acquisition of
manufacturing
experience and skills
delayed
No need to build
customer awareness
Of the new venture
Responce to the
Market deelayed
Learning processes
Reduction of 
Management
novelty
 
Figure 1. Risk Reduction Strategies and Dimensions of Novelty 
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At this point the question is weather the young firm is able to introduce and 
manage the implementation of more strategies in order to reduce its novelty in 
all three dimensions at the same time. The analysis of the above mentioned risk 
reduction strategies according to the compatibility factors previously developed 
in the paper brings us to the following considerations. If the application of three 
risk reduction strategies at the same time is needed, then coordination efforts 
during the implementation phase within the new venture rise. Managing (1) 
marketing agreements as well as (2) outsourcing or licensing agreements 
simultaneously and probably with different partners for each of the two 
strategies may be difficult, especially at a start up when the management team is 
small and its competencies reduced. This may cause competition between the 
two strategies for the scarce human resources available in the young firm. 
The conflict between strategic objectives shouldn’t be considered high, as the 
final goal is still the main objective directing all risk reduction strategies. The 
necessary management know-how required to develop and implement 
strategies is not there yet and needs to be built through (3) education and 
training instruments. Meanwhile marketing and outsourcing agreements help 
to minimize needed competences. Of course, following two agreement 
strategies with different partner firms may widen the duration of development 
and implementation of these strategies. It would be desirable for a new venture 
to have enough competences to be able to reduce novelty at least on one 
dimension by itself. If the founding team of a young firm has management 
experience, so being the firm not novel in its management dimension, then the 
firm needs to apply only two strategies simultaneously. The simultaneous 
application of two strategies instead of three increases the overall strategy 
compatibility. A good business plan would foresee the compatibility problem 
between the needed risk reduction strategies and would therefore include 
enough capital and human resources. Only in this way the high planning costs 
needed to develop the plan, which are properly transaction costs, could be 
balanced through reduced controlling costs for the implementation of the 
chosen strategies (Drumm, 1998). 
The importance of applying compatible risk reduction strategies is 
emphasized through the explanatory case study taken from the media industry 
that we briefly report here. 
 
The Case of ON24 
ON24 is a streaming media delivery platform and distribution network for 
corporate information. ON24’s streaming media business solutions provide 
private-labeled applications for the financial service, enterprise and healthcare 
industries: it is about a one-stop web-cast service for live and on-demand 
corporate communications such as product launches, corporate training, 
conferences and events, customer and partner testimonials, financial road-shows 
and equity research.  
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ON24 was founded by four people in 1998 on the “ashes” of News Direct, a 
public relations firm. After around six months the founders decided that a news 
service had to be added to give legitimacy to the public relations’ piece of the 
company. A hybrid came out as ON24, which is based in San Francisco. The 
company was initially producing more then 20 hours of news a day: at that 
time there was no apparent end to the public’s appetite for financial news. But 
ON24 did not want to—and could not—compete with giants like CNN. So 
managers decided to change strategy and turn into a corporate enterprise service 
company and news was cut down to 5 hours a day. After the bubble burst at the 
stock market, companies either had no money left or became too skeptical to 
spend it, so that they cut every expense they considered not essential. Again the 
strategy was changed and the company went into the web-casting business. 
Now ON24 is smaller and its revenues come from corporate Web-cast, email 
marketing (targeted email lists) and advertisements (even if these are very few).  
"ON24 lived on the daily business of trying to catch the bubble, chasing 
tumble weed in the wind” (Peter Shaplen, Vice President News and News 
Director July 2002). ON24 first thought it was a B2B company, then an ASP 
(Application Service Provider), then again a solution provider. The business 
world was so volatile that ON24 was trying to find its place by changing focus 
continuously. The result was a daily issue instead of a plan. There was no time 
to do market research, so the management decided to change strategy according 
to its own intuition. At that point Venture Capital money was flowing cheaply 
and the company employed up to 150 people. However, the collected money 
was spent more quickly than expected. Although 100 people were laid off, the 
company couldn’t reach profitability yet.  
The main strategy that ON24 followed was to maximize marketing and 
information on the Internet. Unfortunately only the news side of the business 
proved to be good: through high talented journalists it experienced growth both 
in size and range of the content. The unit started with three people and at its 
height it employed 60 people with offices in New York and London. On the 
corporate side, however, there was no clarity at all and no focus. Concerning 
web-casting, the adoption of a technology not universally regarded as essential 
together with the impact of the economic downturn negatively affects online 
businesses as well. The consequence for ON24 is that it continues to struggle 
(Peter Shaplen, Vice President News and News Director July 2002, 2004, Peter 
van Pruissen, Vice President Finance and Administration July 2002).  
On24 has surely reduced market novelty through an extensive marketing 
activity. The company tried to minimize production novelty too hiring highly 
qualified journalists. The main mistake was not to have done a comprehensive 
market exploration and risk analysis at the beginning, when ON24 decided to 
become a financial news network. What seemed or would have been valuable in 
the short run—in this case to provide breaking financial news 24 hours a day—
wasn’t valuable in the long run as there was too much competition in the 
Internet marketplace. Further, ON24 did not look for a specific capability to be 
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its competitive advantage. On the contrary, instead of staying focused and 
exploit its key resources (talented journalists), ON24 changed strategy very 
rapidly and more than once so that a competitive advantage couldn’t even be 
identified. All this derives from a general lack of business skills, industry specific 
information and probably start up experience on the management side. Also, 
geographical expansion didn’t help to make imitation costly for competitors: in 
the internet industry there’s no expensive infrastructure needed to enter the 
business and through the network space and time can be easily bridged. 
Basically ON24 wasn’t able to reduce novelty in any dimension by itself. In 
order to reduce market and production novelty the company concentrated on 
marketing and personnel hiring policies. The simultaneous application of these 
strategies does not cause high coordination efforts or competition between 
strategic objectives the two strategies could therefore be compatible if for their 
implementation managers don’t have to compete on scarce resources. 
Unfortunately the venture capital the firm managed to raise turned out to be 
insufficient. The lack of market research at the beginning and of strategic focus 
later on reveals that not even the management know-how was an available 
internal resource for the company. A lack of the basic risk reduction strategies 
such as business and organizational control, marketing agreements with other 
firms to share expenditures, over-funding or accelerated funding schedules 
together with a compatibility problem between the chosen strategies resulted in 
the company struggling for survival.  
After the successful implementation of some risk reduction strategies, a new 
venture can start to develop growth strategies as survival strategies for the long 
run. Some examples of possible growth strategies will be discussed in the next 
section.  
Growth as Long Term Survival Strategy for Young Firms 
Growth Strategies in young firms as frame of reference 
Although risk reduction strategies are important for new venture survival at 
early stages, during expansion and later stages young companies should pursue 
long term strategies in order to foster firm’s development and growth. As 
already discussed, the probability of exit persists but decreases with firm growth 
(Mata & Portugal, 2002). A business grows when (1) sales revenues increase, 
which means that more products are manufactured, (2) quality is improved and 
therefore an increased unit price is justified, (3) the product range is increased, 
(4) the products functionality and features are improved, (5) a combination of 
these factors occurs. To keep pace with such demands continuous learning 
processes and the adoption of specific growth strategies are required.  
Currently the most studied growth strategies in the entrepreneurship 
literature (Gundry & Welsch, 2001; Tonge, Larsen & Ito, 1998; Taylor, 1997) 
are the following: product and service innovation, market development, internal 
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investment, business and organizational control, acquisitions, and joint 
ventures. We will base the compatibility proof which will follow on these 
growth strategies. 
According to a survey, conducted by Tonge, Larsen and Ito in 1998, young 
companies saw acquisition as the most important strategic objective to have 
provided growth in the past. Beyond acquisition, product and service 
innovation as well as internal investment in capabilities were considered 
crucial, with business and organizational control being seen as key strategy 
between the fastest growing companies included in the survey. Evidently 
companies had tried to adopt a balanced approach to growth incorporating 
both acquisition and organic growth strategies. The survey reports further that 
young firms are seeking not only to position themselves in niche markets but 
especially to establish strong relationships with their customers individually 
rather than aggregating them into market groups (Tonge, Larsen & Ito, 1998). 
In order to meet the customers’ needs and therefore to rapidly grow young 
firms try to provide a quality service and to employ skilled, well-informed and 
flexible staff through a combination of acquisition strategies in the first place, 
organic growth strategies and joint ventures for the future. This agrees with our 
view that, at an early stage, young firms should try to maintain a small 
organizational structure in order to minimize coordination efforts, competition 
between strategic objectives and between different strategies on scarce resources. 
Most of the times young firms follow more than one strategy: depending on 
the life-cycle stage in which they are and according to their financial situation, 
they have to cope with a high mortality risk—and therefore adopt risk 
reduction strategies—while applying growth strategies in order to increase value 
and lower the probability of exit. The challenge young firms face is to stay 
focused on their stated goals and be flexible enough to react to organizational 
and environmental stressors: this means to follow strategies which are 
compatible and do not threat one another. In the next section we will discuss 
the compatibility of some growth strategies according to same the compatibility 
factors we used to compare risk reduction strategies. 
 
Compatibility of growth strategies 
According to the strategy compatibility factors previously identified in the 
paper, we can say that a strong compatibility could emerge from the 
simultaneous application of product innovation and internal investment strategies. 
If a lot is invested in terms of financing, capabilities and competence 
development it is worthy for the young firm to follow also innovation oriented 
strategies. The newly acquired competencies and capabilities could be used to 
develop new products or services. This would not imply high coordination 
efforts nor cause competition between managers on scarce resources or 
between strategic objectives. Moreover, as competencies would already be 
available, the duration of development and implementation of innovation 
strategies probably will be minimized. In order not to compete for scarce 
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resources such as available financing and human capital product innovation 
and acquisition strategies must on the other hand be implemented sequentially. 
Similarly acquisition and joint venture strategies could generate synergies as they 
need the same managerial skills to manage the merger and/or partnering 
process. Business and organizational control strategies should in any case 
accompany the application of a strategy combination as providing transparency 
they can help to find the best compatible growth strategies. 
Growth strategies have to be applied only after having introduced risk 
reduction strategies to minimize mortality risk. This is one of the most 
remarkable findings of our research. The risks deriving from a lack of balance 
between risk reduction and growth in a young firm are further described in the 
following case study which, for coherency reasons, we have taken from the 
media industry too.  
 
The Case of Mondo Media 
The company was founded in 1988 by two founders and its main activity 
was the production of content for other companies. With the ‘90s the 
company started to work for the CD-ROM game business (game producers 
outsourced the graphics and animation work to Mondo Media), so Mondo 
Media became a real outsourcing provider.   
In 1998 the company decided to expand and produce its own products 
(cartoons, animated advertisements), so that the company would have 
produced not only the animation but also the writing and would have had 
its own trademark. To change strategy and turn from an outsourcing 
provider to an original “film” studio the company looked for venture capital. 
Venture capital was found and it was used to go towards original content. 
The product was basically flash animation for the Internet that would have 
been sold through monthly fees or revenue sharing agreements to web 
portals and all the dot.com firms that appeared in that period. This activity 
at the peak—between 1998 and 2000—covered 99% of all the production.   
Unfortunately the dot.com firms faded away and together with them the 
market that Mondo Media was hoping to serve with its own products. Now 
the company is not profitable (while it was before 1998) and in order to 
survive it has gone back to its old activity of production. The company’s 
client list currently include Electronic Arts/Maxis, THQ, Sierra, Activision, 
and Viacom (MTV, VH1) (Alex Chu, Director of Business Affairs, July 
2002, 2004).   
Mondo Media saw an opportunity in the growing Internet Economy to 
expand its activities and become an original production studio. In ten years 
time the company succeeded in reducing its market, production as well as 
management novelty. A good customer base, skilled human resources and a 
capable management team could minimize its mortality risk and secured its 
profitability. Concentrating in market development and product innovation 
Mondo Media found two compatible growth strategies. They did not imply 
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high coordination costs nor competed on objectives, while the know-how 
they required was already available. Though the business model was changed 
abruptly instead of gradually (at the peaks the original production covered 
99% of the company’s activities), therefore the risk faced was too great. In 
fact the company was not able to cope once the targeted market faded away. 
Had Mondo Media chosen a gradual shift continuing its activity as 
outsourcing provider—and therefore not losing its focus—while producing 
original content at the same time (that is diversifying its activities), today the 
company would be exploiting the growing demand for animated 
advertisements online (The Economist, May 2005) and probably be a 
profitable company. 
Cross- Case Conclusions 
If we consider the two case studies presented in this paper we see an example of 
a business which didn’t have a clear and integrated strategy—ON24—and of 
another business—Mondo Media—which had a sound strategy but was badly 
influenced by the collapse of the stock market. While ON24 has never been 
profitable yet and is still struggling without knowing where to go and how, 
Mondo Media can rely on its old production business, which constitutes a basis 
to keep the company alive and recover from the losses. Which are the causes of 
their different development?  
Analyzing ON24 we can state that a lack of the basic risk reduction 
strategies such as business and organizational control, marketing agreements 
with other firms to share expenditures, over-funding or accelerated funding 
schedules – together with a compatibility problem between the chosen strategies 
– can lead the company to struggle for survival. The Mondo Media case reveals 
further that while applying growth strategies a company should not abandon 
risk reduction strategies such as business and organizational control or a 
moderate growth plan. Mondo Media considers itself lucky: having built strong 
relationships with its customers and profiting from skilled but flexible 
employees such as freelancers, the company has had the alternative to stay on 
the market with its “old” production activity. Another important result of this 
case analysis is to have recognized that risk reduction and growth strategies are 
linked to the life cycle of a firm but are not limited to a certain stage within it.  
Considering that growth and mortality risk avoidance are connected to the life 
cycle of a firm—and not to a precise point in time , new ventures could need to 
overlap risk reduction and growth strategies. In the next section we therefore 
analyze the compatibility of both risk reduction and growth strategies within 
the life cycle of a young firm.  
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Compatibility between Risk Reduction and Growth Strategies 
within the Life Cycle of a Young Firm 
At the early stage new ventures face large investments, that is have high costs 
and expenses but low revenues and no profits or positive cash flow. In order to 
reduce mortality risk—that is financial failure—they must first of all assure 
themselves enough funds and try to accelerate funding schedules. Second, new 
ventures must apply risk reduction strategies like marketing agreements with 
other firms, licensing of production rights or outsourcing manufacturing to 
established firms. According to the strategy compatibility factors presented in 
this paper these risk reduction strategies are compatible. Applying only risk 
reduction strategies though imposes a moderate growth plan, which in turn 
slows down revenue and cash flows needed to further funding the firm. Growth 
must therefore be pursued in order to increase a young firm’s probability of 
survival. For this reason a new venture should overlap risk reduction with 
growth strategies, paying attention to their compatibility.  
In order to foster growth without omitting risk reduction tasks new ventures 
can seek joint venture relationships with established and well known firms. This 
strategy would allow them to share expenses and at the same time to build up 
reputation and experience (Lechner, 2001). At the early stage young firms 
should then introduce business and organizational control systems in order to be 
constantly aware of their financial as well as organizational situation and needs. 
Providing transparency such systems allow a young firm not only to track risks 
but also to shed light on investment opportunities. Along their growth process 
new ventures can also apply education and training measures to reduce 
management novelty, and therefore their mortality risk. Increasing managers’ as 
well as employees’ capabilities and skills requires though high investments. 
Education and training are therefore not compatible with the basic risk 
reduction and growth strategies considered above, which a new venture would 
implement at an early stage. 
An internal investment in capabilities is a more suitable strategy for 
expansion and later stages of the firm. In these stages investment returns 
improve the financial situation of a young firm so that growth strategies like 
market development, product and service innovations as well as acquisitions can be 
addressed simultaneously to risk reduction strategies such as education and 
training.  
As new ventures and young firms have to address both risk reduction and 
growth, compatibility between optional strategies depends upon the balance 
that can be established between these two main objectives. A young firm can 
only seek this balance through strategic experimentation and the derived 
learning processes, as experience and needed skills are not yet developed. In the 
early stage is therefore very important to spend on recruiting human resources 
who can bring in key competences. This measure may moderate growth plans, 
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as financial resources are contended between more strategies, but the probability 
of survival and of future growth increases.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
First of all we can say that, according to our analysis, not only strategies 
belonging to different categories must be compatible with each other, on the 
contrary also strategies within the same category must be compatible with each 
other. Second, from the compatibility analysis that we have conducted emerges 
that it is not desirable for a new venture to apply growth strategies without 
foreseeing a previous or simultaneous implementation of risk reduction 
strategies. As not all strategies are compatible with one another, problems arise 
when strategies compete on scarce resources or if they pursue competing 
objectives. Moreover the know-how required to develop and implement the 
chosen strategies should be minimized because competences are not abounding 
in young firms. New ventures should therefore include in their business plan a 
compatibility study for the strategies they would like to pursue. Later on such a 
study should become a part of the strategic planning of young firms. To know 
which strategy is compatible with the others gives firms more visibility on the 
feasibility of desired growing paths and therefore allows them to reduce 
mortality risk. In this perspective managing your firms is certainly a matter of 
good theory.  
Our compatibility analysis reveals that it makes sense to discuss the problem 
in relation to start ups. The important result is anyway that, as growth and 
mortality risk avoidance are connected to the life cycle of a firm, the discussion 
on compatibility between risk reduction and growth strategies is relevant also 
when looking at established firms. If the applied growth strategies fail, in order 
to avoid bankruptcy a firm must consider survival and therefore risk reduction 
strategies. In this way risk reduction strategies are not only strategies for start up 
phases but become complementary strategies in expansion stages. If on the 
contrary growth strategies are successful and therefore the available resources are 
sufficient, a firm can apply not only complementary but also competing 
strategies.  
An important finding of this paper is that learning processes lower mortality 
risk. Learning processes allow young firms to shift resources away from risk 
reduction to sustain growth strategies. As a consequence learning processes can 
anticipate the break even point from the expansion to a “late” early stage of a 
young firm (See Figure 2). If learning processes do not take place a young firm 
cannot develop product or service innovations which constitute fundamental 
growth strategies. Learning processes can disclose possible synergies between the 
applied—risk reduction and growth—strategies. These synergies base on shared 
resources and help to minimize compatibility threatening factors. For instance 
learning processes help minimize the know-how required to develop and 
implement both risk reduction and growth strategies. As a consequence their 
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development and implementation time is reduced too. From this point of view 
we can say that managing young firms is not only a matter of theory but also a 
question of experimentation, learning and therefore practice.  
 
Financial and
life-cycle
stage
EARLY STAGE EXPANSION STAGE LATE STAGE
Business 
Strategy
Profit
Loss
0
Time
RRS overfunding/accelerated funding schedules
RRS licensing instead of manufacturing
RRS leasing instead of buying
RRS moderate growth plan
RRS marketing agreements with other firms
RRS insurance, advertising and promotion
RRS/GS education and training
GS Business and Organizational control
GS Internal Investment
GS Acquisition
GS Market development
GS Product and Service Innovation
GS Joint Ventures
RRS experienced employees from outside
With 
Learning processes
 
Figure 2. Strategies and Learning Processes in Young Firms 
 
However, the results of this paper are not enough to develop a general 
theoretical model for strategy compatibility analysis. Some open questions 
remain for future research and can only be answered empirically. First of all it 
should be tested, whether start ups make any compatibility considerations when 
choosing their strategies. Secondly, the impact of such considerations on success 
has to be elaborated. Third, it should be tested for example whether specific 
strategies and risks exist in different industries.  
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